Nuclear shopping
Rabia Akhtar
The Post
Nov. 4, 2008
Now that India has received a nod from the US House of Representatives, it is all set to conclude global nuclear deals, one more already in the bag with France. Both Russia and France are considering hefty discounts in the sale of nuclear reactors and technology in bilateral deals with India to win Indian markets in a competition against US influence. A lot has been said over a period of six months as to what this deal would accomplish for India and how detrimental it is in its entirety for South Asian strategic stability. However, what remains to be analysed are the various spin-offs that India will enjoy from this point onwards. There exists a huge market for low-cost nuclear reactors in Asia, which the Indians will champion now thanks to the unprecedented waivers from the IAEA, NSG and the approval by the US Senate and House of Reps. The post NSG India is much more confident than before and will accrue financial benefits from dealing with those countries that are interested in low-cost Indian nuclear technology. According to some published sources, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has its eyes set for exporting low cost nuclear reactor designs to various countries. The cost is as low as “Rs 984 ($22.33) per installed KW” and India plans to “export the designs to countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam for just Rs 1,200 ($27.24) per KW, which is substantially less than the international average of $1,500 per KW”. There is simply no stopping India in championing the cause of proliferation now that all bars are removed. Earlier this year, India also represented its interest in exporting missile systems to countries that were eyeing Indian missile technology, more specifically Indian Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles and surface to air Akash system. The combo of low cost nuclear reactors and missile technology will make India the top most nuclear exporter in Asia as it has already initiated the cycle at near zero cost—staying outside the NPT and the NSG.Since the Indo-US nuclear deal will provide India with foreign fuel supplies, relieving its own uranium reserves for weapons build up (as suggested by several popular arguments), therefore, one clear shift should be expected in India’s nuclear deterrence posture from ‘minimum’ to ‘sufficient’. Various reports published by the International Panel for Fissile Material (IPFM) estimate that India already possesses a reserve of 500kg of Plutonium which is sufficient for around 100 fission bombs. When added to the existing estimates of 60-70 bombs in the Indian inventory, this amount is sufficient to maintain and sustain a ‘minimum’ deterrence posture. Given this size of inventory coupled with efficient delivery systems, it may be enough for any country to remain within the comfort zone where minimum deterrence will still hold. China and UK are probably the most credible examples of minimum deterrence postures with an inventory of around 200 or more bombs. But Indian nuclear ambitions are set way beyond minimum. In its bid to develop stockpiles of fissile material to make more bombs and with its progressing Agni ICBM ranges up to 5000 km, India appears to be aiming for ‘sufficient’ deterrence, beyond Pakistan and China. This change in deterrence posture will have significant consequences for the delicate crisis and deterrence stability models currently prevailing in South Asia, which have managed to divert nuclear war between India and Pakistan thus far. If India was to open up two Andhra Pradesh uranium mines, with a reported production capacity of 100-200 tons, it would have sufficient uranium for energy production for more than a decade. But it wants more. Since the Indian ambition is to achieve the MAD capability, therefore, no amount of calculation would prevail upon this irrationality. Since the Indo-US nuclear deal is all about ‘economics’, therefore, the ‘hegemonic stability’ theory needs to be revisited. Given that hegemony demands power the world might witness a period of bipolarity at least ‘on the economic front’, from this moment onwards. This bipolarity suggests that two hegemon-like powers — the US (global) and India (regional) can co-exist. Withstanding the hierarchical nature of this relationship, they do possess the ability to destabilize each other at the same time. The system will sustain as long as the hegemons have mutual interest. Since the system can only be maintained through ‘coercion’—as successfully demonstrated by the US in accomplishing this nuclear deal—therefore, India should refrain from challenging the global hegemon and the system—by refraining to build itself stronger than the global hegemon. Or else, the system will collapse. Therefore, given the neo-realist argument, the US must not continue to build India without any checks and balances and stop it from challenging US unilateralism and hegemony at large so as to preserve the very system that accentuates its existence. For now, the Indo-US nuclear deal allows India to enter into nuclear trade and commerce without becoming a party to the NPT or the CTBT. But as India prospers through this deal and becomes an economic giant in Asia through increasing its nuclear exports to those that are interested in low cost nuclear technology, India stands out to be the only long term beneficiary of this deal in the region and beyond.
Now that India has received a nod from the US House of Representatives, it is all set to conclude global nuclear deals, one more already in the bag with France. Both Russia and France are considering hefty discounts in the sale of nuclear reactors and technology in bilateral deals with India to win Indian markets in a competition against US influence. A lot has been said over a period of six months as to what this deal would accomplish for India and how detrimental it is in its entirety for South Asian strategic stability. However, what remains to be analysed are the various spin-offs that India will enjoy from this point onwards. There exists a huge market for low-cost nuclear reactors in Asia, which the Indians will champion now thanks to the unprecedented waivers from the IAEA, NSG and the approval by the US Senate and House of Reps. The post NSG India is much more confident than before and will accrue financial benefits from dealing with those countries that are interested in low-cost Indian nuclear technology. According to some published sources, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has its eyes set for exporting low cost nuclear reactor designs to various countries. The cost is as low as “Rs 984 ($22.33) per installed KW” and India plans to “export the designs to countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam for just Rs 1,200 ($27.24) per KW, which is substantially less than the international average of $1,500 per KW”. There is simply no stopping India in championing the cause of proliferation now that all bars are removed. Earlier this year, India also represented its interest in exporting missile systems to countries that were eyeing Indian missile technology, more specifically Indian Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles and surface to air Akash system. The combo of low cost nuclear reactors and missile technology will make India the top most nuclear exporter in Asia as it has already initiated the cycle at near zero cost—staying outside the NPT and the NSG.Since the Indo-US nuclear deal will provide India with foreign fuel supplies, relieving its own uranium reserves for weapons build up (as suggested by several popular arguments), therefore, one clear shift should be expected in India’s nuclear deterrence posture from ‘minimum’ to ‘sufficient’. Various reports published by the International Panel for Fissile Material (IPFM) estimate that India already possesses a reserve of 500kg of Plutonium which is sufficient for around 100 fission bombs. When added to the existing estimates of 60-70 bombs in the Indian inventory, this amount is sufficient to maintain and sustain a ‘minimum’ deterrence posture. Given this size of inventory coupled with efficient delivery systems, it may be enough for any country to remain within the comfort zone where minimum deterrence will still hold. China and UK are probably the most credible examples of minimum deterrence postures with an inventory of around 200 or more bombs. But Indian nuclear ambitions are set way beyond minimum. In its bid to develop stockpiles of fissile material to make more bombs and with its progressing Agni ICBM ranges up to 5000 km, India appears to be aiming for ‘sufficient’ deterrence, beyond Pakistan and China. This change in deterrence posture will have significant consequences for the delicate crisis and deterrence stability models currently prevailing in South Asia, which have managed to divert nuclear war between India and Pakistan thus far. If India was to open up two Andhra Pradesh uranium mines, with a reported production capacity of 100-200 tons, it would have sufficient uranium for energy production for more than a decade. But it wants more. Since the Indian ambition is to achieve the MAD capability, therefore, no amount of calculation would prevail upon this irrationality. Since the Indo-US nuclear deal is all about ‘economics’, therefore, the ‘hegemonic stability’ theory needs to be revisited. Given that hegemony demands power the world might witness a period of bipolarity at least ‘on the economic front’, from this moment onwards. This bipolarity suggests that two hegemon-like powers — the US (global) and India (regional) can co-exist. Withstanding the hierarchical nature of this relationship, they do possess the ability to destabilize each other at the same time. The system will sustain as long as the hegemons have mutual interest. Since the system can only be maintained through ‘coercion’—as successfully demonstrated by the US in accomplishing this nuclear deal—therefore, India should refrain from challenging the global hegemon and the system—by refraining to build itself stronger than the global hegemon. Or else, the system will collapse. Therefore, given the neo-realist argument, the US must not continue to build India without any checks and balances and stop it from challenging US unilateralism and hegemony at large so as to preserve the very system that accentuates its existence. For now, the Indo-US nuclear deal allows India to enter into nuclear trade and commerce without becoming a party to the NPT or the CTBT. But as India prospers through this deal and becomes an economic giant in Asia through increasing its nuclear exports to those that are interested in low cost nuclear technology, India stands out to be the only long term beneficiary of this deal in the region and beyond.
The writer is Chair Defense and Diplomatic Studies Department at Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi
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