analysis : Debating first use -Rasul Bakhsh Rais
While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use optionDuring a candid interview with Indian journalists assembled on the invitation of the Hindustan Times, President Asif Ali Zardari addressed many difficult issues in a warm and reconciliatory manner. His Indian interviewers may have found him easy and forward-looking with some bold ideas; ideas that many carrying the burden of history on both sides of the border may not readily accept.While talking about nuclear weapons, he sounded like a mystic from the heart of Sindh who is not comfortable with India and Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are bad, because, if used, they could kill millions and devastate the environment.But then India and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons. And there is a reason nuclear states devote so much material and scientific resources to produce them: deterrence — preventing other states from committing aggression.In examining deterrence, the issue of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons is extremely important, and in every case, it is a result of well thought out strategy based on the strategic balance and security environment of nuclear states. President Zardari’s comment on this difficult issue should be read in light of the general tenor of his conversation rather than as a reflection of change in Pakistan’s earlier position on the matter.But first, we should contextualise the first use option, and understand how and why it has been at the centre of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine. Assuming that constant increase in Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities and American interest in specific types of political and security policies in and around the region keep Pakistan’s strategic environment fluid, how will Pakistan’s deterrence posture towards India be affected?The first use option implies that Pakistan will not wait for India to strike first with nuclear weapons. Rather, it will keep its options open as to the stage of a conflict when it should use nuclear weapons. The issue has two levels: doctrinal and operational. It makes sense for a country with limited nuclear resources and limited capability to fight a conventional war against a larger adversary not to renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first.There is the benefit of ambiguity: such a posture would definitely interfere with the strategic gaming of the adversary. Pakistan’s first use option is primarily meant to offset India’s conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is a matter of conjecture under what conditions of war Pakistani strategists decide to pull the nuclear trigger, if at all. Pakistan’s best bet is that India would be deterred from major conventional war by the declaratory policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons. Since the entire edifice of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence rests on this option, its nuclear policy credibility would be suspect should it ever commit itself to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack by India.We are familiar with the strategic debate in the United States of the first use option that accompanied the massive retaliation doctrine against the conventional threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The US compensated for its relatively weak conventional forces by declaring that it would respond to conventional provocation with nuclear weapons at a time and place of its choosing. The massive retaliation doctrine was credible as long as the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons. Once it did, the doctrine lost credibility because even without a formal acknowledgement, nuclear parity began to impact American strategic thinking. Since Moscow had acquired second strike capability, it had the means to cause unacceptable damage to American cities.European allies of the US became concerned about the credibility of extended deterrence. Nuclear parity then caused a shift to flexible response, meaning that the US might not use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression, but it retained the first use option.While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era, i.e. ambiguity, uncertainty, risk propensity and doctrinal flexibility deter a nuclear adversary. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use option.How credible is the threat? At what stage of a conflict would Pakistan use nuclear weapons? Would it be at the beginning of a war when its conventional assets are secure and it has not lost major chunks of its territory; or close to the end when its very survival is threatened by serious setbacks in the conventional battlefield?These are not easy questions for any strategist in Pakistan because of two reasons: the dynamic nature of the balance of power, which is rapidly shifting in favour of India; and the multiple economic and political troubles Pakistan faces today.The question of ‘when’ Pakistan would use nuclear weapons is the most troubling one. Using nuclear weapons at a time when it has lost a conventional war would prove suicidal. India could retaliate, or even choose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. By going for the second option, India would gain tremendous international support and use that sympathy to pursue its objectives against Pakistan with greater vigour and determination.Using nuclear weapons at the start of a war could invite retaliation and combined with that an intensive conventional attack. By using nuclear weapons first, Pakistan would hardly gain any strategic ground, since India could strike back and cause equal or greater damage. Rising sentiments in favour of revenge in the targeted state, international support for the victim of the nuclear attack and the invoking of collective security under the UN for action against Pakistan would present a situation with unacceptable security and political costs.Pakistan would have to be more careful in calculating the costs of a first strike, and opt for it only under the most desperate conditions. But what would these conditions be? The threat to Pakistani territorial integrity posed by a massive Indian conventional attack may present the most obvious condition that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. That will have horrendous consequences as well.What we need to do in South Asia is to even restrain from engaging in conventional conflict. Rather, possibilities of peace and reconciliation should be explored, and with some commitment and struggle, we may discover each other’s humanity and respect our right to exist with honour and dignity.Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use optionDuring a candid interview with Indian journalists assembled on the invitation of the Hindustan Times, President Asif Ali Zardari addressed many difficult issues in a warm and reconciliatory manner. His Indian interviewers may have found him easy and forward-looking with some bold ideas; ideas that many carrying the burden of history on both sides of the border may not readily accept.While talking about nuclear weapons, he sounded like a mystic from the heart of Sindh who is not comfortable with India and Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are bad, because, if used, they could kill millions and devastate the environment.But then India and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons. And there is a reason nuclear states devote so much material and scientific resources to produce them: deterrence — preventing other states from committing aggression.In examining deterrence, the issue of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons is extremely important, and in every case, it is a result of well thought out strategy based on the strategic balance and security environment of nuclear states. President Zardari’s comment on this difficult issue should be read in light of the general tenor of his conversation rather than as a reflection of change in Pakistan’s earlier position on the matter.But first, we should contextualise the first use option, and understand how and why it has been at the centre of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine. Assuming that constant increase in Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities and American interest in specific types of political and security policies in and around the region keep Pakistan’s strategic environment fluid, how will Pakistan’s deterrence posture towards India be affected?The first use option implies that Pakistan will not wait for India to strike first with nuclear weapons. Rather, it will keep its options open as to the stage of a conflict when it should use nuclear weapons. The issue has two levels: doctrinal and operational. It makes sense for a country with limited nuclear resources and limited capability to fight a conventional war against a larger adversary not to renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first.There is the benefit of ambiguity: such a posture would definitely interfere with the strategic gaming of the adversary. Pakistan’s first use option is primarily meant to offset India’s conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is a matter of conjecture under what conditions of war Pakistani strategists decide to pull the nuclear trigger, if at all. Pakistan’s best bet is that India would be deterred from major conventional war by the declaratory policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons. Since the entire edifice of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence rests on this option, its nuclear policy credibility would be suspect should it ever commit itself to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack by India.We are familiar with the strategic debate in the United States of the first use option that accompanied the massive retaliation doctrine against the conventional threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The US compensated for its relatively weak conventional forces by declaring that it would respond to conventional provocation with nuclear weapons at a time and place of its choosing. The massive retaliation doctrine was credible as long as the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons. Once it did, the doctrine lost credibility because even without a formal acknowledgement, nuclear parity began to impact American strategic thinking. Since Moscow had acquired second strike capability, it had the means to cause unacceptable damage to American cities.European allies of the US became concerned about the credibility of extended deterrence. Nuclear parity then caused a shift to flexible response, meaning that the US might not use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression, but it retained the first use option.While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era, i.e. ambiguity, uncertainty, risk propensity and doctrinal flexibility deter a nuclear adversary. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use option.How credible is the threat? At what stage of a conflict would Pakistan use nuclear weapons? Would it be at the beginning of a war when its conventional assets are secure and it has not lost major chunks of its territory; or close to the end when its very survival is threatened by serious setbacks in the conventional battlefield?These are not easy questions for any strategist in Pakistan because of two reasons: the dynamic nature of the balance of power, which is rapidly shifting in favour of India; and the multiple economic and political troubles Pakistan faces today.The question of ‘when’ Pakistan would use nuclear weapons is the most troubling one. Using nuclear weapons at a time when it has lost a conventional war would prove suicidal. India could retaliate, or even choose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. By going for the second option, India would gain tremendous international support and use that sympathy to pursue its objectives against Pakistan with greater vigour and determination.Using nuclear weapons at the start of a war could invite retaliation and combined with that an intensive conventional attack. By using nuclear weapons first, Pakistan would hardly gain any strategic ground, since India could strike back and cause equal or greater damage. Rising sentiments in favour of revenge in the targeted state, international support for the victim of the nuclear attack and the invoking of collective security under the UN for action against Pakistan would present a situation with unacceptable security and political costs.Pakistan would have to be more careful in calculating the costs of a first strike, and opt for it only under the most desperate conditions. But what would these conditions be? The threat to Pakistani territorial integrity posed by a massive Indian conventional attack may present the most obvious condition that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. That will have horrendous consequences as well.What we need to do in South Asia is to even restrain from engaging in conventional conflict. Rather, possibilities of peace and reconciliation should be explored, and with some commitment and struggle, we may discover each other’s humanity and respect our right to exist with honour and dignity.Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
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