analysis: Imperatives of counter-terrorism —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Any surgical airstrike, limited war, or Cold Start will drag the region into full war. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford a full-fledged conventional war or even the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball military brinkmanship they engaged in 2001-02The post-Mumbai strategies of India and Pakistan reflect their immediate political concerns rather than long-term, coherent and shared perspectives on counter-terrorism. India is trying to extract maximum diplomatic dividend against Pakistan by activating multilateral channels and applying direct pressure. Pakistan is engaged in damage control in an extremely difficult diplomatic situation created by the Mumbai attacks.Pakistan has banned the Jama’at-ud Dawa, sealed its offices and arrested several of its leaders and activists. One wonders why the government had to wait for a UN Security Council resolution and prodding by the United States to act. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies must have enough information on the activities of hard-line and militant groups, as well as on their linkages with the Taliban. It is also well known that a good number of non-Pakhtun Pakistanis are involved in the Pakistani Taliban movement. Similarly, Pakistani agencies would know if JuD was a front for banned terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayba.The present Pakistani government and military top brass view the Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups as a major threat to Pakistan’s internal political and societal stability. This is a shift from the past when General Pervez Musharraf’s regime pursued a dual policy of taking some action against these groups but leaving them enough space to continue with their activities in a low-key manner.The present government asked the military to launch the ongoing operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in some tribal agencies, and the operations have made significant gains in Bajaur and Khyber. Militants were also pushed back in Swat, though they are far from being fully contained. Given that the security forces had their hands full in the tribal areas, the government did not want to open a new front against militants in mainland Pakistan.However, consensus at the international level on the involvement of a Pakistan-based group in the Mumbai attacks left Pakistan with no credible option but to take immediate action against militant groups in the mainland. These groups are transnational and use all possible means, including violence, to pursue their agenda with total disregard to the imperatives of Pakistan as a nation-state in the comity of nations. They want Pakistan to be subservient to their agenda, and do not respect Pakistan’s sovereign status and territorial boundaries.Should these movements be allowed to impose precarious foreign policy situations on Pakistan? If Pakistan is to function as a coherent and effective state, it cannot allow non-state actors to engage in violent and disruptive activities inside or outside its boundaries.Pakistan’s policymakers need to do some hard and realistic thinking on the current situation and terrorism-related issues. Indian policymakers need to do the same. They need not descend into traditional India-Pakistan polemics to deflect criticism of internal security lapses and the probability of terrorism having domestic roots.The Indian government has not blamed the Pakistani government of direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks, but maintains that a Pakistan-based group planned and executed them. This places indirect responsibility on the Pakistani government, given that it is seen to have allowed such a group to use Pakistani territory for a terrorist attack abroad.However, semi- and non-official Indian circles rarely maintain this distinction and project Pakistan as an irresponsible terrorist state. They find encouragement to adopt this position in India’s official effort to extract the highest possible diplomatic dividends against Pakistan at the international level. As citizens of a number of states were killed in the attacks, India has found it easy to mobilise support. It is interesting to note that Indian expats in the US are fully involved in the campaign to get Pakistan designated as a terrorist state and to get UN approval for Indian airstrikes in Pakistan.A review of this ongoing Indian diplomatic campaign gives a strong impression that India is more interested in undermining and isolating Pakistan at the international level to further India’s wider regional agenda rather than evolving a shared regional counter-terrorism strategy. The present strategy may meet India’s immediate domestic needs, but it does not serve the long-term need of countering terrorism holistically and effectively. This long-term objective cannot be achieved without working with Pakistan.A large number of people in India’s official and non-official circles want to emulate the United States: the argument is that if the US can launch airstrikes in Afghanistan and invade Iraq in response to attacks on its soil, India can do the same to counter terrorism originating in Pakistan.As early as April 2003, while commenting on the US invasion of Iraq, Yashwant Sinha, the then Indian external affairs minister, described Pakistan as a ‘fit case’ for Iraq-like military action because Pakistan possessed weapons of mass destruction, sheltered terrorists and lacked democracy — a charge-sheet similar to the one issued against Iraq by the US. A couple of days later, he made a similar statement in the Rajya Sabha, India’s upper house of parliament, that Pakistan should be tackled with pre-emptive airstrikes.Similar ideas are now being advocated in India that it should launch surgical airstrikes against ‘terrorist training camps’ in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and mainland Pakistan. There is also talk of trying out what Indian strategic experts describe as ‘Cold Start’ to occupy some Pakistani territory at more than one point through a coordinated, swift and massive ground and air operation. This will, it is argued, enable India to deal with Pakistan from a position of strength.Any surgical airstrike, limited war, or Cold Start will drag the region into full war. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford a full-fledged conventional war or even the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball military brinkmanship they engaged in 2001-02 as both face enormous economic challenges. Further, as both possess nuclear weapons, a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear exchange, with devastating consequences for both countries. Therefore, war is not an option.The major reason, then, why some people in India are talking of the military option against Pakistan is the tendency to overestimate India’s capacity to wage a successful war and underestimate Pakistan’s capacity to defend itself.Pakistan’s effort to control Islamic militancy will be strengthened if India provides it with some credible evidence of the involvement of Pakistani groups in terrorist acts in India. This evidence can be combined with the evidence available in Pakistan to endure judicial scrutiny of action against militant elements.Terrorism is a threat to both India and Pakistan. More people have died in Pakistan during 2007-08 by terrorists than in India by so-called Islamic Pakistan-based terrorists. Both countries need to cooperate to deal with the terrorist threat, else they will both not succeed.Further, India should also investigate its domestic sources of terrorism. There are several alienated groups in India, including a significant section of its huge Muslim population that appears to have lost confidence in the Indian political system. The sooner India recognises this reality and deals with it, the better.The imperatives of counter-terrorism, therefore, are cooperation between India and Pakistan; consistency in Pakistan’s efforts to contain militancy within its boundaries; and Indian efforts to cope with domestic sources of terrorism.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Is Pakistan ready for a no-first use?

Is Pakistan ready for a no-first use?

Rabia Akhtar
The POST
Dec 05, 2008

The comments on Pakistan's nuclear no first use made by President Asif Ali Zardari, Chairman National Command Authority (NCA), in his address at the Leadership Summit by the Hindustan Times, New Delhi warrant serious contemplation. Not because such vague statements are subject to various interpretations adding to the ambiguity that already surrounds Pakistan's nuclear doctrine but because it signals a departure (if it is in fact) from Pakistan's current nuclear use doctrine. Regardless of whether President Zardari's statement was intentional or unintentional, it has gained considerable attention. What needs to be addressed is whether Pakistan is ready for a declared No First Use (NFU) policy as opposed to the current ambiguity which can be termed as a No No First Use (NNFU) posture?Pakistan's nuclear doctrine rests on the pillar of unpredictability whereby Pakistan has achieved strategic parity vis-à-vis India beyond the traditional theatre of war. Pakistan's nuclear red lines are ambiguous at best leaving the adversary in disarray as to when does nuclear first strike stand warranted and that has precisely been the advantage over the decade of overt nuclearisation. The very uncertainty of a Pakistani response limits the Indian room for manoeuvre thus imposing strict limitations on New Delhi's willingness to take risks. Drawn in an asymmetric relationship with India, in the absence of negative security assurances by the international community, it seemed justified to have resorted to an ambiguous no first use posture as a measure of credible deterrence. Pakistan's ambiguity about a NFU comes from that fact that superior Indian conventional forces make the nuclear option imperative to save Pakistan in an event where India launches a debilitating conventional military attack on Pakistan. If India does not cross the un-stated but understood nuclear thresholds and continues engaging Pakistan in a peace process, then what President Zardari has stated stands its ground that we hope 'we never get to that position' of using nuclear weapons at all. As for the current strategic environment prevalent in and around Pakistan, the ambiguity about NFU is integral to Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. It stands as a viable policy and it is rational to keep pursuing it for times to come. Various factors contribute to the viability of this doctrine and its continuity as a solution in the shape of offence/defence balance to our security dilemma. First, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has raised enough controversies worldwide and according to various studies and estimates, the deal provides India the leverage to use its domestic uranium reserves for nuclear weapons build-up. Second, the statements that have originated post Indo-US nuclear agreement with respect to India's sovereign right to nuclear testing, hold considerable policy and doctrinal implications for Pakistan especially because India proposes to graduate its deterrence from a minimum position once it acquires a significant number of nuclear weapons that are beyond the current 'minimum' stockpile. It could very well be that since Pakistan's minimum deterrence posture is relative to that of India, an increase in India's nuclear weapon stockpile coupled with its prospects of acquiring a ballistic missile defence would demand an increase in Pakistan's nuclear stockpile to manage and sustain deterrence as well as strategic parity. Pakistan since 9/11 is in a precarious position surrounded with both short and long term threats. Various threats need to be analysed which include US nuclear submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with an operational 'first use' doctrine; NATO's future role in the IOR with an operational 'first-use' doctrine coupled with US/NATO joint force presence on Pakistan's western borders. Moreover, the prospects of being sandwiched between a nuclear India and a nuclear Iran suggest an 'offensive defence' doctrine that rests on a NNFU policy. Given the rapidly changing international environment, it will only be rational that Pakistan should not revise its current ambiguity about its NFU policy at any cost. Under the prevailing circumstances, it could very well be that Pakistan might need to enter into multilateral deterrent relationships besides the existing bilateral one with India in times ahead.

The writer is Chair Department Defence and Diplomatic Studies at Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi

Mumbai Terror: Evidence being deliberately ignored!

Strange that none of the media (TV or Print) have picked this up at all. Or have they been deliberately ignoring it?

Have a look at the above picture of one of the terrorists. [Another angle]

Notice the orange thread / band on his right hand.

Tying a red thread or cord around the wrist is a Hindu practice and it is unlikely a Muslim, especially one politicized enough to carry out an attack such as this, would observe it. I think this provides more evidence that this was a false flag operation or at least an attack by a non-Muslim group. For more information about the significance of the red thread see wikipedia and this blog post. [Thanks to Uruk]

Additionally, the terrorists inside the Nariman House Building were reported to have stocked up on supplies on Wednesday evening, buying not just food items but liquor, among other things, from a local store [Source]. Again, it is highly unlikely that a Muslim, let alone a 'Mujahid', and especially one politicized enough to carry out such an attack, would consume liquor in normal life, let alone hours before his inevitable 'martyrdom'.

Don't let them ignore it. Circulate this to as many people as you can as we strongly believe it wouldn't have been ignored if the terrorists were carrying a copy of the Qur'an, or a taveez.

KalavaFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Kalava (Sanskrit: कलावा) is the sacred Hindu thread. It is worn while performing Hindu rituals like Yajna or Puja. It is tied by a priest on the wrists of all the people attending the prayer ceremony. Kalava is tied on right hand of males and unmarried females, and on left hand of married females. Sometimes it has small yellow parts in between the mostly red string. It sometimes has knots which are tied up while reciting Sanskrit mantras to invoke God and is worn to ward off evil from the person

Are Indian N-Assets Safe?

Are Indian N-Assets Safe?

Two of the crown jewels of the Indian nuclear program and a number of other sites that possibly house Indian nuclear material are a stone throw’s away from Mumbai, where ten young me infiltrated the city, patrolled its streets, killed India’s top antiterrorism official, and faced off hundreds of India’s elite soldiers for 60 hours. The question is: How safe are India’s n-assets?

By Akhtar JamalMonday, 1 December 2008.
WWW.AHMEDQURAISHI.COM

ISLAMABAD – If one is to believe the Indian claim that ten young militants engaged more than 3000 of India’s top commandoes, intelligence and police officials for 60 hours and killed 200 people in Mumbai city, then we must seriously be worried about the safety of India’s nuclear arsenal, radioactive material, and nuclear power plants. Two prominent experts on Pakistan and India today expressed their fear that if ten militants in their early twenties can hold a city of 15 million people, which houses a number of sensitive nuclear and radio-active plants, then how safe are India’s nukes. Speaking to TVOneNews program, ‘Siyasat aur Pakistan’, strategic experts Zaid Hamid and Ahmed Quraishi also warned that Hindu hawks may try to grab India’s nukes. According to reports, two of India’s most important nuclear installations are located near Mumbai. Tarapur’s two 160 MW nuclear plants are already functioning near Trombay while two more 500 MW PHWRs power plants are under construction near Mumbay itself. These two plants are designed to work as fuel fabrication facilities and are not safeguarded under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor effectively protected.

India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and a number of other nuclear plants and uranium conversion facilities (UF6) are also not part of IAEA safeguards. A fuel fabrication facility is also not far from the city and is considered unsafe by most accounts. What surprised India experts is the fact that militants reportedly entered the city on boats crossing the eyes of the Indian navy and marines and carried not only heavy arms but also tens of kilograms of military- standard RDX explosives. According to an article published Monday in the Washington Post, “In just minutes, Mumbai was under seige” by young gunmen. After landing, the gunmen fanned out across the city, most likely in groups of two or three. Within half an hour, they had hit about five sites: the city's main rail station, a Jewish center at the Nariman House, the Leopold Cafe, and the Oberoi and Taj hotels.

Washington Post quoted a photographer for the Mumbai Mirror newspaper, Sebastian D'Souza, as saying that, "There were armed policemen hiding all around the station, but none of them did anything,” D'Souza told reporters afterward. "At one point, I ran up to them and told them to use their weapons. I said, 'Shoot them! They're sitting ducks,' but they just didn't shoot back." Mr. Jamal can be reached at PakPressATYahoo.com

An Indian in Every Pakistani?

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Shireen M Mazari

The writer is a defence analyst

Lack of formal education and sheer ignorance does not by definition imply an innate sense of stupidity. On the other hand, formal education in itself is no guarantee of an intelligent and rational human being – just look at the American leaders over the years! As for mental stability, that has little to do with formal education or education of any sort whatsoever. What is true is that leaders who are intelligent and not overwhelmed by a sense of their own greatness and the autocratic "I", realise their limitations and seek guidance. That is why while many commentators attribute President Zardari's bizarre pronouncements very charitably to a lack of information or knowledge, the reality is that there is an ominous design in it all. After all, he is surrounded by not only his sycophants but also the whole state machinery with its bureaucrats, intelligence networks and so on. So why do statements that damage the nation in the long run continue to pour forth from the present leadership? Does no one dare to advise the president, or does he see himself as all-knowing even as he is all-powerful? Or is the reality that his advice is actually linked to a US agenda targeting Pakistan? Whatever the case, let us see if a pattern can be traced in all his shenanigans, at least in the realm of foreign and security policies where he has managed to reduce us to a collective absurdity and a vile joke. First, there is suddenly a furore over a truncated map of Pakistan that is only now being examined by a wider Pakistani audience. But the reality is that the map first appeared in the US Armed Forces Journal in July 2006, written by a retired US intelligence officer, Ralph Peters and entitled, "Blood Borders". Some of us had pointed out at that time that this was now part of the US agenda for the so-called "Greater or Broader Middle East Project", but at that time few paid notice. This has been part of the problem here in Pakistan – we never see far enough ahead and now the US design is in the midst of being operationalised and we have a leadership that has come with a seeming commitment to aid this nefarious US design of destabilising Pakistan through increasing military incursions through the tribal belt and moving beyond – and we have already had that with the US attacks on Bannu – and multiple efforts to eventually roll back our nuclear capability. Now let us look at our own leadership's antics. No one from the presidency has forcefully refuted US media claims that in September this year President Zardari gave the US a nod to continue predator attacks against Pakistan. Meanwhile, we had the "absurdity" of the president claiming that the US had not violated Pakistan's sovereignty since only aerial attacks were being conducted! Then we had the farce of the parliamentary consensus resolution on terrorism which demanded the government take action against the predator attacks. The government has so far not moved an iota on any of the substantive demands of this resolution. Instead, to make us look even more ridiculous than we already were looking, our leadership hopes that Obama will stop the attacks. Have they looked up Obama's statements and his potential secretary of state's viewpoints? From any rational perspective, given the manner in which the US is behaving it is now a hostile if not an enemy state for us, but we have that strange minister of defence continuing to state that if the US stays here for three decades it will be good for Pakistan! Does he think we will survive in any viable form after three decades of bombings by the US and the retaliatory lethal and non-discriminatory suicide attacks against this nation? But then so many of the present leadership, in keeping with past tradition, have homes and rich setups abroad. So what do they care? Parallel to our continuous conceding of ground to the US, we are also now complying with the US agenda of establishing India as the regional hegemon. If we see no threat from India and we want a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, eventually we may have a declaration by this president that he hates nukes and we will renounce ours unilaterally – that is unless the US has created enough instability to seek a UN Security Council intervention regarding control of our nuclear assets! Yes, it may seen far-fetched to some, but look how so many unthinkable developments have hit us in a short space of time – beginning right from the present occupant of the presidency itself.So when President Zardari offers a "no-first use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons to India, there is a design behind it – a US design. The problem is we have short memories and have forgotten that India has actually reneged on its limited NFU declaration it had made earlier in its overt nuclear life! When India declared its strategic doctrine and stated its intent of using nuclear strikes against any WMD threat from anywhere, it effectively adopted a "first use" doctrine similar to that of the US.As for Pakistan, given our limited conventional capability, we cannot afford to remove the ambivalence we are maintaining regarding NFU. In this we are no different from the much mightier NATO. Is it not time for our security managers and strategists to inform the president that one does not bandy about NFU offers whimsically or because one hates the idea of nuclear weapons. No one loves nukes and no one loves war – apart from Mr Bush and the neocons – but there are realities that need to be considered; and one does not bandy about strategic doctrines simply as appeasement tools. Our declared posture of nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort and a deliberate ambivalence on NFU must not be compromised. As for the idea of a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), it is the Indians who have always rejected the idea, just as they rejected the zero missile idea and now with India acquiring Missile Defence from the US, we cannot continue to support notions that we floated before May 1998. Of course, if the Indians had conceded to a NWFZ and renounced their grandiose nuclear weapon programmes, their fears regarding China (or so their pretext goes) could easily have been handled in a protocol attached to the treaty similar to the protocols attached to and an integral part of the Latin American NWFZ treaty – the Tlatelolco Treaty. But all that was in the past – as was the no-war pact which Pakistan kept pushing for with India. Now all that is truly feasible in the nuclear domain with India is joint nuclear power generation and an ongoing strategic dialogue to maintain the nuclear balance. But then that is not part of the nuclear agenda of the US. The US continues to seek a rollback of Pakistan's nuclear programme as part of its long-term negative agenda towards Pakistan.As for the new, more so-called informed US media on Pakistan, it is high time they realised that our suspicions and hostility towards the US have nothing to do with illiteracy or Talibanisation – Jane Perlez's analysis notwithstanding. Instead, it has everything to do with US policies towards Pakistan. It is that simple. But our greater issue is with our leadership that seems to be hand in glove with the US. After all, we can certainly counter the predator or the impending grim "Reaper" attacks now on the cards. When will our missiles prove their worth? Or, if our military feels insecure with a direct military response, how about more simple actions easier to accomplish? Here are some suggestions: halt the transit logistic supplies; suspend high-level diplomatic relations; opt out of the trilateral commission; reduce the number of US personnel in Pakistan; take back all the bases. That should be enough to send a resolute message of Pakistani intent to the US and its NATO allies. Finally, Mr President, I have searched intensely within myself to discover a little Indian within my Baloch, Punjabi, Seraiki and Pathan heritage, but all I see is an intense Pakistani, born in the sovereign state of Pakistan. For me India is as foreign a country as any other. Sorry Mr President, but you are wrong on this count too.

Email: callstr@hotmail.com

Policy in Wonderland-Ejaz Haider

INSIGHT: Policy in Wonderland —Ejaz Haider

Mr Zardari has offered no-first-use (NFU) to India. This is new. But its newness notwithstanding, it shows he knows next to nothing about the issue and was either not briefed on it or decided, of his own bat, to charge down the pitchPresident Asif Ali Zardari’s address to the Hindustan Times Summit 2008 through video-conferencing from Islamabad reminds me of HL Mencken’s line that “Poetry has done enough when it charms, but prose must also convince”.Good intentions are the stuff of poetry, but realpolitik works and survives on the basis of capability and power projection and that is the stuff of prose. The prosaic line was delivered by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which quickly made clear that the remarks were not official and that change of Pakistani policy would have to be seen on the ground first. End of story.

Let me make the positive assumption about Mr Zardari, however — i.e., he really wants to break new ground. That’s good news. The bad news is that, like wars, the areas where some good can be done must be chosen carefully.Exhibit A: Let South Asia be a nuclear free zone (NFZ). Sure. Why just South Asia? The entire world should be an NFZ. Indeed, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty talks about disarmament as one of the three pillars of the treaty, the other two being non-proliferation and the right to fuel cycle.But Article VI has not happened and is unlikely to consummate anytime soon unless the new US President-elect can begin to stitch back the tattered non-proliferation regime, do so without discrimination and move from non-proliferation to disarmament. Whether such is possible after the India-US civil nuclear deal is not something on which I shall wager my meagre resources.India has never pegged its nuclear capability on Pakistan, citing global reasons. That may be bunkum given its deployment patterns and force configuration but who can deny it its Foucauldian discourse which has informed its policy since the NPT came up for discussion. Over time, it has used both the nuclear capability and other sinews of national power to add value to itself. Why would it do poetry when prose has worked fine for it?Plus, this is not breaking new ground at all.

Pakistan first talked about a South Asian NFZ during General Zia-ul Haq’s time. We were of course developing our nuclear capability, as was India! We offered it, they rejected it and it was business as usual.Incidentally, on this note of history, let me pre-empt Mr Zardari on something he might also offer India thinking it is new ground — a no war pact. That too we offered India; that too was rejected. So yes, Mr President, it won’t be new.Exhibit B: First use of nuclear weapons. Mr Zardari has offered no-first-use (NFU) to India. This is new. But its newness notwithstanding, it shows he knows next to nothing about the issue and was either not briefed on it properly or decided, of his own bat, to charge down the pitch. If the first, he was obviously not briefed by the Strategic Plans Division. If the second, he needs to learn to play himself in before attacking. Let’s consider.NFU is for the birds, Mr President. Even India, which began with a declaratory NFU policy has let it drop quietly. Our nuclear capability and first use had rather simple premises. We needed the weapons capability because we were/are conventionally inferior. That being the case, we needed to, and still do, project the capability and the will to use it — and do so first and early into a conflict.But this still does not solve the problem of NFU. So here goes.

NFU is insubstantial in military terms unless it can be verified. Since Indian and Pakistani capabilities remain opaque, it is impossible to verify that the forces on one or both sides are configured for an NFU policy.Simply declaring NFU intent is merely a political statement. While nuclear weapons have a political purpose, they are also military weapons. Indeed, it is the military side — projection of capability and the will to use it — that allows a nuclear-weapon state to draw political mileage out of them.But if verification that a force is configured for NFU is important for the policy declaration to have any military meaning, are there any parameters through which this can be achieved?Li Bin, a Chinese expert, has presented five important parameters through which a state can project its NFU intent and which can be verified by rival states: the size of the nuclear force; the composition of that force; the number of warheads on each missile; the accuracy of nuclear weapons (whether counter-value or counter-force targeting); and the strength of the conventional forces. (For a detailed discussion of these points see Ejaz Haider, “First use and nuclear risk-reduction”; Daily Times, June 22, 2004.)Let it be said, however, that I raise the above points and objections strictly within the ambit of nuclear strategy and to show that Mr Zardari talked about a non-issue. Both Pakistan and India now face other forms of threats that need to be countered and they require cooperative strategies. It would be more useful, while nuclear weapons hold the inter-state balance, to offer concrete and workable proposals in those areas. Exhibit C: Mr Zardari also expressed the desire to trade with India and said that he looked forward to an economic union. No one can contend against the idea of trade per se. That, therefore, is not the issue. There was a time Pakistan used non-economic arguments to shoot down trade with India. Now there is a rush, without looking into what can be traded and to what extent and end, to trade. It has become a shibboleth.

I cannot do better than to draw the president’s and the government’s attention to work done in the area by Moeed Yusuf and his colleagues. See Yusuf, “Peace trade-off?” Daily Times, November 20, 2006; Yusuf, “Using Trade as a Driver of Peace: Prospects in the Indo-Pak Context,” Criterion, Vol 2, No 3, July-September 2007; Khan, Shaheen and Yusuf, “Managing Conflict through Trade: The Case of Pakistan and India” in Regional Trade Integration and Conflict Resolution: Southern Perspectives, Shaheen Rafi Khan, ed. (London, Routledge, 2008); Khan, Yusuf, Bokhari, and Aziz, “Quantifying Informal Trade Between Pakistan and India” in The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan-India Trade, Naqvi and Schuler, eds. (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2007). This is an area that, more than good intentions, requires solid work. There are other economists who strongly favour trade. At the minimum there should be informed debate on the issue. And that brings me to the conclusion.The last time Pakistan tried its hand at a coherent national security policy was with the 1976 White Paper. Since then there has been no attempt to formulate a coherent NSP and/or set down some mechanism to review it annually, biennially or quinquennially etc. New opportunities and dangers have emerged; the world has changed in many ways. Yet, we trundle along like we are sleepwalking through all this.Mr Zardari will do the country much good if he could get down to the task of doing this review which could then become a basis for policies in various areas.As the situation stands, here’s an offering from Alice in Wonderland, the dialogue between Alice and the Cheshire Cat:“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where –” said Alice.“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

Nuclear South Asia

Daily Times 25 Nov. 2008

analysis : Debating first use -Rasul Bakhsh Rais (Daily Times, (Tuesday, November 25, 2008)

analysis : Debating first use -Rasul Bakhsh Rais
While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use optionDuring a candid interview with Indian journalists assembled on the invitation of the Hindustan Times, President Asif Ali Zardari addressed many difficult issues in a warm and reconciliatory manner. His Indian interviewers may have found him easy and forward-looking with some bold ideas; ideas that many carrying the burden of history on both sides of the border may not readily accept.While talking about nuclear weapons, he sounded like a mystic from the heart of Sindh who is not comfortable with India and Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are bad, because, if used, they could kill millions and devastate the environment.But then India and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons. And there is a reason nuclear states devote so much material and scientific resources to produce them: deterrence — preventing other states from committing aggression.In examining deterrence, the issue of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons is extremely important, and in every case, it is a result of well thought out strategy based on the strategic balance and security environment of nuclear states. President Zardari’s comment on this difficult issue should be read in light of the general tenor of his conversation rather than as a reflection of change in Pakistan’s earlier position on the matter.But first, we should contextualise the first use option, and understand how and why it has been at the centre of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine. Assuming that constant increase in Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities and American interest in specific types of political and security policies in and around the region keep Pakistan’s strategic environment fluid, how will Pakistan’s deterrence posture towards India be affected?The first use option implies that Pakistan will not wait for India to strike first with nuclear weapons. Rather, it will keep its options open as to the stage of a conflict when it should use nuclear weapons. The issue has two levels: doctrinal and operational. It makes sense for a country with limited nuclear resources and limited capability to fight a conventional war against a larger adversary not to renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first.There is the benefit of ambiguity: such a posture would definitely interfere with the strategic gaming of the adversary. Pakistan’s first use option is primarily meant to offset India’s conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is a matter of conjecture under what conditions of war Pakistani strategists decide to pull the nuclear trigger, if at all. Pakistan’s best bet is that India would be deterred from major conventional war by the declaratory policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons. Since the entire edifice of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence rests on this option, its nuclear policy credibility would be suspect should it ever commit itself to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack by India.We are familiar with the strategic debate in the United States of the first use option that accompanied the massive retaliation doctrine against the conventional threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The US compensated for its relatively weak conventional forces by declaring that it would respond to conventional provocation with nuclear weapons at a time and place of its choosing. The massive retaliation doctrine was credible as long as the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons. Once it did, the doctrine lost credibility because even without a formal acknowledgement, nuclear parity began to impact American strategic thinking. Since Moscow had acquired second strike capability, it had the means to cause unacceptable damage to American cities.European allies of the US became concerned about the credibility of extended deterrence. Nuclear parity then caused a shift to flexible response, meaning that the US might not use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression, but it retained the first use option.While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era, i.e. ambiguity, uncertainty, risk propensity and doctrinal flexibility deter a nuclear adversary. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use option.How credible is the threat? At what stage of a conflict would Pakistan use nuclear weapons? Would it be at the beginning of a war when its conventional assets are secure and it has not lost major chunks of its territory; or close to the end when its very survival is threatened by serious setbacks in the conventional battlefield?These are not easy questions for any strategist in Pakistan because of two reasons: the dynamic nature of the balance of power, which is rapidly shifting in favour of India; and the multiple economic and political troubles Pakistan faces today.The question of ‘when’ Pakistan would use nuclear weapons is the most troubling one. Using nuclear weapons at a time when it has lost a conventional war would prove suicidal. India could retaliate, or even choose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. By going for the second option, India would gain tremendous international support and use that sympathy to pursue its objectives against Pakistan with greater vigour and determination.Using nuclear weapons at the start of a war could invite retaliation and combined with that an intensive conventional attack. By using nuclear weapons first, Pakistan would hardly gain any strategic ground, since India could strike back and cause equal or greater damage. Rising sentiments in favour of revenge in the targeted state, international support for the victim of the nuclear attack and the invoking of collective security under the UN for action against Pakistan would present a situation with unacceptable security and political costs.Pakistan would have to be more careful in calculating the costs of a first strike, and opt for it only under the most desperate conditions. But what would these conditions be? The threat to Pakistani territorial integrity posed by a massive Indian conventional attack may present the most obvious condition that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. That will have horrendous consequences as well.What we need to do in South Asia is to even restrain from engaging in conventional conflict. Rather, possibilities of peace and reconciliation should be explored, and with some commitment and struggle, we may discover each other’s humanity and respect our right to exist with honour and dignity.Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk

FCNL Nuclear Calendar

Nuclear Calendar
November 24, 2008Receive updates by email
UncertainNational Academy of Sciences issues its second phase report on assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile (Public Law 109-364, Sec. 3116).Nov. 24Due date for comments on the National Nuclear Security Administration's final SPEIS (Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) for Complex Transformation, the proposed plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex. Comments can be submitted by email.Nov. 27Thanksgiving (holiday)Nov. 27-28International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors meeting. Vienna, AustriaNov. or Dec.State Department's International Security Advisory Board issues a report on China's Strategic Modernization. A draft of the report is on the Washington Times website.Nov. or Dec.National Academy of Sciences issues the first phase report on assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile (Public Law 109-364, Sec. 3116).Dec. 1Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry, issues an interim report to Congress (Public Law 110-181, Sec. 1062 and Public Law 110-417, Sec. 1060).Dec. 1-5Biological Weapons Convention annual meeting. GenevaWeek of Dec. 1 or 8Six-party talks resume on North Korea's nuclear program (possible). BeijingDec. 29:00-11:00 a.m., Peter Scoblic, The New Republic, "Progressives Change the Debate around Nuclear Disarmament: Practical Applications of New Psychological Research." Sponsored by the Proteus Fund. At the Third Way, 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 501, Washington. RSVP to Nandini Merz by email.Dec. 2Georgia run-off election between Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R) and Jim Martin (D)Dec. 2-3NATO foreign ministers meeting. Budapest, HungaryDec. 2-5ExchangeMonitor Publications, "Nuclear Deterrence Summit," with keynote speakers Rep. Ellen Tauscher (CA), and Thomas D'Agostino, National Nuclear Security Administration. L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 480 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington. Registration online.Dec. 2-5Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons annual meeting. The Hague, NetherlandsDec. 3Noon-1:00 p.m., Sally McNamara, Heritage Foundation; Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council; and Mario Loyola, Senate Republican Policy Committee, "Missile Defense in Europe: The Way Forward." RSVP online. Webcast on the Heritage Foundation website.Dec. 3Noon-1:30 p.m., Richard Hatchett, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, "Public Health Preparedness and the Unthinkable: Reflections on Nuclear Terrorism and Pandemic Influenza." Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Encina Hall, Hills Conference Room, 616 Serra St., Second Floor, Stanford, CADec. 312:30 p.m., Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by former Sen. Bob Graham, issues its report (Public Law 110-53, Sec. 1851 et seq.). S-207 Capitol Building, WashingtonDec. 312:30-2:00 p.m., Takeo Akiba, Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry; Tamim Khallaf, Egyptian Foreign Affairs Ministry; and Sarah MacIntosh, U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Challenges Facing Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Impact on International Security." Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Bowie-Vernon Room N262, 1033 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MADec. 3International Convention on Cluster Munitions opens for signature. Oslo, NorwayDec. 46;30-9:00 p.m., Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, guest of honor, ICAS Annual Liberty Award Dinner, 325 Russell Senate Office Building, WashingtonDec. 5U.S. and Russian due date on the decision to extend the START nuclear arms reduction treaty. (The treaty expires Dec. 5, 2009.) Dec. 6Louisiana general election in Congressional District 2 between Rep. William Jefferson (D) and Anh Cao (R), and in Congressional District 4 between Paul Carmouche (D) and John Fleming (R) (Elections were rescheduled because of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike.)Week of Dec. 8House and Senate reconvene for a lame-duck session.Dec. 91:00 p.m., Energy Department, public hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership draft PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). Holiday Inn Washington-Capitol, 550 C St., SW, Washington. (Other public hearings are held across the country, Nov. 17-Dec. 4.)Dec. 94:00-5:30 p.m., Edward Ifft, Georgetown University; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment; and Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation, "“Steps to Zero.” Sponsored by Physicians for Social Responsibility. At the Carnegie Endowment, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington. RSVP by noon, Dec. 8 to Jill Parillo by email.Dec. 119:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Peace and Security Initiative community-wide meeting. At the Carnegie Endowment, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington
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The Need For Clarity In India’S Nuclear Doctrine

The Need For Clarity In India’S Nuclear Doctrine
Ali Ahmed
November 11, 2008
IDSA
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis
While the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 was an elaborate document, the press release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on India’s operationalisation of its nuclear doctrine of January 4, 2003 was, on the other hand, very succinct. While reflexively it may be said that India’s doctrine is predicated on a nuclear retaliation of sufficient magnitude to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ against nuclear use by an adversary against India or its forces anywhere, it is contended here that there has been a shift in the doctrine as explicated in the press release to potentially countenance ‘flexible response’. Since transparency in the nuclear doctrine is important for communication of nuclear intent to potential adversaries, there is a requirement of spelling out the nuclear doctrine in greater measure. This article brings to the fore the need for clarity by challenging the commonly held position that India’s doctrine is one of ‘assured destruction’ by making the case that it can equally be interpreted as ‘graduated deterrence’. In doing so, it highlights an area of potential confusion and recommends that this be addressed.
The understanding widely held is that India’s nuclear doctrine is one of assured retaliation of a massive order or ‘assured destruction’ – defined as a strategy based on a high order counter value threat. This is explicable as it is in keeping with India’s philosophy regarding nuclear weapons as being ‘political weapons’ not meant for nuclear use. Their only utility is to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons by adversaries against India. Since these are not meant for war fighting, they have a role in operationalising India’s philosophy of ‘deterrence by punishment’. This is in keeping with the other pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, namely, No First Use, minimum credible deterrent, unilateral moratorium on testing and amenability to universal nuclear disarmament.
The National Security Advisory Board came up with a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (Draft) positing ‘massive retaliation’ for consideration by the government in August 1999 after the Kargil conflict of that summer. In the Draft, the relevant portion has been articulated thus: “Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor” {Para 2.3 (b)}.1 In the wake of Operation Parakram of 2001-02, the government, through a press release from the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, confirmed the adoption of the nuclear doctrine that was explicated in a press release. The appropriate portion is extracted below:
“(ii) A posture of “No First Use”: Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
(iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”2(Italics added)
The doctrine is now one of ‘assured retaliation’ to nuclear use by an adversary with the proviso that this would be massive in the case of first strike. In other words, retaliation in face of sub ‘first strike’ levels or usage could be of a lower order. In effect, India’s nuclear doctrine has moved away from one of assuredly inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ posited in the Draft to one that potentially includes ‘flexible’ or ‘graduated’ response. This shift from ‘assured destruction’ to ‘graduated deterrence’ has not been adequately registered in strategic commentaries, with most commentators continuing to believe that India’s nuclear doctrine continues to be one of retaliation of a massive order.
In case the sub para (ii) of the press release (reproduced above) is being over-interpreted and meanings not meant to be derived are being arrived at here, then it points to the element of confusion induced by the press release - referred to in the introductory paragraph of this article. There is, therefore, a need to clarify to the strategic community, the interested public and indeed, more importantly, to potential adversaries, exactly what is intended. In case India’s nuclear deterrence is in accord with the popularly subscribed view in the strategic community, then the words ‘first strike’ would require to be substituted by ‘first use’ in a review of the doctrine. In such a case, the official doctrine requires to reiterate the Draft’s wordings that “India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable” (Para 4.1) for any form of nuclear ‘first use’.
Such a critique is not mere hair-splitting for these terms have specific definitions and are not inter-changeable. For the distinction, a resort to noted nuclear pundit Lawrence Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy is in order. ‘First strike’ is the opening volley directed against largely counter-force targets with the intent of crippling the adversary’s means of nuclear retaliation.3 This would amount to nuclear first use of a high order against which massive retaliation would be rational, politically acceptable and legitimate.
First strike is, however, not necessarily the only manner of nuclear first use. A sub-first strike level of nuclear first use is feasible and may even be rational and legally and politically sustainable in the circumstance of the conflict. Against such a form of nuclear first use, such as against military forces that threaten the nuclear threshold of a belligerent, ‘assured retaliation’, may not be the best response option and most certainly should not be the sole response option. On receipt of a nuclear first use by the enemy not amounting to ‘first strike’, several factors would impact nuclear decision making. These include the aspect of self-deterrence; the need for proportionality and discrimination in keeping with the laws of armed conflict; escalatory potential of response options; international pressures; economy of force considerations; need for equivalence between the crime and punishment; and the need to win subsequent peace. Therefore, ‘flexible response’ has much to recommend it. If this is the nuclear doctrine India has apparently moved to, it requires acknowledging this explicitly.
It needs to be highlighted that the possibility of a shift away from ‘assured destruction’ through ‘massive retaliation’ was already thoughtfully worked into the Draft (Para 2.4) in the following manner:
“India's peace time (Italics added) posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat; and
(b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.”
Interestingly, the term ‘massive’ has not been used in the Draft but finds mention in the press release. That it has not been used in the Draft indicates that retaliation need not have ‘massive’ connotations, so long as its quantum would make it ‘unacceptable’ to the aggressor. ‘Punitive retaliation’ to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage does not necessarily require massive retaliation. Therefore, the quantum of retaliation was left as a matter of political and operational choice to be dictated by the circumstance. The decision maker is thus not constrained in the options available for nuclear retaliation, which could be massive while not being necessarily so.
This is evident from the fact that the Draft does not mention the nature of the retaliation during war time, restricted as it is to the projection of the posture in peace time. For in-conflict deterrence posture to be different from a peace time posture is sensible and has been catered for in the Draft accordingly. Thus, the Draft has been a precursor for the officially adopted doctrine and there is an element of continuity between the two. The nature of the deterrent posture in war time not having been reflected on indicates that other options have not been ruled out. The Draft, in not overly restricting the government’s nuclear options, had potentially ruled in ‘flexible response’, which the official nuclear doctrine has virtually accepted. In case this is an incorrect impression, then there is no reason for the word ‘peace time’ to have figured in the Draft. It has evidently been used advisedly and calls for an interpretation along the line contended here.
Such options could include a quid pro quo, quid pro quo plus or a spasmic strike, as posited by General Sundarji.4While the peace time posture would appear to rule these out, the nature of the in-conflict deterrent posture – not having been explicated – cannot be said, ipso facto, to have ruled these out. India’s response is to be dictated by the guiding philosophy given in the Draft as: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Action, informed by such intent, while ruling out quid pro quo, could still countenance a quid pro quo plus response. Since the press release explicitly mentions ‘massive’ retaliation only in case of first strike, it rules in the quid pro quo option also. In effect, India has now a nuclear deterrent posture that potentially rules in ‘flexible response’. This marked shift has not drawn any strategic comment and, on that account, requires deliberation by the strategic community and even perhaps, an elaboration by the National Security Coulcil.
The Draft puts its function to serve only as a guide thus: “Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment (Italics added) of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review (Para 1.6).” That this has been done has been communicated through the press release and, therefore, the same can be taken as authoritative. Since this is the critical source document informing thinking on India’s nuclear deterrence posture, there is a need to clarify exactly what is India’s nuclear posture. Is it ‘assured destruction’? Or, does it rule in ‘flexible response’?
Here it must be acknowledged that the Draft was not to be taken as the government’s position, even though it was released for discussion by the then National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri B Mishra. That it was not the official position was clarified after its release by a senior minister in the NDA government, Shri Jaswant Singh. The Draft can, however, be taken as informing the doctrine officially adopted and explicated in the press release. There are elements of continuities and discontinuities between the two. However, the press release is the authoritative statement and is very clear. That it has, however, given rise to an interpretation at variance with the commonly held notion of Indian deterrence, there is a case for clarifying the issue. To this author, the official doctrine is indeed one positing ‘flexible response’ as evident from its use of ‘first strike’ as against ‘first use’ in the relevant sentence. That this fact has not been registered by the wider strategic community is why the point being raised here for wider debate.
The only fallout from acknowledging the shift would be on India’s position that nuclear weapons are only for deterring. This is not affected in a major way by the shift to ‘flexible response’ since having a menu of options does not degrade deterrence. Instead, an ‘assured destruction’ posture is not credible against enemy nuclear first use of a lower order, such as a counter force attack on invading forces on his own territory. Therefore, there is a case for the shift and acknowledging the shift openly. The strategic commentaries that have largely missed the shift should also reflect on its implications. In this manner the public - that has a right to know in a democratic system - and the enemy - that needs to know as per deterrence theory – would be in a better position to appreciate the nuclear doctrine in the correct perspective.
Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
1.The Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine is available at:
2. Press release on India’s nuclear doctrine is available at:
3. Freedman, L., Evolution of Nuclear Strategy; London, MacMillan Press, 1989 (2nd Edition), p. 135.
4. Sundarji, K., Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century; New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 2003, pp. 146-153.

Barack Obama's missile defense challenge

Barack Obama's missile defense challengeBy Pavel Podvig 11 November 2008

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
What a difference eight years makes. Following the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a new disarmament initiative that called for reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads apiece. Although that statement was basically ignored--at the time, Washington was embroiled in the recount saga--Putin's proposal remained the official Russian position on disarmament in subsequent years.
Fast-forward to this recent president election. Instead of calling for reductions in nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Barack Obama's victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, he quickly presented Obama with his first major foreign policy test--how to handle the issue of missile defense in Europe, the biggest irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. He also seemed determined to demonstrate that Russia is going to be a difficult and capricious partner for the new U.S. administration.
Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow’s standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system."
So far, the Obama team has shown great care in dealing with the thorny issue of missile defense in Europe. During the campaign, they deliberately avoided making any critical statements on the European system to avoid alienating Polish voters in battleground states such as Pennsylvania. And now that the election is over, we're hearing that they're telling the eager Polish government that their general position on missile defense--it should be deployed only "when the technology is proved to be workable"--applies to the European part of the system as well. This isn't good news for missile defense in Europe, since its technology is "workable" only in a narrow sense, if at all.
Of course, this story is far from over. If the Obama administration decides not to deploy interceptors and radar in Europe, it opens itself to a charge of yielding to Russian pressure--especially from Republicans, for whom missile defense is a signature issue. The plan to deploy missile defense in Europe also has supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic; both governments seem to believe that the presence of U.S. personnel on their soil would provide them a security guarantee far stronger than NATO membership. Finally, Russia isn't exactly interested in seeing the issue disappear: The system presents no threat whatsoever, but the controversy allows the Kremlin to score lots of rhetorical points.
Finding a solution that calms the waters and satisfies everyone won't be easy. But it's not impossible either. One thing the new administration must avoid is getting into a discussion with Russia about whether Washington has the right to deploy its military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, or whether Russia should have the right to veto such a decision. While a legitimate discussion, we know that it's not going to get us anywhere.
Therefore, we need to take the dispute in a different direction. Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow's standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system. The offer still seems to be on the table, although Russia has been far less enthusiastic about it since the United States made clear that this joint system wouldn't replace the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The problem with those sites might seem serious, but it can be solved. A year ago, Washington considered delaying the actual deployment of the interceptors until the ballistic missile threat from Iran (or maybe some other country) becomes evident. Moscow seemed interested, but the United States withdrew the offer. It certainly could be revived now. And I believe such a compromise would satisfy missile defense supporters and skeptics alike and also buy the necessary time to make the issue less sensitive politically. History shows us that once controversy dissipates, legitimate questions can be asked about effectiveness and cost--and on these counts, the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe fails in any sober, independent assessment.
What would remain then is a joint U.S.-Russian project in which both countries would work together to monitor missile tests and satellite launches. It's hard to think of a better legacy of the current missile defense dispute.

Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review

Orienting the 2009
Nuclear Posture Review
A Roadmap
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/nuclear_posture_review.html
Andrew GrottoCenter
for American Progress
Joe Cirincione Ploughshares Fund
November 2008


Executive summary www.americanprogress.org 1
Executive summary
There is an emerging bipartisan consensus that America’s current nuclear weapons posture imposes an unnecessary burden on U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology to additional nation-states. It holds that the United States must retain a nuclear arsenal as a strategic deterrent, but should embrace the vision laid out by senior statesmen George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn of a world free of nuclear weapons in order to strengthen America’s ability to exercise global leadership in countering 21st century nuclear threats. The Obama administration should use the congressionally mandated 2009–2010 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, to realign nuclear policy, forces, and posture with these threats. This study makes the case for why a successful NPR should be among the Obama administration’s
top priorities and provides a roadmap on how to structure and manage the review so that it achieves key policy objectives. It is not a study on nuclear weapons doctrine.
The 2009–2010 NPR will be the third formal review of U.S. nuclear strategy conducted since the end of the Cold War. The preceding reviews were conducted early in each of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ first terms. The Clinton administration’s review essentially
ratified the Cold War status quo, despite an urgent need to recalibrate in light of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the need to work with Moscow to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. The National Security Council was largely disengaged from the process, as the White House was just emerging from a series of bitter disputes with the armed forces over such issues as Somalia and gays in the military. The administration was also battling both the military and an increasingly hostile Congress over defense spending priorities. The Department of Defense underwent a leadership change in the middle of the review, and other issues, such as dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program and the multiple proliferation concerns presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union, competed for senior appointees’ finite time and resources.
The second formal NPR took place in 2001 under vastly different political and policy circumstances. It was driven by presidential prerogatives, which guaranteed that senior officials would invest time and energy in the NPR process. The review yielded the administration’s preferred policy outcomes, but it also undermined America’s nonproliferation credentials.
2 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
The goals of the 2009–2010 NPR should be to recalibrate America’s nuclear deterrent in light of existing and emerging threats, strengthen America’s hand in negotiations on improvements to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and send a clear signal to the world that the United States is charting a new, multilateral course. Success in achieving these goals hinges on development of a coherent, realistic strategy for conducting the review that ensures senior appointees devote sustained attention even as they confront other national security challenges. The strategy should be organized according to these principles:
Do not politicize nuclear weapons doctrine.•
Conduct the review as a strategy-driven exercise guided by a vision for nuclear weapons • policy elaborated by the president.
Consult and engage the Joint Chiefs of Staff.•
Consult and engage Congress. •
Appoint experienced professionals to carry out the vision.•
Ensure that the review is interagency.•
Consult and engage key allies and partners.•
Develop a communications plan.•
This study identifies the key nuclear policy issues that demand senior-level attention, which we identify as falling into three categories: “Deterrence and Doctrine,” “Force Structure and the Nuclear Weapons Complex,” and “Nonproliferation and Arms Control.” It also provides a notional timeline for sequencing the review.
These recommendations and findings are based on a review and comparison of how the structure of the Clinton and Bush administration NPRs, conducted in 1993–1994 and 2001, shaped the final review product in each case. The study was also informed by nearly two dozen interviews and informal discussions with experts, congressional staff, and former senior officials with experience in nuclear policy from both sides of the political spectrum. The authors take sole responsibility for the content of this report.
An emerging bipartisan consensus for a new nuclear posture www.americanprogress.org 3
An emerging bipartisan consensus
for a new nuclear posture
There is an emerging bipartisan consensus that America’s current nuclear weapons posture—the policies governing the role, mission, and size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal—imposes an unnecessary burden on U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology to additional nation-states. This consensus, which includes more than two-thirds of living former national security advisors and secretaries of state or defense, acknowledges the ongoing role of U.S. nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent for the United States and its allies. But the consensus also embraces the vision of “a world free of nuclear weapons” articulated by former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in a pair of Wall Street Journal op-eds.1
The emerging consensus rests on two propositions. First, it holds that the current posture is based on outdated Cold War assumptions about nuclear targeting that emphasize the need to deter large-scale, preemptive nuclear strikes by Russia, our former Cold War adversary. Cold War hostilities ended more than 15 years ago with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Although the United States and Russia have serious differences over a range of international security issues and retain large nuclear arsenals, the two nations no longer consider each other as irreconcilable ideological adversaries. China has an estimated two dozen ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the continental United States and is slowly modernizing its nuclear forces. Taiwan remains a potential flashpoint in U.S.-China relations, but as long as all parties respect the principles laid out in the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués and the one China policy, armed conflict is a remote possibility and nuclear conflict even more so. Although the United States will retain a nuclear arsenal for as long as other countries possess them, these developments have brought the world a step closer to achieving President Ronald Reagan’s dream that one day “nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.”
Rest of the World
Russia
United States
Global nuclear stockpiles
1955–2008
102003,0573516,12931,98272319,05527,8261,08539,19724,2371,20027,00012,14485017,00010,29598914,0005,4001955197519952005200870,0060,00050,00040,00030,00020,00010,000019651985
Source: NRDC (2006); Norris (2007); Norris & Kristensen (2008a); (2008b); (2008c); (2008d); (2007).
4 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
21st century nuclear threats
The second proposition underlying the bipartisan consensus is that many countries consider U.S. compliance with its nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, a precondition before supporting additional U.S. nonproliferation initiatives that are vital to countering 21st century nuclear threats. These threats are characterized by the diffusion of nuclear materials, know-how, and technology—much of it with a civilian dimension—to state and non-state actors enabled by globalization and economic development. In the words of secretaries Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Sen. Nunn, “Without the vision of moving toward zero [nuclear weapons], we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.”2
The United States cannot counter these threats alone. The success of American nonproliferation
strategy is now tied in significant part to the willingness and capacity of other countries to make costly investments of time, money, and sovereignty in a host of domestic and international institutions designed to regulate the transfer of sensitive materials
and technology, build confidence in global supplies of nuclear fuel so that domestic enrichment projects are unnecessary, penalize violations of nonproliferation norms, and deter future transgressions. The United States could acquire “much greater leverage to persuade other countries to take [these steps]” by addressing concerns about Article VI compliance, according to a nonproliferation policy task force chaired by ex-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary Perry.3
Nuclear terrorism and rogue states
There is no single greater threat to the U.S. homeland than terrorist use of a nuclear device against an American city. Although the chances of this happening are small, the consequences
of a nuclear attack would be devastating, likely killing hundreds of thousands of people, causing trillions of dollars in lasting damage, and forever changing our way of life. Potentially vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium, or HEU—what a terrorist would need to build a crude nuclear device—exist at civilian research facilities
in dozens of countries around the world. By securing or eliminating these stockpiles, the United States could practically guarantee against an act of nuclear terrorism. Yet the pace of efforts to address this key national security vulnerability by securing stockpiles and, preferably, phasing out the civilian use of HEU altogether lags behind the severity of the
21st century nuclear threats www.americanprogress.org 5
threat. As of 2007, an estimated four out of five research reactors lacked adequate security to protect against sophisticated thieves, while only around one-third of HEU-fueled research reactors have had all their HEU monitoring removed.4
Rogue state acquisition of nuclear weapons presents a different, more complex challenge. It raises the chances of nuclear war through miscalculation or accident while providing an incentive for other countries to seek their own nuclear deterrent, potentially leading to regional arms races. Iran continues to press forward with its nuclear program in violation of successive U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding a suspension. North Korea has agreed in principle to eliminate its nuclear program as of this writing, but it is by no means certain whether ongoing negotiations will produce that outcome. Other states, such as Syria, may also have secret programs underway. Although concerns about U.S. compliance
with NPT Article VI are unlikely to exert a direct influence on rogue states’ nuclear ambitions, such concerns may influence the willingness of other countries to join an international effort to contain those ambitions using sanctions, diplomatic pressures, and other means. Finally, over the long run, an insistence by the world’s strongest conventional military power, the United States, that it cannot meet its security needs without nuclear weapons can only make nuclear weapons more attractive for weaker powers.
T
he nuclear black market
The lifeline for these illicit efforts is a nuclear black market comprised of skilled manufacturers,
engineers and scientists, middle-men, and transportation and logistics channels. It is serviced by three broad types of proliferators that vary in their willingness and ability to combat proliferation: “willful proliferators,” such as the infamous A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan’s centrifuge enrichment program; “willfully blind proliferators” that should reasonably know their skills and wares will be used to advance a bomb program but fail to perform due diligence; and “ignorant proliferators” that genuinely do not understand the proliferation consequences of their actions. Often, the actor in question is a private-sector entity operating in a country with uneven or largely non-existent governmental oversight over flows of potentially sensitive materials and technology. Each of these proliferators presents a unique challenge, but they all have this in common: They reflect fundamental weaknesses in domestic and international governance of global commerce.
In the industrialized West, there have been major improvements in export controls and related measures to clamp down on illicit nuclear trade during the past 15 years. These advances were spurred in large part by shocking revelations in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War concerning the size and scale of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear procurements during the 1980s. Iraq during this period, along with India, Pakistan, and others, exploited weaknesses
in the export control regimes of the advanced industrial democracies, particularly in select European countries whose industries possessed high technologies. The exposure of A.Q. Khan’s network in 2003 motivated another round of improvements in many coun6
Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
tries. Export controls remain a work in progress, despite decades of experience regulating nuclear exports. Constant vigilance is demanded to stay ahead of the proliferation curve.
Moreover, the forces of economic development, industrialization, and globalization are establishing new centers of high technology in the developing world that can serve as alternative suppliers for sensitive, precision technologies. A.Q. Khan, for example, set up a centrifuge component manufacturing facility in Malaysia, a country with little prior experience policing illicit transfers of proliferation-sensitive technologies. This development
presents a grave and growing new challenge to the nonproliferation regime, for many of these countries—which are concentrated in the Non-Aligned Movement, or NAM, an international bloc of mostly developing countries—lack the domestic capability to adequately
regulate sensitive technology flows and/or the political will to better regulate the flow of technology exports, which are often seen as essential to economic development for countries that have made export-led growth the cornerstone of their national economic policy. A United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research study reports, for example, that many developing countries “regard export controls with suspicion, viewing them as barriers to economic development at best, and at worst as part of a deliberate strategy of technology denial on the part of the developed world.”5
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 highlights the difficulties associated with motivating
countries to spend scarce resources on nonproliferation efforts. It is, in essence, an unfunded mandate requiring that countries “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws” preventing non-state actors from proliferating WMD. States must criminalize proliferation, adopt and enforce export and border controls, and institute effective physical protection measures. For many countries, particularly developing ones, this is a very tall order requiring
potentially significant investments in a range of specialized regulatory capacity—investments they might prefer to spend on education, infrastructure, or public health. But UNSC-1540 does not define what “appropriate effective” means, leaving the interpretation
to individual countries’ discretion. As a result of these factors, implementation among developing countries, according to the UNIDIR study, is weak.
Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons proliferation
Future proliferants need not pursue the clandestine—and hence unambiguously illegal—
route that Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and possibly Syria have taken. Instead, a government could announce a grandiose nuclear energy development program that includes a domestic nuclear fuel-making capability, ostensibly to guarantee a supply of nuclear fuel for its anticipated reactor fleet. The NPT does not expressly prohibit states from pursuing this technology, provided it is for avowedly peaceful purposes and the host government subjects it to IAEA inspections—even though it can produce fuel for bombs as well as reactors. If Iran, for example, had disclosed the existence of its nuclear fuel-making program from the beginning instead of hiding it in violation of its IAEA safeguards
21st century nuclear threats www.americanprogress.org 7
agreement, the prevailing view among most international legal experts is that the program would be permissible under the NPT. IAEA inspections can verify that a declared facility is peaceful in nature, but they cannot prevent a country from kicking inspectors out and using the facility to produce fuel for bombs. Alternatively, a state can divert the experience and knowledge gained from operating a declared “peaceful” facility to a secret, undeclared facility dedicated to making bombs. That is why Iran’s nuclear fuel-making programs pose such a grave proliferation risk.
These scenarios are far from hypothetical. Iran already justifies its enrichment program on energy security grounds, and many developing countries are reluctant to strongly condemn
Iran’s program for fear that further restrictions on nuclear fuel-making could jeopardize
their energy security should they develop nuclear reactors for producing electricity. Other countries may well follow the more above-board route available to them under the NPT and pursue a weapons program under the guise of a civilian energy program.
This risk could grow precipitously in the coming decades if demand grows for nuclear energy as an alternative to burning fossil fuels for electricity production. At present, more than 90 percent of existing nuclear reactor capacity is concentrated in developed and transition economies. Most of the net growth in worldwide capacity, however, is projected to occur in developing countries, particularly in those associated with the Non-Aligned Movement. In just the past two years, for example, many such countries—including several
U.S. partners in the Middle East—have announced ambitious nuclear energy development
plans, citing concern over global warming and rapid demand growth for energy.
Only a few non-aligned countries, such as Brazil and South Africa, currently possess domestic enrichment technology or have plans to pursue it; the risk that several or more may decide to do so in the future, however, is significant. Top nonproliferation priorities
for the Obama administration will include reducing the incentive for indigenous fuel making by promoting credible, economically attractive alternatives to domestic fuel production, improving transparency of civilian nuclear energy programs by strengthening
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to conduct nuclear inspections, and strengthening export and border control regimes to curb the flow of illicit nuclear commerce.
The challenge for nonproliferation diplomacy is that countries are under no general legal obligation to accept or support these measures. Some countries recognize the direct benefits they would derive from accepting these obligations and already support them. Other countries, however, do not and must be lobbied or cajoled into supporting them.
8 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
T
he imperative of U.S. leadership
U.S. leadership is essential to mobilizing international action to reduce these risks. As former Secretaries Shultz, Perry, and Kissinger and Sen. Nunn wrote in their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, it is “required to take the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”
But many developing countries have rejected U.S. leadership. A recent UNIDIR study reports, for example, “a widespread belief in South-East Asia and elsewhere that an exaggerated
non-state WMD threat is being used by the nuclear weapons states to distract attention from their failure to comply with their disarmament commitments.”6 These countries accuse the United States of failing to uphold its commitment to nuclear disarmament
as required by the NPT, citing the Bush administration’s repudiation of a political
understanding reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference on a series of 13 specific measures or actions that would serve as benchmarks for evaluating progress as well as the outcome of the 2001 NPR that, as explained in Appendix II, is widely interpreted as expanding the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy. The 13 benchmarks include entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty with verification provisions, sustaining the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and other arms control measures. Increasingly, developing countries are the main targets of nonproliferation diplomacy, yet they have indicated they will not entertain the possibility
of assuming new nonproliferation obligations unless the existing nuclear powers take further steps to reduce their arsenals. This issue will dominate the spring 2010 NPT Review Conference, which many experts regard as a make-or-break moment for the nonproliferation regime. The success of the conference—and the ability of the United States to advocate for necessary improvements to the nonproliferation regime—will turn in part on the nuclear weapons policies of the United States.
R
ussia’s key role
Russian support is indispensable to any durable effort to constrain proliferation. It is already a major military and diplomatic power and a leading energy supplier due to its large reserves of oil and natural gas. It also has an advanced nuclear energy industry. These assets endow Russia with tremendous influence over proliferant states such as Iran—and
The imperative of U.S. leadership www.americanprogress.org 9
the prospects for more durable improvements to the nonproliferation regime, such as initiatives to constrain the spread of nuclear fuel-making facilities.
By the same token, the United States cannot revitalize international efforts to reduce nuclear weapon dangers with Russia, China, and other countries without a clear sense of how nuclear weapons fit into broader U.S. defense strategy. In December 2009, the cornerstone arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, the START treaty, will expire. This agreement specifies the essential procedures and mechanisms for verifying mutual compliance with agreements that reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals, including the Moscow Treaty (also known as SORT) signed in 2002.
Other key items on the arms control and nonproliferation agendas include the disposition of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ongoing negotiations over a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, convincing developing countries to renounce national uranium enrichment in favor of multilateral alternatives, and strengthening the IAEA’s authority and ability to conduct nuclear inspections. Achievement of these objectives is likely to hinge in part on the status of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Unfortunately, the U.S.-Russia relationship, which had achieved unprecedented cooperation
on nuclear nonproliferation matters in the 1990s, is broken. The Bush administration’s
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 set the stage for an increasingly acrimonious and at times hostile relationship between the two former military adversaries. Russia’s leadership, particularly former President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, deserves the lion’s share of the blame for the downturn. Moscow has clamped down on freedoms at home and exploited its newfound clout in global energy markets to bully neighbors. In addition, its military conflict with Georgia in August 2008 has raised grave questions about Russia’s strategic direction. But Bush administration policies ranging from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to its current efforts to establish a missile defense beachhead in Eastern Europe have fed the impression in Russia that the United States is not an enlightened superpower, but an expansionist one that seeks power and influence at Russia’s expense. U.S.-Russian relations have reached a nadir not seen since the Cold War ended nearly 20 years ago.
10 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Regarded as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the NPT divides the world into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty considers China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States nuclear-weapon states. Every other country in the world is considered a de jure non-nuclear weapon state, even if they de facto possess nuclear weapons. Thus, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are considered non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Those four countries are also the only countries that aren’t party to the treaty.
Nuclear-weapon states:
Won’t proliferate to non-nuclear weapon states (Art I)•
Facilitate the use of peaceful nuclear technology (Art IV)•
Negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament (Art VI) •
Non-nuclear weapon states party:
Foreswear nuclear weapons (Art II)•
Accept IAEA safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities (Art III)•
The NPT’S “grand bargain”
United States
United Kingdom
France
Russia
China
North Korea
India
Israel
Pakistan
Nuclear-weapons states
De facto nuclear states
Needed: a new U.S. nuclear weapons posture www.americanprogress.org 11
Needed: a new U.S. nuclear
weapons posture
The Obama administration must break this logjam—both with the developing world and with Russia—in order to effectively combat the nuclear threats of the 21st century. A renewed commitment on the part of the United States to reducing its nuclear arsenal, along with a reinvigorated strategic dialogue with Russia, would bolster America’s nonproliferation
bona fides and enable it to reassume its traditional leadership role in efforts to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Accordingly, the Obama administration should use the congressionally mandated 2009–2010 nuclear posture review [see Appendix I] to realign nuclear policy, forces, and posture with 21st century nuclear threats. The goals of the review should be to recalibrate the nuclear deterrent in light of existing and emerging threats, strengthen America’s hand in negotiations over improvements to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and send a clear signal to the world that the United States is charting a new course.
12 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Structuring the 2009 NPR
Success in achieving these goals hinges on development of a coherent, realistic strategy
for conducting the review that ensures senior appointees from the departments of defense, state, and energy, along with the National Security Council, devote sustained attention even as they confront other national security challenges. The 2009 NPR will occur in a vastly more complex policy environment than either of the preceding two reviews, which occurred at the start of each of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ first terms. The Obama administration will inherit a staggering array of major foreign policy challenges that will compete for the attention of senior appointees, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Iran’s nuclear ambitions
and growing regional clout, a broken U.S.-Russia relationship, energy insecurity, climate change, and a nonproliferation regime in urgent need of repair. It will also likely have to make a number of difficult choices about defense spending priorities.
Policy choices in one area may constrain or enable policy options in other areas. For example, some analysts have proposed eliminating the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, which serves as the Atlantic seaport for America’s SSBN fleet. From an operational standpoint, this would effectively eliminate the ability of the United States to conduct nuclear patrols in the Atlantic, which has implications for U.S. alliance relations in NATO and broader U.S. policy toward Russia as well. Administration policy toward nuclear testing—including the CTBT—will affect the ability of the United States to achieve diplomatic objectives at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. And a determination
to press forward with missile defense installations in Eastern Europe will affect the prospects for bilateral arms control with Russia. Abandoning these installations, however, could have alliance repercussions. These are just a few illustrations of why it is essential to have a coherent strategy for carrying out the NPR.
Nationalism in Russia is at an apex, as is distrust of Washington. These dynamics reinforce the need for the Obama administration to seek a strategic dialogue with Russia, but they also raise questions about whether Russia’s leadership is ready to engage the United States in a serious way, particularly with respect to strategic issues such as nuclear weapons, missile
defense, and NATO expansion. The Obama administration must seek this dialogue, but have realistic expectations about what it is capable of producing in the near term.
Structuring the 2009 NPR www.americanprogress.org 13
Finally, the emerging bipartisan consensus on nuclear policy does not yet extend to such key questions as the appropriate nuclear weapons manufacturing complex to support the arsenal, the role and future of ballistic missile defense systems, and the military use of space. In addition, some conservative legislators and pundits further to the right on the political spectrum remain committed to a Cold War posture and have indicated strong support for a nuclear weapons complex capable of supporting a much larger arsenal than may be warranted by a realistic threat assessment. The Obama administration should expect these conservatives to challenge a progressive nuclear posture and seek to fracture the emerging bipartisan consensus.
In order to maximize the NPR’s effectiveness and ensure its subsequent implementation, it should be structured according to the following list of core principles. These principles are derived from a series of wide-ranging interviews with experts and former senior officials with experience in nuclear policy from both sides of the political spectrum, and a review and comparison of how the structure of the Clinton and Bush administration NPRs shaped the final review product in each case (see Appendix II, “Past as Prelude: The Politics and Process of Nuclear Posture Reviews”).
Conduct the NPR as a strategy-driven exercise guided by a vision for nuclear • weapons policy elaborated by the president in a Presidential Decision Directive or other appropriate means. A review process conducted without a sense for the ultimate destination is unlikely to produce any meaningful changes in the posture. This vision is essential for defining the parameters of interagency debate (what’s settled and what’s up for grabs), focusing the review process, and arming the president’s appointees with political authority for driving the president’s agenda forward. The president himself should determine the goal of the review, which could be as general as instructions to his senior appointees that they achieve deep cuts in nuclear forces consistent with sustaining
deterrence and revitalize international arms control. His senior appointees should then lead the review, as opposed to delegating the review to mid-level appointees and career civil servants. This is essential in order to identify, weigh, and definitively settle tradeoffs across traditionally stovepiped policy areas.
Consult and engage the Joint Chiefs. • Their advice and support is essential to conducting
a posture review and effectively communicating the results to the American people and Congress. The JCS are in all likelihood prepared to accept potentially significant changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy, but their support should not be taken for granted. It is essential that they be actively consulted and brought into the review process.
Consult and engage with Congress. • The Obama administration could count on the support of a progressive Congress, provided key members of Congress are consulted at the onset of the review and given an interim report. Conservative legislators may attempt to challenge the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policies, but they
14 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
can be rebuffed if there is consistent, close communication between the White House and the Congress, accompanied by a concerted effort to reach out to moderate conservative
legislators.
Do not politicize nuclear weapons doctrine. • The president must speak to the American people about the strategic threats to the nation, particularly nuclear terrorism and the risk of nuclear weapons use. His administration’s nuclear policy, however, may be an attractive target for conservatives in Congress and elsewhere, particularly if they sense that the president is personally committed to the issue. There is little value in elevating the political profile of nuclear weapons doctrine beyond the broad parameters of the bipartisan consensus in favor of further reducing the size and strategic profile of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. This consensus is embodied in the joint writings of senior statesmen Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn. Finally, the administration should be particularly
careful not to make public commitments in advance of the review on specific numbers for the weapons stockpile.
Appoint experienced professionals to carry out the vision.• A successful NPR must engage a diverse spectrum of nuclear weapons policy constituencies, some of which may resist an effort to streamline U.S. nuclear forces. The process will go much more smoothly if the president taps experienced professionals who understand the inner workings of the nuclear weapons bureaucracy, have productive working relationships with the uniformed military and with each other, and enjoy the respect of civilian and uniformed career professionals alike. These individuals must also be able to count on the president’s full support. The administration can gain additional insights and support for its policies from independent expert groups, including the congressionally mandated Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
Ensure that the review is interagency. • All relevant agencies should have a seat at the table, though it is important to recognize that the personal relationships among the senior appointees and their commitment to the process will exert a far greater impact on the process than formal lines of consultation and communication.
Consult and engage key allies and partners.• America’s allies are weary of foreign policy surprises and increasingly jittery about America’s security commitment to them. The unease could grow among allies in the Middle East in light of Iran’s nuclear ambitions
and as the United States begins to redeploy from Iraq, in Eastern Europe due to Russia’s armed conflict with Georgia, and in East Asia because of North Korea’s nuclear program. This unease could corrode America’s relationships and influence, and lead some countries to seek a nuclear weapons capability. It is essential that the NPR consider
the effect that changes in the size and strategic profile of U.S. nuclear forces may have on America’s alliances.
Structuring the 2009 NPR www.americanprogress.org 15
Develop a communications plan. • This will ensure that the United States reaps the maximum possible international diplomatic benefit from its new posture at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where NAM countries are likely to link their support for new nonproliferation obligations to progress on nuclear disarmament by the United States and other nuclear powers. The United States should seek to be as transparent as possible—consistent with sustaining deterrence—about the review’s results in order to counter misperceptions and concretely illustrate how the United States is fulfilling its nuclear disarmament commitments under NPT Article VI. In addition, conservatives must not be allowed to frame the debate over the results of the NPR. Their critique is likely to employ these five rhetorical strategies and arguments: attempt to inaccurately frame the stakes of the NPR as a choice between their vision of nuclear weapons policy and unilateral nuclear disarmament; ridicule the notion that nuclear reductions by the United States would have any impact on countries like Iran and North Korea when the main diplomatic objective is to influence non-aligned countries’ willingness to support America’s nonproliferation agenda; falsely suggest that other countries are modernizing their strategic arsenals while America is not; selectively interpret technical data on warhead
reliability to justify large nuclear weapons production facilities; and offer unduly optimistic projections about the cost of these new facilities.
16 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Sequencing the 2009 NPR
The sequencing and pace of the review will depend largely on the degree to which the president and his senior appointees make it a priority, along with the broader political and policy climate in 2009. Still, it is useful to lay out a notional timeline in order to provide an initial framework for organizing the process.
During the transition
Signal presidential commitment to a progressive nuclear posture.• The president-elect and/or his senior appointees should inform the JCS during transition briefings that the president-elect wants to take bold steps in the direction of a world free of nuclear weapons while preserving America’s nuclear deterrent. The transition team should begin to outline the main parameters of a new Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy.
T
he first 100 days
Hold a meeting of the principals of the National Security Council, along with the • commander of STRATCOM, to formally launch the review. The goals of the meeting are to demonstrate presidential commitment to nuclear policy, identify which aspects of nuclear policy are settled and which are up for grabs, and establish a precedent for a robust interagency process. The president should request that the results of the review be given to him in the form of a memo of options that all participants in the review regard as legitimate, even if they prefer one over another. The advantage of this approach is that it doesn’t require the president to explicitly overrule the viewpoint of any particular
constituency when he chooses his preferred option.
Develop a process ensuring sustained senior-level commitment to implementing the • president’s vision. The success of the review will hinge in significant part on the participation
of senior-level political appointees capable of mobilizing their respective bureaucracies
behind the president’s vision, resolving interagency disputes, and engaging the JCS. This may require a careful examination of whether the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Sequencing the 2009 NPR www.americanprogress.org 17
Capabilities, or SO/LIC&IC, which currently has responsibility for nuclear weapons policy at DOD, has the resources to effectively lead the review, given its other policy responsibilities. One option is to create a separate Office of Strategic Capabilities headed by its own assistant secretary. A second and perhaps preferred option, in light of the challenges associated with a significant reorganization of DOD, would be to appoint a strong assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear and chemical and biological
defense programs, or ATSD(NCB), and make it a direct report to the secretary of defense. This position already exists on paper and requires Senate confirmation.
Host a meeting with congressional leaders on the president’s vision. • Congressional invitees should include the Senate Majority Leader, the Speaker of the House, and the Chair and Ranking Members of the House and Senate foreign relations and armed forces committees and relevant subcommittees.
Launch outreach process to key U.S. • allies and partners. The United States should launch consultations with NATO allies, in connection with NATO’s effort to draft its new Strategic Concept, on the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance and the disposition
of the estimated 350 tactical nuclear weapons forward-deployed by the United States in Europe. The United States should also initiate discussions on nuclear policy with the governments of Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. It should also explore avenues to deepen a dialogue over strategic forces with China. Finally, the United States should seek a strategic dialogue with Russia on the role of nuclear weapons
and the future of arms control in light of the December 2009 expiration of START I.
T
he first year
Present Congress with an interim briefing.• The goal of the briefing is to give Congress an opportunity to weigh in on the process and to launch a process to resolve any disagreements
well in advance of the February 2010 due date.
Provide the president with the options memo on nuclear weapons policy. • The NPR results should be delivered to the president by the secretaries of defense, energy, and state, along with the chairman of the JCS.
Launch a bipartisan process to address and resolve issues relevant to Senate ratifica•
tion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The main issues are verification of the treaty and the treaty’s implications for stockpile reliability.
Develop a communications plan on nuclear policy. • This should be considered a core part of the review, not an afterthought. In addition to framing the new posture to build domestic political support, the communications plan should also feature a vigorous strategy
for maximizing U.S. diplomatic gains at the spring 2010 NPT Review Conference.
18 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
A progressive nuclear posture:
key policy issues
The demands made on the president and his senior appointees are great even in peacetime.
But the Obama administration will inherit two wars and a host of other pressing national security problems that will compete for senior policymakers’ limited pool of time and attention. It is therefore essential to identify in advance the key nuclear policy issues that are likely to demand senior-level decisions and guidance. These issues fall into three categories: “Deterrence and Doctrine”; “Force Structure and the Nuclear Weapons Complex”; and “Nonproliferation and Arms Control.”
Deterrence and doctrine
The mission(s) and role(s) for nuclear weapons. • Should the employment of nuclear weapons be limited to deterring and if necessary responding to nuclear attacks? Or are there other legitimate missions for nuclear weapons, e.g. to preempt or retaliate against the use of chemical or biological weapons attacks? Would the United States ever use nuclear weapons first? What role, if any, exists for tactical nuclear weapons? Does uncertainty
over the strategic direction of China or Russia materially affect these questions?
Nuclear weapons targeting plans. • Should the United States continue to rely on preset targeting plans against Russia, China, and other possible adversaries, or abandon them in favor of flexible targeting procedures that tailor a response to unique contingencies as they emerge?
Deployment practices, including alert rates. • Should the United States retain rapid launch options for nuclear weapons, such as “launch on warning” or “launch under attack”? What are the operational implications?
Declaratory policy. • Should the United States publicly renounce and/or reaffirm (as the case may be) its policies regarding security assurances?
The role, if any, of nuclear weapons in sustaining key security alliances. • How important
is America’s nuclear umbrella to the NATO alliance and U.S. relations with Japan? Should NATO remain a nuclear alliance? What about extending the umbrella to others, e.g. allies in the Middle East?
U.S. nuclear forces by the numbers (active stockpile)
Warheads
Delivery vehicles/platforms
2,000SeaLandAirNon-strategic1,5001,0005000
Source: Norris and Kristensen (2008d).
A progressive nuclear posture: key policy issues www.americanprogress.org 19
The relationship between nuclear forces, conventional long-range strike, and bal•
listic missile defense systems.
Force structure and the nuclear weapons complex
The sum total of the arsenal, including deployed and reserve nuclear weapons. • Should the total be a political decision dictated ex ante by the president (e.g., president issues instructions at the onset capping the total arsenal at 1,000 warheads)?
Key nuclear weapons-related facilities
Bangor Naval Submarine Base, WA
Trident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles. Houses an estimated 2,364 warheads.
Barksdale AFB, LA
B-52H bombers. Houses 940 warheads.
Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MO
Manufactures and procures non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. Employs ~2,900 personnel.
Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, GA
Trident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles. Houses an estimated 1,364 warheads.
Kirtland AFB, NM
Home of the Air Force Materiel Command’s Nuclear Weapons Center (NWC). Houses an estimated 1,914 warheads.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA
Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and refurbishment. Employs ~5,100 personnel.
Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, NM
Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and refurbishment. Employs ~5,900 personnel.
Malmstrom AFB, MT
Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 535 warheads.
Minot AFB, ND
B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMS, and nuclear-capable advanced cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles.
Houses an estimated 1,250 warheads.
Nellis AFB, NV
Houses an estimated 902 warheads.
Nevada Test Site, Las Vegas, NV
Supports stockpile stewardship and sustains U.S. readiness to resume underground nuclear testing. Employs ~2,200 personnel.
Offutt AFB, NE
Home to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX
Range of warhead surety and safety services, along with pit storage and warhead assembly and disassembly. Employs ~3,200 personnel.
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA; Kauai, HI; Tonopah, NV
Responsible for non-nuclear components and systems engineering. Employs ~5,100 personnel.
Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC
Produces and manages tritium for use in nuclear weapons. Employs ~1,700 personnel.
Warren AFB, CO, NE, WY
Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 170 warheads.
Whiteman AFB, MO
B-2 bombers. Houses an estimated 136 warheads.
Y-12 National Security Complex,
Oak Ridge, TN
Fabricates warhead parts and components from special nuclear materials. Employs ~4,000.
20 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
The configuration of the triad, including whether all three “legs” are required. • Should the United States eliminate one or more of the legs? What are the strategic, budgetary,
and political implications of eliminating, for example, the bomber fleet and/or the intercontinental ballistic missile force?
The appropriate nuclear weapons surety and manufacturing base to guarantee the • safety and reliability of the arsenal. How can the United States sustain its nuclear weapons design expertise? Does the United States need to design and build new warheads?
Does it need new nuclear weapons production facilities, e.g. to produce plutonium
pits? What are the strategic, budgetary, and political implications?
Nuclear testing, including disposition of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. • Can the Stockpile Stewardship Program guarantee the safety and reliability of the arsenal, particularly in the event of deep reductions that would reduce the number of weapons held in reserve or inactive status?
Nonproliferation and arms control
The role of arms control. • Should the United States negotiate legally binding accords with Russia on nuclear reductions or pursue them unilaterally? If negotiated, to what extent should issues such as missile defense and NATO expansion be part of the discussions?
If pursued unilaterally, what if Russia does not reciprocate? Where does China fit in? And where do allied (France and Great Britain) arsenals fit in?
The relationship between America’s nuclear posture and its ability to advocate on • behalf of nuclear nonproliferation. What can the United States do to address concerns expressed by many countries that it is not living up to its nuclear disarmament obligations
under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty?
A progressive nuclear posture: key policy issues www.americanprogress.org 21
The United States currently has an estimated 10,000 nuclear warheads in its total stockpile of which approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads are in the active stockpile: 4,075 “operational” weapons and another 1,260 warheads kept in “reserve.” The operational stockpile consists of around 3,575 “strategic
nuclear forces” and 500 “nonstrategic (‘tactical’) nuclear forces.” The remainder of the weapons is in storage awaiting dismantlement.
Strategic nuclear forces. A nuclear warhead is generally considered “strategic” if it is delivered using a long-range strategic delivery platform as part of a deterrence mission. These platforms include:Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs. America has an estimated 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, but plans reductions to 450. The ICBMs are located at three U. S. Air Force bases in five states: Minot AFB (ND), Malmstrom AFB (MT), and Warren AFB (which overlaps
corners of CO, NE, and WY). These ICBMs carry an estimated 764 nuclear warheads, most of which are 20 times more powerful than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Ballistic Missile Submbmarines, or SSBNs. The United States has 14 SSBNs, two of which are currently in overhaul. These are based out of Bangor Naval Submarine Base (WA) or Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base (GA). The SSBN fleet can carry 288 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles. Each missile, in turn, can carry six nuclear warheads for a total of 1,728 operationally deployed strategic warheads on the SSBN fleet—nearly 40 percent of the operationally deployed arsenal. The explosive power of these warheads ranges from eight times to 30 times more powerful than the Hiroshima device, depending on the warhead model. More than 60 percent of SSBN patrols now occur in the Pacific, compared to just 15 percent in the 1980s. The targets for these patrols are likely China, North Korea, and Russia.
L
ong-range heavy bombers. Two bombers, the B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress, are dual-hatted for nuclear and conventional missions. America has 16 B-2s and 56 B-52s on operational status, and another four B-2s and 38 B-52Hs are used for training, testing, and backup missions. The B-52s are stationed at Barksdale AFB (LA) and Minot AFB (ND), and the B-2s at Whiteman AFB (MO). The bombers can carry several different types of nuclear weapons, including some with a so-called “dial-a-yield” capability that enables the user to choose from a range of explosive yields. The explosive power of the air-delivered strategic
arsenal ranges from less than the explosive yield of the Hiroshima bomb to 80 times as powerful. More than 1,000 strategic warheads are operationally deployed to the bomber force.
Non-strategic “tactical” nuclear forces. These are nuclear weapons intended for tactical use on a military battlefield. There are no binding international legal constraints on them. America has an estimated 1,290 non-strategic weapons, of which 500 are considered “operational” and ready for deployment. The remaining 790 are considered “inactive.” An estimated
350 warheads from the active stockpile are forward deployed on the territory of several NATO allies. The non-strategic arsenal consists of sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and air-launched gravity bombs.
U.S. nuclear forces and the nuclear triad
Source: Norris & Kristensen (2008d).
22 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Appendix I
“Revised Nuclear Posture Review” (§1070 FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act)
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.—In order to clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence
policy and strategy for the near term, the secretary of defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. The secretary shall conduct the review in consultation with the secretary of energy and the secretary of state.
(b) ELEMENTS OF REVIEW.— The nuclear posture review shall include the following elements:
(1) The role of nuclear forces in U.S. military strategy, planning, and programming.
(2) The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.
(3) The relationship among U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.
(4) The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces.
(5) The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be required for implementing the United States’ national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems.
(6) The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing the United States’ national and military strategy, including any plans to modernize or modify the complex.
(7) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be required for implementing
the United States’ national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads.
(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The secretary of defense shall submit to Congress, in unclassified
and classified forms as necessary, a report on the results of the nuclear posture review conducted under this section. The report shall be submitted concurrently with the quadrennial defense review required to be submitted under section 118 of title 10, United States Code, in 2009.
(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the nuclear posture review conducted
under this section should be used as a basis for establishing future U.S. arms control objectives and negotiating positions.
Appendix II www.americanprogress.org 23
Appendix II
Past as prelude: the politics and process of nuclear posture reviews
The Obama administration’s nuclear posture review will be the third formal review of U.S. nuclear strategy conducted since the end of the Cold War. The preceding reviews—conducted early in each of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ first terms—occurred under different policy and political contexts that materially affected the conduct of the review and its impact on U.S. policy. Comparing the two provides crucial lessons on how to structure the 2009 NPR to achieve a desired result.
T
he 1993–1994 NPR
The first NPR occurred in 1993–1994, during the first term of the Clinton administration. As a candidate in 1992, Clinton had made “change” a centerpiece of his campaign. His first secretary of defense, Les Aspin, brought that theme to the Pentagon, where he launched a major defense policy review to craft a U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. The so-called Bottom-Up Review was completed in September 1993 and set the stage for the administration’s NPR, which was launched shortly thereafter.
The original goal of the NPR was to focus on the role of nuclear deterrence in U.S. security
strategy in the new post-Cold War environment. The main nuclear threat was considered
by Clinton appointees to be the accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon by Russia or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a rogue state such as Iraq or North Korea, and not an intentional nuclear strike by the legitimate Russian leadership. The nuclear posture needed to complement America’s broader efforts to address these threats. The risk of accidental or unauthorized launch could be reduced if both sides were to abandon
nuclear war plans driven by the Cold War need to deter a surprise attack—which demanded large numbers of weapons on hair-trigger alert—in favor of a smaller, survivable
force. The United States also sought to promote the nuclear nonproliferation norms captured in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly in advance of the spring 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that would decide whether to indefinitely extend that treaty or allow its expiration later that year. The prospects for indefinite extension
of the NPT could be maximized if the United States was seen as reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its own defense strategy.
24 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
In the end, however, the review generated a posture that more or less ratified the Cold War strategy of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. The story for why the review turned out this way is complex, but several themes stand out. Although the Cold War was over, there were some uncertainties over whether and when Russia, which remained a formidable strategic weapons power with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, would evolve into a full-fledged democracy. Reasonable people could disagree on this fundamental dimension of the overall threat assessment, but opponents of change used this residual uncertainty, and in some cases exaggerated it, to support a hawkish position
on Russia. There was no sustained interagency effort to resolve this divergence, which inherently favored the status quo policy of planning nuclear requirements and operations primarily on the basis of the potential threat posed by Moscow.
Similarly, there was a major gap between the uniformed military and the mid-level DOD political appointees that managed the NPR on what role nuclear weapons played in U.S. defense policy. STRATCOM was committed to sustaining and even expanding the status quo role of nuclear weapons. The political appointees, by contrast, judged that precision conventional weaponry had already begun to replace nuclear weapons in actual war fighting,
and that this trend would only accelerate. The remaining mission for nuclear weapons was deterrence by the threat of overwhelming retaliation—and that mission, in their view, could be fulfilled solely by ballistic missile submarines.
The suggestion that the other two legs of the nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles
and heavy bombers—were obsolete and could be on the chopping block prompted a vigorous campaign on the part of STRATCOM to preempt the formal NPR process with its own internal policy review and vigorous advocacy on the Hill. The uniformed military and the civilian nuclear weapons bureaucracy closed ranks around STRATCOM’s perspective,
and NPR proceedings were leaked to selected members of Congress, who then waged partisan attacks against the administration.
There was no concerted effort by senior political appointees to broker or settle these disputes
over fundamental issues of U.S. grand strategy. The White House was just emerging from a series of bitter disputes with the armed forces over such issues as Somalia and gays in the military, and was battling both the military and an increasingly hostile Congress over defense spending priorities. The NSC was largely disengaged from the process, and DOD underwent a leadership change in the middle of the review and was preoccupied with other issues, such as dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program and the multiple proliferation concerns presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the end, the 1994 NPR essentially ratified the conclusions of STRATCOM’s own internal policy review: keep the triad, pursue no further reductions beyond those agreed to in START II, and stick with current operational doctrine.
Appendix II www.americanprogress.org 25
T
he 2001 NPR
The second formal NPR took place in 2001 under vastly different political and policy circumstances, and was structured in such a way as to produce the administration’s desired outcome. In a May 2000 presidential campaign speech, candidate George W. Bush linked reductions in U.S. nuclear forces to the aggressive pursuit of national missile
defense, with the latter being a core ideological objective for conservatives. Upon taking office, President Bush told his senior advisors that he wanted the NPR to result in significant nuclear reductions. This instruction was likely motivated by a desire to recast U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era, a key objective of Condoleezza Rice, his national security advisor, and Stephen Hadley, Rice’s deputy. Some senior officials in his administration also viewed the NPR process as an opportunity to consolidate support for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which was preordained, and pursuing national missile
defense. These factors helped ensure that the NPR would be ideological and driven by two presidential prerogatives, which guaranteed that senior officials would invest time and energy in the NPR process. But it also produced a posture that undermined America’s nonproliferation credentials.
The main parameters of the review were determined by a relatively small group of senior officials from the National Security Council and Department of Defense. The NPR was conducted primarily during the initial nine months of the new administration, a period of relative calm with few major international crises. Indeed, the main foreign policy battle the administration was gearing up for was over the ABM Treaty and missile defense. The administration attempted to take a page from Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, playbook and link nuclear reductions to missile defense. By developing and deploying such a system, the United States could render rogue nuclear arsenals, in Reagan’s words, “impotent and obsolete” and thereby free up the United States to make cuts in its own arsenal. The Bush administration also had the luxury of a less hostile Congress and, at least in 2001–2002, enjoyed a reputation for competency in defense policy due to the considerable experience of Bush’s cabinet and senior advisors.
On matters of nuclear doctrine, the appointees had a head start in the review process: most of them were involved in a task force study on nuclear weapons policy convened in 2000 by the National Institute for Public Policy, a conservative think tank. According to some participants,
this study served as a refresher on the relevance of nuclear weapons policy to U.S. national security and helped get senior appointees on the same page from day one.
Overall, the Bush NPR did not cut that hard against the grain of established nuclear orthodoxy within the Pentagon or generate any clear budgetary losers in the bureaucracy or Congress. This left the Bush administration’s critics with few constituencies to link up with and limited channels to wage a campaign against the NPR results. (Indeed, the most
26 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
potent early critic of the administration’s nuclear weapons policy turned out to be the Republican chairman of a House Appropriations subcommittee, David Hobson (OH), who challenged elements of the administration’s nuclear weapons budget proposal and not the review’s core conclusions per se.)
The NPR settled on 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed warheads, which marked a reduction
of around two-thirds in the operationally deployed force. That figure was codified in a May 2002 agreement with Russia called the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT. (Some senior officials, such as then-Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley, reportedly supported even deeper reductions, perhaps by several hundred, but were deterred by the prospect of a battle with then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
Senior participants in the 2001 NPR genuinely believed they reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. In his foreword to the NPR report submitted
to Congress, for example, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that “the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide its offensive deterrent capability.” But many countries, ranging from Russia to members of the NAM, judged the precise opposite when portions of the NPR were leaked to the press in early 2002. The NPR called for “greater flexibility” in the planning, development, and use of nuclear weapons, including the development and possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. It also singled out China and Russia as possible
targets for nuclear operations. Finally, the NPR divided U.S. strategic capabilities into three rhetorical categories described as the “new triad”: nuclear and conventional offenses, defenses such as missile defense, and a responsive nuclear weapons manufacturing
and surety infrastructure. The intended goals of this formulation were to signal a reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons to U.S. strategic policy and to boost the profile of missile defense.
Aside from the emphasis on missile defense, these developments did not mark a significant
change in nuclear weapons doctrine from the Clinton administration’s posture. The United States already considered the listed countries as possible targets for nuclear operations, for example, even if it hadn’t said so publicly. But the Bush administration’s aggressive unilateralism—particularly its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its new doctrine of preventive war—created an interpretative context for the NPR’s clumsily blunt language that led China, Russia, and many NAM countries to interpret the posture in the worst possible light. The “new triad” formulation, for example, was widely criticized as blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear forces. And the administration’s
ill-advised proposals for developing new tactical nuclear weapons such as the so-called “bunker buster,” which senior NPR participants viewed as enhancing deterrence (as opposed to supplementing conventional military operations), dramatically reinforced this interpretation.
Appendix II www.americanprogress.org 27
In the end, the 2001 NPR did great damage to America’s nonproliferation credentials. The defense department, which had responsibility for the public relations component of the NPR, had neglected to invest any time or energy into how the NPR results might be received by the administration’s many critics. When the criticisms began to mount, the administration made no concerted effort to counter them. This neglect is a reflection in part of the administration’s unilateralism—many senior officials simply didn’t care how foreign audiences would react. But the defense department was also distracted by the war in Afghanistan and early planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Participants in the 2001 NPR believe that a more effective communications plan might have blunted some of the criticism, although the hostility that the Bush administration’s broader unilateralism was generating around the world would have made this inherently difficult.
28 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Appendix III
A brief history of strategic arms control, 1969–2008
T
he Nixon/Ford years (1969–1977)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT I (1969–1972). This process led to the first treaties
and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union that would impose constraints on strategic weapons. The ABM Treaty was one product of this process. The other main product was the Interim Agreement, in which the United States and Russia agreed to stop building new ICBM silos, exercise restraint in expanding the size of existing ones, and cap the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and SSBNs. That agreement
expired in 1977.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or ABM (1972). The ABM Treaty banned deployment of a missile defense system intended to guard the entire nation against ballistic missiles, and prohibited a range of research and development activity that could lead to such a system. The United States withdrew from the treaty on June 13, 2002.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, or TTBT (1974). Concluded by the Nixon administration, this early attempt at arms control prohibited nuclear tests that exceeded 150 kt (10 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb) and established a number of transparency and verification measures. Limiting the permissible yield for nuclear testing would constrain development of new, more powerful weapons that could be used in a nuclear first strike. Both parties announced in 1976 their intention to observe the treaty’s yield limit pending ratification. Concerns over verification held up ratification, however, until 1987 when the two sides agreed on additional verification measures. The treaty finally entered into force in 1990. The treaty duration is rolling five-year terms, which are automatically renewed unless either party notifies the other of its intent to terminate.
T
he Carter years (1977–1981)
SALT II (1972–1979). The SALT II process began months after the SALT I process ended. It produced a treaty in 1979 that would limit both sides to a total of 2,400 delivery vehicles, where each ICBM silo, submarine missile-launch tube, or bomber was considAppendix
II www.americanprogress.org 29
ered a single delivery vehicle. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan later that year, however, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate to put advice and consent for the treaty on hold. Both countries initially pledged to abide by its terms pending ratification, but in May 1986 President Reagan renounced this pledge, saying “the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure.” Although the treaty was never ratified, Congress later that year enacted a nonbinding measure indicating “the sense of the Congress that it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sub-limits of the SALT II treaty as long as the Soviet Union complies with such sub-limits.”
T
he Reagan/Bush years (1981–1993)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF (1987). In this treaty, the United States and Russia agreed for the first time to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapon: ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with ranges between 500–5,500 kilometers. The treaty also featured provisions mandating on-site inspections to verify compliance and established a Special Verification Commission to facilitate treaty implementation.
The treaty entered into force in June 1988. Treaty membership expanded in 1991 to include Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which along with Russia had inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved. The provisions for on-site inspections expired on May 31, 2001, so verification is now conducted using surveillance satellites. The treaty is otherwise of unlimited duration.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I (1991). Under START, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads. The treaty features elaborate counting rules for determining these limits. The parties agreed to destroy excess delivery vehicles and accept intrusive inspections
to verify compliance. They also set a deadline of December 5, 2001 to comply with the treaty. All parties met that deadline.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 delayed the treaty’s entry into force because it produced four states with nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In May 1992, the parties signed the Lisbon Protocol, in which all four countries (along with the United States) agreed to sign START I. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. START I entered into force in December 1994.
The treaty will expire on December 5, 2009 unless the parties agree to a five-year extension. An extension for other time periods would constitute an amendment of the treaty and therefore require re-ratification by both parties.
30 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, or PNIs (1991–1992). The PNI is the first and only concrete effort by the United States and Russia to jointly reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals. On September 27, 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally end overseas deployment of ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons and destroy all weapons in this category. He also pledged to end deployments of tactical nuclear weapons on several naval platforms during “normal circumstances,” i.e. unless hostilities broke out.
Bush made these pledges in order to signal to the Soviet Union that the United States would not exploit Soviet weakness as the Soviet state disintegrated and to prompt Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to take reciprocal action. Bush worried that the command and control of the Soviet Union’s tactical nuclear forces, which it deployed in large numbers
throughout the Warsaw Pact, could be compromised. Gorbachev reciprocated with pledges to eliminate and/or consolidate several categories of tactical nuclear weapons.
The PNIs resulted in the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 American weapons. Estimates of the current size of the Russian tactical arsenal vary widely, but the range is likely to be 3,000 to 6,000, down from between 12,000 to 21,700 in 1991. But there are no mechanisms in place to verify compliance with the pledge, and periodic efforts to negotiate transparency measures, such as accounting exchanges on inventories, have yet to succeed. Russia has conditioned further negotiations on the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. tactical nuclear forces from Europe, where they are deployed per NATO policy. A decision to remove them would require the consent of all 26 NATO countries.
T
he Clinton years (1993–2001)
START II (1993) and START III. The core obligation in START II is to further reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500. Another important feature
of the treaty is that it would have banned multiple warheads on ICBMs. The United States ratified the treaty in January 1996 and Russia in May 2000, but Russia refused to exchange instruments of ratification unless the United States Congress approved a 1997 protocol that would extend the START II’s implementation deadline and a series of concurrently negotiated agreements that clarified and strengthened the ABM Treaty. Congress never approved these measures so START II has not entered into force.
START III was intended to serve as a follow-on agreement to START II. It envisioned further reductions and new transparency measures, but it was effectively superseded by the 2002 SORT agreement.
Appendix II www.americanprogress.org 31
T
he Bush years (2001–2009)
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT (2002). Signed by Russia and the United States in May 2002, it commits the parties to limiting their respective arsenals of operationally
deployed strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,000 by December 31, 2012, on which date SORT expires.
SORT suffers from several shortcomings. The treaty incorporates the verification measures of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, but that agreement is set to expire in December 2009, and there is no replacement for it yet. SORT does not specify a timetable or benchmarks to guide the implementation of the treaty, which makes it difficult to objectively
assess treaty implementation. In addition, SORT does not establish any ceilings for the number of strategic warheads kept in reserve or require that excess strategic warheads be dismantled or destroyed, so when the treaty expires in 2012, either party could launch a rapid nuclear build-up using stockpiled weapons and delivery vehicles.
32 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Selected references
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Catastrophe. New York: Times Books.
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Arms Control Association. 2002. “Summary of U.S. Implementation
of the ‘13 Practical Steps on Nonproliferation and Disarmament’ Agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.” (www.armscontrol.org/system/files/npt13steps.pdf).
Braun, Chaim, and Christopher Chyba. 2004. “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” International Security 29 (2).
Bunn, George and Christopher Chyba, eds. 2006. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats. Baltimore: Brookings
Institution Press.
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Campbell, Kurt M., Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds. 2004. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
Cirincione, Joseph, et. al., 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Threats. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Cirincione, Joseph, and Andrew Grotto. 2007. “Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran.” Washington: Center for American Progress.
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Deutch, John, et. al.. 2004. “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy.” Survival 46 (4): 65–80.
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Dunn, Lewis, et. al. 2006. “Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications.” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
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Henry L. Stimson Center.
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National Security Advisory Group. 2007. “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism.” Washington.
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Nolan, Janne E. 1989. Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Basic Books.
Nolan, Janne E., and James R. Holmes. 2008. “The Bureaucracy of Deterrence.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1).
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of the Atomic Scientists 63 (3).
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Payne, Keith B. 2001. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
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34 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
Endnotes www.americanprogress.org 35
Endnotes
1 George P. Shultz et. al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html; George P. Shultz et. al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries.
2 Shultz et. al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.”
3 National Security Advisory Group, “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism” (2007).
4 Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2007” (Cambridge: Harvard University/Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), available at www.nti.org/securingthebomb.
5 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Facilitating Implementation of Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific.” In Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2008).
6 Ibid.
36 Center for American Progress Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap
About the authors
Andrew J. Grotto
Andrew J. Grotto is a Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where he specializes in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, nuclear nonproliferation policy, and nuclear energy.
His work has appeared in a variety of scholarly and popular publications, and he is a frequent guest lecturer on nuclear nonproliferation at the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. State Department’s post-graduate school. He is also a regular guest commentator on nonproliferation and U.S. national security strategy for major international and national media outlets, including BBC, CNN, MSNBC, Al Jazeera, Fox, Sky Channel, National Public Radio, and Air America. In addition to his writings on defense policy, Grotto has also published scholarly works on international trade and intellectual property.
Grotto received his J.D. from the University of California at Berkeley, where he served as an editor of the Berkeley Journal of International Law. He received his master’s degree from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and his bachelor’s degree from the University of Kentucky, where he was a Gaines Fellow.
About the authors www.americanprogress.org 37
About the authors
Joseph Cirincione
Joseph Cirincione joined Ploughshares Fund as president in March 2008. He is author of Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons and served previously as senior vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress and as director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for eight years. He worked for nine years in the U.S. House of Representatives as a professional staff member of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Operations, and served as staff director of the bipartisan Military Reform Caucus. He teaches at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
His previous books include two editions of Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, (2005 and 2002), and previous reports include Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (co-author, March 2005) and WMD in Iraq (co-author, January 2004). He is the author of over 200 articles on defense issues, the producer of two DVDs on proliferation, the former publisher of the comprehensive proliferation website, Proliferation News, and is a frequent commentator in the media. In the past two years has delivered over 150 speeches around the world and appeared in the 2006 award-winning documentary, Why We Fight.
Cirincione is an expert advisor to the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. He also serves as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, headed by former Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) and former Senator Jim Talent (R-MO).
Cirincione is an honors graduate of Boston College and holds a Masters of Science from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.




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