Is Pakistan ready for a no-first use?

Is Pakistan ready for a no-first use?

Rabia Akhtar
The POST
Dec 05, 2008

The comments on Pakistan's nuclear no first use made by President Asif Ali Zardari, Chairman National Command Authority (NCA), in his address at the Leadership Summit by the Hindustan Times, New Delhi warrant serious contemplation. Not because such vague statements are subject to various interpretations adding to the ambiguity that already surrounds Pakistan's nuclear doctrine but because it signals a departure (if it is in fact) from Pakistan's current nuclear use doctrine. Regardless of whether President Zardari's statement was intentional or unintentional, it has gained considerable attention. What needs to be addressed is whether Pakistan is ready for a declared No First Use (NFU) policy as opposed to the current ambiguity which can be termed as a No No First Use (NNFU) posture?Pakistan's nuclear doctrine rests on the pillar of unpredictability whereby Pakistan has achieved strategic parity vis-à-vis India beyond the traditional theatre of war. Pakistan's nuclear red lines are ambiguous at best leaving the adversary in disarray as to when does nuclear first strike stand warranted and that has precisely been the advantage over the decade of overt nuclearisation. The very uncertainty of a Pakistani response limits the Indian room for manoeuvre thus imposing strict limitations on New Delhi's willingness to take risks. Drawn in an asymmetric relationship with India, in the absence of negative security assurances by the international community, it seemed justified to have resorted to an ambiguous no first use posture as a measure of credible deterrence. Pakistan's ambiguity about a NFU comes from that fact that superior Indian conventional forces make the nuclear option imperative to save Pakistan in an event where India launches a debilitating conventional military attack on Pakistan. If India does not cross the un-stated but understood nuclear thresholds and continues engaging Pakistan in a peace process, then what President Zardari has stated stands its ground that we hope 'we never get to that position' of using nuclear weapons at all. As for the current strategic environment prevalent in and around Pakistan, the ambiguity about NFU is integral to Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. It stands as a viable policy and it is rational to keep pursuing it for times to come. Various factors contribute to the viability of this doctrine and its continuity as a solution in the shape of offence/defence balance to our security dilemma. First, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has raised enough controversies worldwide and according to various studies and estimates, the deal provides India the leverage to use its domestic uranium reserves for nuclear weapons build-up. Second, the statements that have originated post Indo-US nuclear agreement with respect to India's sovereign right to nuclear testing, hold considerable policy and doctrinal implications for Pakistan especially because India proposes to graduate its deterrence from a minimum position once it acquires a significant number of nuclear weapons that are beyond the current 'minimum' stockpile. It could very well be that since Pakistan's minimum deterrence posture is relative to that of India, an increase in India's nuclear weapon stockpile coupled with its prospects of acquiring a ballistic missile defence would demand an increase in Pakistan's nuclear stockpile to manage and sustain deterrence as well as strategic parity. Pakistan since 9/11 is in a precarious position surrounded with both short and long term threats. Various threats need to be analysed which include US nuclear submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with an operational 'first use' doctrine; NATO's future role in the IOR with an operational 'first-use' doctrine coupled with US/NATO joint force presence on Pakistan's western borders. Moreover, the prospects of being sandwiched between a nuclear India and a nuclear Iran suggest an 'offensive defence' doctrine that rests on a NNFU policy. Given the rapidly changing international environment, it will only be rational that Pakistan should not revise its current ambiguity about its NFU policy at any cost. Under the prevailing circumstances, it could very well be that Pakistan might need to enter into multilateral deterrent relationships besides the existing bilateral one with India in times ahead.

The writer is Chair Department Defence and Diplomatic Studies at Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi