India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is planning a large expansion of nuclear power, in which fast breeder reactors play an important role. Fast breeder reactors are attractive to the DAE because they produce (or "breed") more fissile material than they use. The breeder reactor is especially attractive in India, which hopes to develop a large domestic nuclear energy program even though it has primarily poor quality uranium ore that is expensive to mine.
Currently, only one fast reactor operates in the country--a small test reactor in Kalpakkam, a small township about 80 kilometers (almost 50 miles) south of Chennai. The construction of a larger prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) is underway at the same location. This reactor is expected to be completed in 2010 and will use mixed plutonium-uranium oxide as fuel in its core, with a blanket of depleted uranium oxide that will absorb neutrons and transmute into plutonium 239. Liquid sodium will be used to cool the core, which will produce 1,200 megawatts of thermal power and 500 megawatts of electricity. The reactor is to be the first of hundreds that the DAE envisions constructing throughout India by mid-century.
However, such an expansion of fast reactors, even if more modest than DAE projections, could adversely affect public health and safety. While all nuclear reactors are susceptible to catastrophic accidents, fast reactors pose a unique risk. In fast reactors, the core isn't in its most reactive--or energy producing-- configuration when operating normally. Therefore, an accident that rearranges the fuel in the core could lead to an increase in reaction rate and an increase in energy production. If this were to occur quickly, it could lead to a large, explosive energy release that might rupture the reactor vessel and disperse radioactive material into the environment.
Many of these reactors also have what is called a "positive coolant void coefficient," which means that if the coolant in the central part of the core were to heat up and form bubbles of sodium vapor, the reactivity--a measure of the neutron balance within the core, which determines the reactor's tendency to change its power level (if it is positive, the power level rises)--would increase; therefore core melting could accelerate during an accident. (A positive coolant void coefficient, though not involving sodium, contributed to the runaway reaction increase during the April 1986 Chernobyl reactor accident.) In contrast, conventional light water reactors typically have a "negative coolant void coefficient" so that a loss of coolant reduces the core's reactivity. The existing Indian fast breeder test reactor, with its much smaller core, doesn't have a positive coolant void coefficient. Thus, the DAE doesn't have real-world experience in handling the safety challenges that a large prototype reactor will pose.
More largely, international experience shows that fast breeder reactors aren't ready for commercial use. Superphénix, the flagship of the French breeder program, remained inoperative for the majority of its 11-year lifetime until it was finally shuttered in 1996. Concerns about the adequacy of the design of the German fast breeder reactor led to it being contested by environmental groups and the local state government in the 1980s and ultimately to its cancellation in 1991. And the Japanese fast reactor Monju shut down in 1995 after a sodium coolant leak caused a fire and has yet to restart. Only China and Russia are still developing fast breeders. China, however, has yet to operate one, and the Russian BN-600 fast reactor has suffered repeated sodium leaks and fires.
When it comes to India's prototype fast breeder reactor, two distinct questions must be asked: (1) Is there confidence about how an accident would propagate inside the core and how much energy it might release?; and (2) have PFBR design efforts been as strict as necessary, given the possibility that an accident would be difficult to contain and potentially harmful to the surrounding population?
The simple answer to both is no.
The DAE, like other fast-reactor developers, has tried to study how severe a core-disruptive accident would be and how much energy it would release. In the case of the PFBR, the DAE has argued that the worst-case core disruptive accident would release an explosive energy of 100 megajoules. This is questionable.
The DAE's estimate is much smaller when compared with other fast reactors, especially when the much larger power capacity of the PFBR--and thus, the larger amount of fissile material used in the reactor--is taken into account. For example, it was estimated that the smaller German reactor (designed to produce 760 megawatts of thermal energy) would produce 370 megajoules in the event of a core-disruptive accident--much higher than the PFBR estimate. Other fast reactors around the world have similarly higher estimates for how much energy would be produced in such accidents.
The DAE's estimate is based on two main assumptions: (1) that only part of the core will melt down and contribute to the accident; and (2) that only about 1 percent of the thermal energy released during the accident would be converted into mechanical energy that can damage the containment building and cause ejection of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.
Neither of these assumptions is justifiable. Britain's Atomic Energy Authority has done experiments that suggest up to 4 percent of the thermal energy could be converted into mechanical energy. And the phenomena that might occur inside the reactor core during a severe accident are very complex, so there's no way to stage a full-scale experiment to compare with the theoretical accident models that the reactor's designers used in their estimates. In addition, important omissions in the DAE's own safety studies make their analysis inadequately conservative. (Our independent estimates of the energy produced in a hypothetical PFBR core disruptive accident are presented in the Science and Global Security article, "Compromising Safety: Design Choices and Severe Accident Possibilities in India's Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor" and these are much higher than the DAE's estimates.)
Turning to the second question: In terms of the stringency of the DAE's design effort, the record reveals inadequate safety precautions. One goal of any "defense-in-depth" design is to engineer barriers to withstand the most severe accident that's considered plausible. Important among these barriers is the reactor's containment building, the most visible structure from the outside of any nuclear plant. Compared to most other breeder reactors, and light water reactors for that matter, the design of the PFBR's containment is relatively weak and won't be able to contain an accident that releases a large amount of energy. The DAE knows how to build stronger containments--its newest heavy water reactor design has a containment building that is meant to withstand six times more pressure than the PFBR's containment--but has chosen not to do so for the PFBR.
The other unsafe design choice is that of the reactor core. As mentioned earlier, the destabilizing positive coolant void coefficient in fast reactors is a problem because it increases the possibility that reactivity will escalate inside the core during an accident. It's possible to decrease this effect by designing the reactor core so that fuel subassemblies are interspersed within the depleted uranium blanket, in what is termed a heterogeneous core. The U.S. Clinch River Breeder Reactor, which was eventually cancelled, was designed with a heterogeneous core, and Russia has considered a heterogeneous core for its planned BN-1600 reactor. The DAE hasn't made such an effort, and the person who directed India's fast breeder program during part of the design phase once argued that the emphasis on the coolant void coefficient was mistaken because a negative void coefficient could lead to dangerous situations in an accident as well. That might be true, but it misses the obvious point that the same potentially dangerous situations would be even more dangerous if the void coefficient within the core is positive.
Both of these design choices--a weak containment building and a reactor core with a large and positive void coefficient--are readily explainable: They lowered costs. Reducing the sodium coolant void coefficient would have increased the fissile material requirement of the reactor by 30-50 percent--an expensive component of the initial costs. Likewise, a stronger containment building would have cost more. All of this is motivated by the DAE's assessment that "the capital cost of [fast breeder reactors] will remain the most important hurdle" to their rapid deployment.
Lowered electricity costs would normally be most welcome, but not with the increased risk of catastrophic accidents caused by poorly designed fast breeder reactors.
Copyright © 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. All Rights Reserved.
Source URL (retrieved on 07/27/2009 - 17:42):
http://thebulletin.org/node/7471
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
America's Nuclear Game...Shireen M Mazari, The News...08/07/09
Obama is certainly stretching his global goodwill to its limits. After critiquing the US invasion of Iraq when out of power, he has upped the military ante with the surge in Afghanistan; refocused on the military centric approach in Pakistan with a massive increase in drone attacks against Pakistani civilians (just so much "collateral damage" for the US of course) on the one hand, and with the successful goading of the Pakistan military through the Zardari nexus into FATA where the quagmire is already unfolding in the terrible deaths of our soldiers and innocent civilians while the terrorism issue shows no signs of abating. Pakistan has come out the worst in Obama's policies especially in terms of the growing intrusiveness the US is acquiring in our daily lives with US inspectors now promising to hover in all our bureaucracies to see that the "aid" they are giving is spent as they see fit – not to mention the $.9 billion that will immediately go back to the US for the rebuilding of its embassy in a more imperial design. However, it is not just Pakistan that is suffering from what is effectively a right-wing Obama agenda. Now Obama has teamed up with Russia to fool the world in terms of nuclear disarmament. The US and Russian leaders declared in a grand fashion that they have agreed to reduce their existing nuclear stockpiles but failed to tell the world that most of these reductions would be of redundant weapons which will create space for the new ones. After all, neither side avowed to stop adding to their arsenals! An even more dangerous development has been the gradual taking over of critical international institutions by the US and its preferred personnel. We first saw the UN effectively become a tool in US hands with the Secretary-Generalship going to South Korea's Ban Ki Moon – a look at the UN record post the Moon takeover will be self-explanatory. Now we have seen the IAEA once again coming under the US and its allies' control with the election of Japan's Ambassador Yukiya Amano by the IAEA BoG followed by his formal appointment by the BoG. Now the General Conference will confirm this appointment later in September. This election of Amano is unfortunate since the strong positions taken by the present DG, El Baradei stand threatened as the Japanese have always gone along with US positions – something Baradei did not do and therefore fell afoul of this super power. Competing with Amano was South Africa's Abdul Samad Minty – a respected and strong diplomat, which is why the US had nightmares. Till the last ballot, the stalemate persisted but in the end one vote changed it all and the Indian media has been agog with how their last minute reversal to an abstention allowed Amano to win. No one will ever know but having seen Minty in action two years ago, he would have been the more desirable strong man to follow Baradei and maintain IAEA's independent positioning on issues like Iran. So now the US has won back control of the UN and IAEA. Apparently, the US is already using the Japanese to wield pressure where it cannot do so itself too overtly. In this connection, recently a Japanese team visited Pakistan demanding access to Dr Khan but were not successful. Now with Amano at the helm at the IAEA, what sort of Japanese pressure will we see vis a vis Pakistan? Perhaps it is time we drew more attention to Japan's massive civil nuclear programme and its controversial reprocessing agenda. Nor is this all in terms of US seeking to implement its nuclear agenda globally. It has got things moving again at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). Perhaps after what happened at the IAEA on the Indian safeguards agreement, we should not be surprised to find that our highly competent head diplomat in Geneva also buckled under (or was made to) and accepted the US-pushed programme of work for the CD. This does not specifically include the issue of existing nuclear stockpiles in relation to the FMCT so has Pakistan shifted its position to its permanent disadvantage under US pressure once again? Also, while the programme of work has identified four issues – FMCT, Nuclear Disarmament, PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space) and Negative Security Guarantees – by delinking these issues the attempt is clearly to move on the FMCT without conditionalities relating to the other three issues. This is again a major shift because many states including China wanted linkages between the FMCT and PAROS for instance. Now it would appear that the US will again move on the FMCT as it did on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the UN in the sixties. When states like Pakistan had raised issues of negative and positive security guarantees to be linked to the NPT, the US insisted that first the NPT should be approved and then the security guarantee issues could be dealt with. The result was that the Conference on the security guarantees followed the passage of the NPT and the US was not prepared to even provide negative security assurances in any form whatsoever to non-nuclear weapons states. For Pakistan all these issues, and none more so than the issue of reduction of existing stockpiles of fissile material, are very crucial in the context of the FMCT and even if we have to go it alone we should, because otherwise we will be at a permanent disadvantage. But the way things are unfolding it appears we may have made some fatal compromises already in this regard.It is in this overall context of the US pushing its nuclear agenda globally that we must raise our voices of concern over what seems to have become a covert official US policy – to allow Israel to deal with Iran's nuclear facilities. Most recently Biden (New York Times) stated that the US would not "stand in Israel's way" if it sought to take action against Iran's nuclear facilities. It was amusing to hear Biden talk of Israel being a "sovereign" state taking its own decisions! Now when did the US ever respect any state's sovereignty – as we in Pakistan have continuously experienced and still do so! Be that as it may, the Biden statement was threatening because it came alongside a 5th July 2009 Sunday Times story that Israel's Mossad chief had informed his prime minister of Saudi Arabia's assurance to him that it would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over Saudi air space to conduct attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities. Early this year it had also been reported that the Mossad Chief, Dagan, had met Saudi officials. So a new and threatening pattern is emerging even as Obama seeks to woo the world with what is now becoming his glibness rather than a serious intent to alter the course of US policies on security issues. Is it a mere coincidence that we are now seeing unprecedented violence breaking out in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi? We know that the East Turkmenistan Movement still has its offices in New York. So what is the US intent? To send a hostile message to China? What exactly is the Obama administration up to? Is it all a matter of old wine in new bottles rather than any major shift away from a neoimperialist mindset that has been the hallmark of US global policies for some time now? Too bad. So many had expected so much from Obama – the thinking, intelligent and more world-sensitive US president. But what we are seeing around our part of the world is more of the same – with the new veneer eroding fast. More force; more aggression; more dictation. Just as our leaders crumble once again before the US demands, the US leadership offers little that will compel us to alter our perception of a neoimperial power set on a military-centric course for this part of the world. As before, this course will bring them to ruin but must we go down the same suicidal path?
The writer is a defence analyst. Email: callstr@hotmail.com
Sunday, June 28, 2009
‘US helping modernise Pakistan’s N-arsenal’ --- Anwar Iqbal
‘US helping modernise Pakistan’s N-arsenal’
Anwar Iqbal
Dawn News---29/06/09
Anwar Iqbal
Dawn News---29/06/09
WASHINGTON: The United States is helping Pakistan modernise its nuclear arsenal in hopes to make them safer, says a report released on Sunday.
Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.
But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.
The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.
This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.
The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.
‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’
The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.
In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.
The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’
The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.
The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.
Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.
The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.
‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.
The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.
But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.
The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.
This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.
The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.
‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’
The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.
In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.
The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’
The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.
The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.
Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.
The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.
‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.
The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
The Nuclear Non-Option
The Nuclear Non-Option
Christina Jung
The Korea Times
06/24/09
Christina Jung
The Korea Times
06/24/09
The time has come for South Korea to lay its cards on the table and openly discuss what is to be done about North Korea.News of sanctions and "stern'' measures are now widespread, and play a necessary part in curbing the North's deeply misguided nuclear ambitions. While there may never be a final resolution to this highly complex issue, South Korea would do well to steer clear of one option that appears to be gaining traction in conservative circles ― the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons in order to conclusively deter the North.Acquiring a nuclear weapon to balance the ostensible South-North power asymmetry may provide immediate relief and perhaps a thinly veiled sense of security, but it would nonetheless be devastating to the South's long-term interests in a number of ways. The most obvious result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be further regional destabilization. It would needlessly flare up tensions between the South and its neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan. More significantly, a nuclear South would aggravate tensions with the North, and may culminate in a North-South arms race in a worst-case scenario. None of these outcomes would be conducive to any of the goals that the South wishes to achieve, both within the peninsula and throughout the greater Northeast Asian region.From a more global perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine the international status that the South has built as a non-nuclear weapon state. South Korea is a signatory to numerous international and regional treaties on nuclear weapons, the most central of which is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Acquiring a nuclear weapon would thus effectively render null and void its participation in all of these significant agreements, which prohibit nuclear proliferation and possession. The South's inconsistency would also undoubtedly draw the criticism and ire from its allies and partners, dealing a significant blow to its credibility in global affairs.And if there was ever a surefire way to ensure that the North never gives up its nuclear weapons, it would be for the South to acquire its own. One significant leverage the South maintains over the North lies in its nuclear weapon-free status, for it gives the South a legitimate right to demand that the North dismantle its nuclear capability. Without this leverage, the South would be a hypocrite to demand nuclear dismantlement from the North, and would give the North even more reason to cling to its nuclear program. The suggestion of a nuclear option therefore defies all logic in the context of the South's foremost aims toward the North, which is to persuade the hermit regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons program.Furthermore, those who argue for the South's acquisition of weapons base their claims on the weak presumption that the North's nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the South. To be sure, we cannot entirely preclude the possibility that the North will consciously seek to impose nuclear destruction on the South. Nonetheless, we can be fairly certain that this scenario is unlikely, as any pursuit by the North to destroy the South would inevitably bring self-destruction in the form of retaliatory strikes. While it would be unwise to underestimate the physical threat posed by nuclear capability, it is now apparent that, for the North, nuclear weapons have become a tool of power consolidation domestically and of bargaining leverage internationally ― and not much more. Combined with the assurances of protection under Washington's nuclear umbrella, we can therefore be reasonably confident that no direct existential threat exists.Finally, there is always the classic concern over human error. As history attests, humans are particularly prone to blunders involving judgment on delicate issues. Obviously, the only way to guarantee that no nuclear mishaps occur is to deny their possession; once a nation acquires nuclear weapons, there will always be an infinite number of opportunities for error and misuse.And this should be at the heart of South's pursuit to dismantle the North's capabilities ― the potential for error is always too large.South Korea possesses globally competitive nuclear power plant construction technology, and the country could easily exploit this expertise to develop its own nuclear weapons program. To do so would be tragic, however. Such technology should remain a force for good ― as an invaluable tool to export peaceful nuclear energy use worldwide, especially in high-risk areas ― and must not be abused as a means to satisfy a myopic desire for power.Instead of wringing hands over whether the South should or shouldn't acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear acquisition card should be pushed aside in favor of those more in harmony with its long-term interests. One card off the table will help the South's decision over the North, if even marginally.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
view: Mystery of Indian scientist’s death —Haleema Saadia
view: Mystery of Indian scientist’s death —Haleema Saadia
Daily Times --- 22/06/09
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\06\22\story_22-6-2009_pg3_5
Daily Times --- 22/06/09
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\06\22\story_22-6-2009_pg3_5
Stories surrounding the nuclear scientist’s suicide seem quite dubious. Mental health professionals generally agree that anyone contemplating suicide desires a swift death. Why would Mahalingam choose torturous and slow death? Did somebody throw him in the river?The dead body of an Indian nuclear scientist Lokanathan Mahalingam was found six days after he mysteriously went missing. According to the police he committed suicide by jumping into the Kali River in Kaiga township in Karwar, Karnataka.The stories surrounding the nuclear scientist’s suicide seem quite dubious. Mental health professionals generally agree that anyone contemplating suicide desires a swift death. Why would Mahalingam choose torturous and slow death? Did somebody throw him in the river? Was he injured or murdered before his body was thrown into the flooded Kali River? Whether Mahalingam was thrown into the river or he willingly offered his life to the powerful currents is going to remain a mystery since his remains have been cremated. A DNA test was performed to ascertain the identity of the dead body because his family members feared that the authorities might have handed over the dead body of someone else. They expected foul play which is why they demanded DNA testing. But that also raises the question: why was he cremated in such a hurry even before the results of the DNA test and the post-mortem report? The presence or absence of air in his lungs, any signs of torture on his body and the level of decomposition could have pointed out to the circumstances in which he met his final end.It is also intriguing that shortly after his body was found by the naval divers, the police announced its verdict that the scientist had committed suicide. The conclusion was premature since Mahalingam left no suicide note, another normal practice with those planning to commit suicide. How could the police state with certainty if the death was suicide? Reports suggest it could be an attempt to quash rumours of the scientist’s kidnapping and subsequent murder. But by acting thus the authorities have disregarded the efforts and contribution of Mahalingam to the Indian nuclear programme and have done a disservice to his family. By ignoring the possibility of target killing, they have subjected their nuclear scientists and engineers to a life of threat and danger. What would be the response of Indian nuclear establishment if another one of their personnel having access to sensitive nuclear information met a similar end? Even if this version of Mahalingam’s death is accepted, the suicide of an Indian nuclear scientist who worked in a sensitive field is not an ordinary event. It points to the shaky human and personnel reliability in the Indian nuclear complex. Till his apparent suicide Mahalingam was working on a sensitive and important post at the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant. Kaiga Atomic Power Plant is not a civilian nuclear plant and is not under IAEA safeguards. It is part of India’s nuclear weapons complex and is designed for plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Mahalingam had a quarter-century experience of working on nuclear reactors. He was by no means a junior officer as wrongly claimed by some Indian newspapers. Interestingly, he had past record of absence without permission. After returning from his worrisome absence, ten years ago, he claimed to have gone in search of spiritual solace. It was the responsibility of the Indian nuclear security apparatus to verify his claims and keep an eye on his activities. Had any action been taken, this mishap would not have happened. It seems that no thought is given to maintaining personality profiles of scientists working in the sensitive areas of the nuclear programme in India. Nuclear weapons possessor states have designed Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP) to ensure that only the most trustful, reliable and dependable individuals exhibiting excellent conduct and responsible behaviour are assigned sensitive jobs. PRP is a measure to prevent proliferation and minimise the threat of accidents due to deviant behaviour and potentially dangerous activities. To top the recklessness shown by those responsible for ensuring security of India’s nuclear complex Mahalingam was given the sensitive task of training young scientists. Until his disappearance he was working in the Simulator Training Division of the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant. A simulator is a precise replica of the control room of a nuclear power plant and the personnel working in that particular area are carefully chosen. The simulator control room mimics the situations and events taking place in the operational control room of nuclear reactor. Scientists and engineers are trained on simulators before they assume their duties on the nuclear plant. Personnel in the control room are highly experienced and have inside knowledge of the all the operations taking place in the nuclear reactor. A slight mistake or a small error of judgement on their part can create havoc. These individuals are responsible for the safe operation of the nuclear reactor and they have to be vigilant enough to deal with any emergency that might arise at any point in time.Apart from the current debacle, Indian nuclear programme has been in the news for all the wrong reasons. This is not the first case of mysterious disappearance and death of an employee of India’s strategic programme. A few weeks back another employee Ravi Mule of the same Kaiga Atomic Power Plant was murdered and his dead body was found in jungle in Kaiga township. Dr Anil Kumar Tiwari, the Director of Uttaranchal Space Application Centre, was assassinated on November 11, 2006. Both cases remain unsolved to date. Also, many cases of uranium thefts and smuggling from Indian nuclear facilities have been reported in the past several years. Indian scientists have been found involved in proliferation activities and have provided crucial know-how to Iran and Iraq. The US had imposed sanctions on two former chiefs Dr YSR. Prasad and Dr C Surendar of Nuclear Power Corporation of India in 2004. The United States, which has cut a nuclear deal with India, should stress upon India to clean up its act and put in place stringent safety and security measures as well as develop a reliable PRP. India claims to be a responsible nuclear power but that responsibility should be evident in its practices as well.
Haleema Saadia is a research fellow at SASSI, Islamabad. She can be reached at saadia.haleema@gmail.com
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
N-strategy for dummies ---------- The News-18/06/09
N-strategy for dummies
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Rabia Akhtar:The defence analyst. Email: rabois@gmail.com
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Rabia Akhtar:The defence analyst. Email: rabois@gmail.com
Nuclear weapons are weapons of the weak because they embolden the weaker state through security that nuclear deterrence provides. There is enough evidence in history to reveal that deterrence as a strategy with its various phases from flexible response to mutually assured destruction (MAD) held value for the two Cold War rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union, only to deny the other 'nuclear superiority' or 'nuclear advantage'. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, the unipolar world order emerged and the US, being the mightiest, moved away from MAD to the doctrine of pre-emption which made much more sense because there was no point anymore in threatening the enemy when it could be beaten ten times over. The powerful state will not rely on deterrence as much as it will rely on pre-emption (either through conventional or nuclear means) because it can afford to. But for the weak states, nuclear weapons are power personified. However unfortunate the situation might seem, there is simply no comparison of states like Pakistan with the United States where an overwhelming conventional capability is absent thus deterrence through MAD seems not only plausible but the only rational doctrine to adopt. For those who do not respect deterrence for what it is worth for the weak and think of the bomb as a liability, history needs to be read backwards. While the critics of deterrence may like to believe that deterrence failed to prevent Vietnam, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egypt-Israel conflict, Kargil crisis when one or the other parties involved were nuclear-weapon states, the lesson learnt is that deterrence works best when it is direct and mutual. In all the cases cited above with the exception of Kargil, blaming the bomb or deterrence is simple ignorance about the facts of Cold War history. For instance, had Egypt possessed even a small nuclear force at the time of the Suez crisis, Anglo-French involvement in the conflict would have been on different grounds altogether; Czechs possessing a few nuclear weapons would have seen a different Russian response and North Korea and Iran have already brought the superpowers to the 'negotiating table'. For Pakistan and India where deterrence is direct and mutual, I believe that it is the minimalist form of MAD coupled with a credible minimum deterrence doctrine that has helped prevent escalation between India and Pakistan and has denied India escalation dominance in every crisis. It has become rather fashionable for analysts at home and abroad to find parallels between the Cold War and the two South Asian rivals instead of founding new theories about crisis behaviour of Pakistan and India. The Cold War history of deterrence witnessed the shift from MAD to the discourse on defence. The cornerstone of the US nuclear security strategy remained reliance on MAD and Robert McNamara, the then US secretary of defence, articulated it well by stating that quantitative improvement in strategic weapons other than those required by MAD was not necessary simply because there was no longer any such thing as nuclear superiority, thus rendering defence useless. As bizarre or uncomfortable the notion might be for the peace nicks; for the weak states nuclear weapons still make sense. The very fact that Pakistan has the capability to threaten the Indians to escalate the conflict by 'threatening' to use nuclear weapons, denies the Indians the advantage of launching and fighting a conventional war in South Asia. This is the 'stability' that MAD provides between Pakistan and India which borders on rationality from the weaker states' perspective. The key, however, to sustain credible deterrence in a hostile crisis-prone environment for Pakistan is to continue to deny Indians the nuclear advantage they are seeking by gradually strengthening its nuclear deterrence.
Comment: Riedel and the Pakistani Bomb —Naeem Salik
Daily Times - Site Edition
Thursday, June 18, 2009
A person of Mr Riedel’s stature should be very careful in gathering and verifying his facts and should also avoid using unsubstantiated stereotypes and sweeping statementsIn the past month or so, there has been a concerted media campaign in the United States raising concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Alarmist press reports were interspersed with some reassuring statements by responsible officials, including President Obama himself, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus.Not to be left behind was Mr Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who served in the NSC during the Clinton administration and is currently a senior fellow at the Saban Centre for Israel and Middle East at the Brookings Institution at Washington, DC. But more importantly he is one of the senior advisors to President Obama on the so-called ‘Af-Pak’ policy. For that particular reason, Mr Riedel’s diatribe against Pakistan and its nuclear security — “Pakistan and the Bomb: How the US can divert a crisis” — published in the Wall Street Journal of May 30, 2009 is being viewed in Pakistan as very disturbing.Mr Riedel has an axe to grind with Pakistan. He came to Pakistan as part of Strobe Talbott’s team in an emotionally charged atmosphere after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 on an impossible mission to persuade Pakistan from following suit. Unfortunately for him and his team, they were meted out very roughshod treatment by senior Pakistani diplomats and he still carries the scar of that experience. He has written in the past on issues related to Pakistan in terms not very favourable to Pakistan, which is perfectly understandable given the fact that most of these papers were commissioned by the Centre for Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.In his WSJ piece, Mr Riedel has made some very positive points, such as calling upon the US to have constancy and consistency in its policy towards Pakistan and to avoid using double standards when treating India and Pakistan. He has also debunked the idea floated around by some in the US political as well as think tank circles of ‘securing’ the Pakistani nuclear arsenal by force, calling it unrealistic and counterproductive.He has also grudgingly acknowledged that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been any proliferation activity involving any Pakistani national since 2004. He has also conceded that Pakistan’s arsenal is well protected, concealed and dispersed. However, he has added so many qualifiers in the form of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ that he has more or less nullified the positive side of these comments. While one does not contest Mr Riedel’s right to have and express his opinions, he should be mindful of the fact that such utterances would not be viewed in Pakistan as his personal views due to his official position. More importantly, a person of his stature should be very careful in gathering and verifying his facts and should also avoid using unsubstantiated stereotypes and sweeping statements.For instance, it is surprising that Mr Riedel has named Yaqub Khan as Pakistan’s military ruler in 1971 instead of Yahya Khan; maybe a quick glance through the country fact file of his old employers would have given him the correct answer.Similarly, on the issue of whether the assistance given to Pakistan has been utilised to expand Pakistan’s nuclear capability, Mr Riedel did not have to look very far. The Pakistan Aid Table compiled by Alan Kronstandt of the Congressional Research Service has given the breakdown, which clearly illustrates that $5.7 billion have been disbursed under the head Coalition Support Fund, which essentially means reimbursement of money spent by Pakistan in providing logistical support to US forces and the expenditure incurred by Pakistan in its own counterterrorism operations.But facts don’t seem to be Mr Riedel’s strength as is evident from his unsubstantiated statements about the ‘shaky’ security of Pakistan’s ‘fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world’ as a result of the ongoing military operation against the Taliban. He says this without establishing a causal relationship between the two events. He also alleges that Pakistan is constructing ‘several’ new reactors — again without any factual basis.The funniest comment is about Pakistan’s efforts to ‘buy more reactors from China to increase its production of fissile material’. Mr Riedel should know better: Pakistan has so far purchased two nuclear reactors from China which are under IAEA safeguards, and if it purchases more of the same, those too would be covered by similar safeguards. Secondly, these reactors are light water or boiling water type reactors that are not suited for producing fissile material even if they were not safeguarded.Mr Riedel has also termed Pakistan a ‘unique’ nuclear country, which has both obtained and proliferated nuclear technology. Just a brief recap of US nuclear history would tell Mr Riedel that all the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were European expatriates — none except one had US citizenship — who had escaped to the US with their ‘stolen’ nuclear secrets from Germany, Italy, Austria and the Scandinavian countries.It is no secret that US later helped Britain and France; Russia helped China; India was assisted by Canada, the US, Britain and France; Germany helped South Africa and Brazil; France virtually built the Israeli nuclear infrastructure; and he only needs to ask Seymour Hersh about the ultimate destination of large quantities of fissile materials stolen from US labs. Then how is Pakistan ‘unique’?There are many more factually incorrect, loaded and deliberately twisted statements that cannot be possibly be addressed given the limitation of space. But one can only hope that responsible people like Bruce Riedel will be more careful with their facts next time around and will be mindful of the fact that unlike journalistic statements, their comments carry serious implications and create doubts in the minds of the Pakistani people about the sincerity of the US’ commitment to Pakistan. Finally, with regards to Mr Riedel’s fears about a ‘jihadist’ takeover of Pakistan and his overblown concern about Pakistan itself falling into wrong hands, one only needs to look at the results of the national elections of February 2008, which unequivocally dispelled these misplaced fears which were also being expressed on the eve of the elections.
Naeem Salik: The writer is a retired brigadier and a defence analyst
Monday, June 8, 2009
Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program
Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program
Written by The Public Record
Friday, 05 June 2009 20:25
http://www.pubrecord.org/nationworld/933-documents-offer-new-revelations-of-israeli-nuclear-weapons-program.html
Written by The Public Record
Friday, 05 June 2009 20:25
http://www.pubrecord.org/nationworld/933-documents-offer-new-revelations-of-israeli-nuclear-weapons-program.html
Recent Actions by Declassification Panel Show Pattern of CIA Overclassification and Tight Grip on Early Cold War History
New Declassification Releases by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)
During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the few U.S. intelligence organizations to dissent from the Bush administration's allegations of a revved-up Iraqi nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell ignored his own experts, but INR's prescience raised its prestige.
INR also got it right in its forecast of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, according to a recently declassified post-mortem on the U.S. intelligence failure during the October War, published today by the National Security Archive. In the spring of 1973, INR analysts wrote that, absent diplomatic progress in the Middle East, "the resumption of hostilities will become a better than even bet."
INR analysts argued that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would go to war not for specific military objectives, but to take "military action which can be sustained long enough" to get the United States and the Soviet Union strongly involved in the Middle East peace process.
The authors of the October War post-mortem saw the INR estimate as a "case of wisdom lost," because as the signs of conflict unfolded in the fall of 1973, the intelligence establishment forgot those warnings. The post-mortem, which reviewed failures to take into account communications intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), quickly became a secret "best seller" in the intelligence establishment after it was published.
When the Archive filed a mandatory review request for the post-mortem, the CIA denied much of the document, and it took a decision by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in response to the Archive's appeal to reverse the CIA decision and declassify much more of the withheld information. Acting as the court of last resort for mandatory declassification review requests, ISCAP recently reversed other CIA initial denials of documents from the 1960s and 1970s. While it exempted material it regards as sensitive, ISCAP nevertheless found that much of the information denied by the CIA could be declassified without harm to national security.
Among the ISCAP Releases Are:
The U.S. government's first intelligence estimate--a Special National Intelligence Estimate from December 1960--on the purposes of Israeli nuclear activities at a nuclear reactor complex near Beersheba: "We believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort."
Biographical sketches of members of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. For years, the CIA routinely refused to declassify its biographical reporting.
A top secret report from November 1973 on the possibility that Moscow shipped nuclear weapons into Soviet bases in Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war.
A National Intelligence Estimate from April 1986 on "The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups" which found that the "prospects that terrorists will attempt high-level nuclear terrorism" was "low to very low." While the CIA analysts speculated that even the terrorist groups of the 1980s may have had inhibitions against actions that produced civilian mass casualties, they suggested that the inhibitions could erode and that groups "with a different state of mind" could emerge.
ISCAP's decision to declassify these documents is commendable, but the CIA's initial denials suggest that the Agency is following overly restrictive declassification review standards. Just as troubling, the Agency used the CIA Information Act to prevent ISCAP from making a decision on the classification status of a history of early covert operations, "Office of Policy Coordination, 1948-1952."
These CIA examples suggest that the rules and regulations that support the U.S. government secrecy system enable government agencies to follow unreasonably narrow standards. Moreover, as the CIA's action on the covert operations history suggests, laws on the books give the Agency inordinate power to keep the veil of secrecy over important parts of its history. Indeed, President George W. Bush's executive order on secrecy policy, still in force, gives the CIA veto power over ISCAP decisions on intelligence records. These problems point out the need for significant change in the U.S. government's secrecy policy.
New Declassification Releases by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)
During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the few U.S. intelligence organizations to dissent from the Bush administration's allegations of a revved-up Iraqi nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell ignored his own experts, but INR's prescience raised its prestige.
INR also got it right in its forecast of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, according to a recently declassified post-mortem on the U.S. intelligence failure during the October War, published today by the National Security Archive. In the spring of 1973, INR analysts wrote that, absent diplomatic progress in the Middle East, "the resumption of hostilities will become a better than even bet."
INR analysts argued that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would go to war not for specific military objectives, but to take "military action which can be sustained long enough" to get the United States and the Soviet Union strongly involved in the Middle East peace process.
The authors of the October War post-mortem saw the INR estimate as a "case of wisdom lost," because as the signs of conflict unfolded in the fall of 1973, the intelligence establishment forgot those warnings. The post-mortem, which reviewed failures to take into account communications intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), quickly became a secret "best seller" in the intelligence establishment after it was published.
When the Archive filed a mandatory review request for the post-mortem, the CIA denied much of the document, and it took a decision by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in response to the Archive's appeal to reverse the CIA decision and declassify much more of the withheld information. Acting as the court of last resort for mandatory declassification review requests, ISCAP recently reversed other CIA initial denials of documents from the 1960s and 1970s. While it exempted material it regards as sensitive, ISCAP nevertheless found that much of the information denied by the CIA could be declassified without harm to national security.
Among the ISCAP Releases Are:
The U.S. government's first intelligence estimate--a Special National Intelligence Estimate from December 1960--on the purposes of Israeli nuclear activities at a nuclear reactor complex near Beersheba: "We believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort."
Biographical sketches of members of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. For years, the CIA routinely refused to declassify its biographical reporting.
A top secret report from November 1973 on the possibility that Moscow shipped nuclear weapons into Soviet bases in Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war.
A National Intelligence Estimate from April 1986 on "The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups" which found that the "prospects that terrorists will attempt high-level nuclear terrorism" was "low to very low." While the CIA analysts speculated that even the terrorist groups of the 1980s may have had inhibitions against actions that produced civilian mass casualties, they suggested that the inhibitions could erode and that groups "with a different state of mind" could emerge.
ISCAP's decision to declassify these documents is commendable, but the CIA's initial denials suggest that the Agency is following overly restrictive declassification review standards. Just as troubling, the Agency used the CIA Information Act to prevent ISCAP from making a decision on the classification status of a history of early covert operations, "Office of Policy Coordination, 1948-1952."
These CIA examples suggest that the rules and regulations that support the U.S. government secrecy system enable government agencies to follow unreasonably narrow standards. Moreover, as the CIA's action on the covert operations history suggests, laws on the books give the Agency inordinate power to keep the veil of secrecy over important parts of its history. Indeed, President George W. Bush's executive order on secrecy policy, still in force, gives the CIA veto power over ISCAP decisions on intelligence records. These problems point out the need for significant change in the U.S. government's secrecy policy.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
The security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal
During the last week of April, I visited four cities in Pakistan (Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi). The purpose of the trip was to discuss a December 2008 Center for American Progress report that I coauthored, Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region.
Although this was my first trip to Pakistan, one of the two other colleagues who accompanied me had visited the country on three previous occasions. For two reasons, we had exceptional access to some 60 current and former civilian and military government officials (including a two-hour visit to the ISI headquarters), members of the media and academia, and heads of nongovernmental organizations. First, one of the members of the working group who helped us formulate the report is now the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Second, several of our colleagues from the Center for American Progress have moved into key positions in the Obama administration. Moreover, since we aren't in government, it was easier for us to challenge the bromides that some officials peddle.
Before the visit, I knew Pakistan was facing several critical political, economic, and security problems. Still, there were some hopeful signs: Pakistan held free and fair elections in February 2008; the country has an independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society and media; and the Obama administration and Congress were finally making U.S. relations with Pakistan a priority.
That said, the day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today's Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order.
After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn't about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.
The trip reinforced my belief that Pakistan has a great many political, economic, and social problems that prevent it from achieving its full potential. But the majority of the population wants the duly constituted government to fulfill its responsibilities to promote the general welfare and provide for the common defense. They aren't looking to some outside force such as the Taliban to assume control of the country and solve these problems. Unlike Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban in Pakistan isn't seen as a group capable of imposing order on a chaotic situation. Rather, the Taliban is seen as an organization trying to upset the existing order. For instance, the majority of the Pakistani population urged the government to take forceful action against the Taliban when it reneged on its agreement in the Swat District.
Moreover, at this time, the Pakistani Army has no desire to seize political power, nor will it let the Taliban take control of Pakistan proper or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country. The army knows that if it staged a coup at this time, it would become responsible for all of the country's economic and social problems.
Likewise, the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan, even if it keeps a large contingent on the border with India. Since the army knows that the collateral damage--including creating refugees--would be significant if it uses force, it won't take action until ordered to do so by the prime minister and the Parliament.
I'm also convinced that Pakistan's nuclear weapons won't be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents. This sentiment is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, and Adm. Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president himself. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Obama said, "We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals."
Why? Because even though the program originally was started by a civilian, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the 1970s, the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India's large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That's exactly why it's currently increasing its nuclear arsenal. In addition, over the past three years, Washington has made a $100-million investment to improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon safeguards. (The Pakistanis won't let us see how this money was spent because they fear that we will use this information to disable the nukes.)
It's also important to note that Islamabad's intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army's control. In fact, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, once headed the ISI, and the high-level officials in that agency are all his appointees and thus, very loyal to him.
Lastly, the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won't let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons.
Given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don't buy it at this time.
Although this was my first trip to Pakistan, one of the two other colleagues who accompanied me had visited the country on three previous occasions. For two reasons, we had exceptional access to some 60 current and former civilian and military government officials (including a two-hour visit to the ISI headquarters), members of the media and academia, and heads of nongovernmental organizations. First, one of the members of the working group who helped us formulate the report is now the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Second, several of our colleagues from the Center for American Progress have moved into key positions in the Obama administration. Moreover, since we aren't in government, it was easier for us to challenge the bromides that some officials peddle.
Before the visit, I knew Pakistan was facing several critical political, economic, and security problems. Still, there were some hopeful signs: Pakistan held free and fair elections in February 2008; the country has an independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society and media; and the Obama administration and Congress were finally making U.S. relations with Pakistan a priority.
That said, the day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today's Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order.
After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn't about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.
The trip reinforced my belief that Pakistan has a great many political, economic, and social problems that prevent it from achieving its full potential. But the majority of the population wants the duly constituted government to fulfill its responsibilities to promote the general welfare and provide for the common defense. They aren't looking to some outside force such as the Taliban to assume control of the country and solve these problems. Unlike Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban in Pakistan isn't seen as a group capable of imposing order on a chaotic situation. Rather, the Taliban is seen as an organization trying to upset the existing order. For instance, the majority of the Pakistani population urged the government to take forceful action against the Taliban when it reneged on its agreement in the Swat District.
Moreover, at this time, the Pakistani Army has no desire to seize political power, nor will it let the Taliban take control of Pakistan proper or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country. The army knows that if it staged a coup at this time, it would become responsible for all of the country's economic and social problems.
Likewise, the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan, even if it keeps a large contingent on the border with India. Since the army knows that the collateral damage--including creating refugees--would be significant if it uses force, it won't take action until ordered to do so by the prime minister and the Parliament.
I'm also convinced that Pakistan's nuclear weapons won't be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents. This sentiment is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, and Adm. Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president himself. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Obama said, "We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals."
Why? Because even though the program originally was started by a civilian, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the 1970s, the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India's large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That's exactly why it's currently increasing its nuclear arsenal. In addition, over the past three years, Washington has made a $100-million investment to improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon safeguards. (The Pakistanis won't let us see how this money was spent because they fear that we will use this information to disable the nukes.)
It's also important to note that Islamabad's intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army's control. In fact, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, once headed the ISI, and the high-level officials in that agency are all his appointees and thus, very loyal to him.
Lastly, the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won't let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons.
Given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don't buy it at this time.
2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Monday, April 27, 2009
Rising Tide Of Militancy Feeds Fears About Pakistan's Nukes - Radio Free Europe
Rising Tide Of Militancy Feeds Fears About Pakistan's Nukes - Radio Free Europe
A worker in Islamabad cleans a bas-relief of the Chaghi Mountains, where Pakistan conducted its atomic explosions in 1998.
April 24, 2009
By Ron Synovitz
Advisers to U.S. President Barack Obama's administration say their worst security nightmare is the possibility that Pakistan -- a nuclear-armed country -- might fall under the control of Al-Qaeda militants.Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani insists that no group will be allowed to challenge the authority of the government. Pakistani officials also insist that the country's nuclear arsenal is secure.But U.S. officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week highlighted concerns about the security situation in Pakistan. Clinton described advances by Islamic militants in Pakistan as a "mortal threat" to the security and safety of the world.George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says he has never been more concerned about the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamist extremists."I would say that I thought [the threat] was exaggerated -- that there were 10 or 12 other [threats] in Pakistan that were more probable and were also very grave -- [but] it's gotten much worse in the last few years, and you have a sense of parts of Pakistan now becoming ungovernable by the Pakistani state," Perkovich says. "Today I'm feeling like we really, really have to focus on the nuclear danger in a way that I wouldn't have said was the case until recently. It's not an exaggeration to say that there is a risk."Locked Up Tight?Most experts say they have no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now under tight control by Pakistan's Strategic Plan Division -- the security structure headed by 58-year-old General Khalid Kidwai and intended to keep the weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic militants, Al-Qaeda scientists, or Indian saboteurs. Jeff Lightfoot, assistant director of the Atlantic Council's program on international security, says he is not so worried about militants obtaining Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the army's current system of safeguards. Lightfoot tells RFE/RL that he sees the recent extremist advances as a danger primarily to Pakistan itself -- and by extension, the wider region with Afghanistan and India.He describes "the greatest threat" as a "gradual bleeding of Pakistani authority" that would leave large parts of the country outside central government control. Lightfoot calls the military the "glue of the country" but questions its ability to demonstrate that it can control and defend Pakistan's borders and ensure sovereignty, something he labels "an ideology problem.""In terms of the nuclear weapons and them falling into the hands of terrorists, the army may not necessarily be able to control all of Pakistan," Lightfoot adds, "but I don't think that necessarily translates into a breakdown of their nuclear-weapons command-and-control system."Key FigurePerkovich says current safeguards should ensure that any possible collapse of the civilian government in Islamabad would not affect the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons -- at least, he says, as long as General Kidwai remains in control."The civil government is not relevant to the control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan; it is entirely an army issue," Perkovich says. "We do have a strong sense that [Pakistan's nuclear weapons] are controlled by elements in the army that have been selected and are reliable. As long as that control by this current military leadership remains strong, then I think one can have pretty good confidence that these weapons won't be used crazily."But Perkovich says his concern centers around what could happen if pro-Islamist elements within Pakistan's military and security forces turned against Kidwai."The risk on the nuclear side is that the country falls apart or has a civil war that the bad guys win," Perkovich says. "The fear comes if there is a coup within the military so that, somehow, the people now in charge within the military get dispossessed of their nuclear weapons by other people in the military who would be less responsible."To that "first fear," however, Perkovich adds another alarming scenario: "The second fear is [if] there is basically just a takeover by the Taliban and somehow the military crumbles and flees."Guessing GameThe size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is classified information in Islamabad. Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been careful not to disclose the exact number or locations of its nuclear weapons. Estimates by experts and researchers range from around 50 nuclear weapons to as many as 150. Former President General Pervez Musharraf declared in 2007 that the weapons were in a "disassembled state" -- most likely meaning that the warheads were kept separately from the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to targets as far away as New Delhi, India.General Kidwai has said that the nuclear warheads could be assembled very quickly with land- and air-delivery systems.Seth Jones, a political scientist who is currently in Pakistan doing research for the RAND Corporation, tells RFE/RL that Pakistan has "dozens" of nuclear weapons dispersed in or near major cities throughout the country. He says that his recent visits to nuclear facilities in Pakistan suggest the country's weapons are still in a disassembled state."I've visited a number of the nuclear facilities [in Pakistan] and I'm fairly confident that security procedures are actually pretty good," Jones says. "The ones I've visited have included sites that hold fissile material and also that hold ballistic-missile technology -- where one could put nuclear weapons on and [that] would give Pakistan a range to target countries like India if there was an exchange."He likens those facilities to "what one might see in China or, frankly, in the United States."Dangerous PrecedentWith his firsthand views of security for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Jones says he is most concerned about how a destabilized government in Pakistan might promote the spread of nuclear-weapons technology out of the country or to Al-Qaeda militants."In most of these scenarios, still, the likelihood that nuclear weapons are going to be used or come in the hands of militants or terrorists is highly unlikely," Jones says. But he is quick to add that "where one might get concerned...is elements of the A.Q. Khan network that were involved in building Pakistan's atomic capability -- a range of scientists that have proliferated nuclear material to North Korea, Iran, and several other places."In that respect, he cites a lesson that was learned under previous leadership in Islamabad, before the international community was fretting publicly about any "existential threat" to the Pakistani state posed by extremists. "We know in the past that there have been talks between members of the A.Q. Khan network and militants, including Al-Qaeda several years ago," Jones says. "So is it possible that some technology at some point falls into the hands of terrorists? I think that's a more likely scenario than actual nuclear weapons coming out of [the Pakistan army's] control."
Comments
by: Saul from: Canada
April 27, 2009 17:42
There goes the USA establishment, Pentagon, CIA and its media again. 1st Iraq on WMDs and now another Muslim country on false pretext of Nukes falling in the hands of extremists in Pakistan. Wow! The web of lies - ain't all of us familiar with them now? Most of the Western, especially US analysts, have no idea how big Pakistan is and how diverse. Besides, nukes are not like laptops that can be stolen by criminals. The way false image is being created about that poor country leads me to believe that there is far more realistic danger lurking in the dark with respect to nukes. I am 100% convinced that US establishment, Pentagon and CIA are, in collusion with Israeli and Indian lobbies, planning a small nuke attack on the US soil or somewhere in Europe, blame it on Pakistan, move against it unilaterally and try to destroy it. I hope I am proven wrong, but this is my prediction - A staged, concocted drama to destroy another Muslim country.
by: Dolmance from: Mexico City
April 27, 2009 14:47
Let's hope the parallels between Obama and FDR don't go beyond the new President having to fix a broken American economy with a big, nasty war. Has anyone done a study of what would happen environmentally speaking if say India and Pakistan exchanged nuclear missiles? Because I really cannot see a nuclear armed Al Qaida not using every weapon at it's disposal.
by: ibsteve2u from: U.S. of A.
April 27, 2009 14:33
On the other hand, imagine how much of the world felt - knowing that our nuclear football was constantly next to somebody who didn't require actual proof of misdeeds to attack another sovereign nation.I'm a rather gung-ho American, but not to the point of ignoring the fact that we don't all live in the same reality around the world.(P.S. Speaking of differing realities: Who was it that sold the Pakistanis the hardware to design and build those nukes, again?)
by: Fraz Haider from: Rawalpindi
April 26, 2009 12:42
A country which can build, maintain and improve its nuclear arsenal against all odds has all the capability to ensure that this capability remains in safe and capable hand. Secretary Clinton’s description this weak regarding situation in Pakistan is the issue of perception or misperception.Mr George Perkovich of Carnegie Endowment is a respected scholar, my suggestion to him would be to stop worrying about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rather he should worry about the US weapons which could be found missing for hours, the sensitive nuclear weapons components and technology which can land up in a different country with that country demanding it and those nuclear facilities those have been recently reported by USNRC as below acceptable safety and security standards as stipulated in the US EPA 2005. Terrorism or extremism in this region is the gift of a friend who masters in stabbing in the back. These people being most feared by the west were created, supported and funded to achieve the objective of breaking up of the former Soviet Union and some other objectives of the regional players. Now once they do not serve any good purpose to the west they are being portrayed as most fearsome creatures on God’s earth. Not that I or most of Pakistani have any soft corner for them or their ideology is appreciated or have any sympathy for them, but one thing I am sure that we Pakistanis can handle them ourselves. My sincere advice to our so called friends would be to stay away from our internal affairs and stop using Pakistan as a ladder for achieving their own objectives.Notwithstanding the above, I am appreciative of Mr Jeff lightfoot, George Perkovich and Seth Jones views on Pakistan’s Command and Control System and the ability of its armed forces to take a good care of Nation’s ‘Crown Jewel’. However fears and concerns highlighted by Mr Perkovich are all about future, which is unpredictable and uncertain. If for a moment it is believed that the concerns are right and logical may I ask about thousands of much more capable nukes in the hands of possibly extremist Christians or Hindus or that matter any other religion in the world. To me this is all about gaining a ‘Total Global Dominance’ as some time back a former National Security Advisor of the US, Brizensky advised to the US in his book ‘Grand Chase Board’.Visiting a Pakistani facility may not be Seth Jones dream only but many other in the US also have similar desires. May I draw your attention towards and incident which happened to a BBC correspondent about two decades back once he tried to get close to one of the site? No one except those whose business is can get close to a site what to talk of a facility housing fissile material or missile technology. Those, in this business anywhere in the world would exactly know what it means. Hence it can be easily concluded that both the claim mentioned in the story 1) Seth Jones is in Pakistan and 2) he has visited any site are baseless, misleading and with designs. Being a patriotic Pakistani I am confident that we can handle our problems our self as all nations in the world do. Therefore no one should interfere with our affairs. As regards a comment regarding destruction plan of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by the US is concerned, I would say only one thing “Anyone who tries any misadventure would dig its own grave’
by: umer from: lahore
April 25, 2009 13:13
such articles add to the already held strong perception that US, UK and india are invloved in conspiracy to get hold on Pakistan's nukes and this perception is certainly not helping Pakistan or the Western interests!anyways, the bottom line is, Keep Dreaming :) as Pakistan would keep hold of its nukes, come what may
by: Zoltan from: Hungary
April 24, 2009 16:43
I hope the United Sates is preparing to destroy the whole nuclear arsenal of Pakistan if militants gain control of the country.This Pakistani case shows us that permiting an islamic country to have nuclear weapon is a threat to the civilized world.
A worker in Islamabad cleans a bas-relief of the Chaghi Mountains, where Pakistan conducted its atomic explosions in 1998.
April 24, 2009
By Ron Synovitz
Advisers to U.S. President Barack Obama's administration say their worst security nightmare is the possibility that Pakistan -- a nuclear-armed country -- might fall under the control of Al-Qaeda militants.Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani insists that no group will be allowed to challenge the authority of the government. Pakistani officials also insist that the country's nuclear arsenal is secure.But U.S. officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week highlighted concerns about the security situation in Pakistan. Clinton described advances by Islamic militants in Pakistan as a "mortal threat" to the security and safety of the world.George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says he has never been more concerned about the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamist extremists."I would say that I thought [the threat] was exaggerated -- that there were 10 or 12 other [threats] in Pakistan that were more probable and were also very grave -- [but] it's gotten much worse in the last few years, and you have a sense of parts of Pakistan now becoming ungovernable by the Pakistani state," Perkovich says. "Today I'm feeling like we really, really have to focus on the nuclear danger in a way that I wouldn't have said was the case until recently. It's not an exaggeration to say that there is a risk."Locked Up Tight?Most experts say they have no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now under tight control by Pakistan's Strategic Plan Division -- the security structure headed by 58-year-old General Khalid Kidwai and intended to keep the weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic militants, Al-Qaeda scientists, or Indian saboteurs. Jeff Lightfoot, assistant director of the Atlantic Council's program on international security, says he is not so worried about militants obtaining Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the army's current system of safeguards. Lightfoot tells RFE/RL that he sees the recent extremist advances as a danger primarily to Pakistan itself -- and by extension, the wider region with Afghanistan and India.He describes "the greatest threat" as a "gradual bleeding of Pakistani authority" that would leave large parts of the country outside central government control. Lightfoot calls the military the "glue of the country" but questions its ability to demonstrate that it can control and defend Pakistan's borders and ensure sovereignty, something he labels "an ideology problem.""In terms of the nuclear weapons and them falling into the hands of terrorists, the army may not necessarily be able to control all of Pakistan," Lightfoot adds, "but I don't think that necessarily translates into a breakdown of their nuclear-weapons command-and-control system."Key FigurePerkovich says current safeguards should ensure that any possible collapse of the civilian government in Islamabad would not affect the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons -- at least, he says, as long as General Kidwai remains in control."The civil government is not relevant to the control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan; it is entirely an army issue," Perkovich says. "We do have a strong sense that [Pakistan's nuclear weapons] are controlled by elements in the army that have been selected and are reliable. As long as that control by this current military leadership remains strong, then I think one can have pretty good confidence that these weapons won't be used crazily."But Perkovich says his concern centers around what could happen if pro-Islamist elements within Pakistan's military and security forces turned against Kidwai."The risk on the nuclear side is that the country falls apart or has a civil war that the bad guys win," Perkovich says. "The fear comes if there is a coup within the military so that, somehow, the people now in charge within the military get dispossessed of their nuclear weapons by other people in the military who would be less responsible."To that "first fear," however, Perkovich adds another alarming scenario: "The second fear is [if] there is basically just a takeover by the Taliban and somehow the military crumbles and flees."Guessing GameThe size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is classified information in Islamabad. Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been careful not to disclose the exact number or locations of its nuclear weapons. Estimates by experts and researchers range from around 50 nuclear weapons to as many as 150. Former President General Pervez Musharraf declared in 2007 that the weapons were in a "disassembled state" -- most likely meaning that the warheads were kept separately from the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to targets as far away as New Delhi, India.General Kidwai has said that the nuclear warheads could be assembled very quickly with land- and air-delivery systems.Seth Jones, a political scientist who is currently in Pakistan doing research for the RAND Corporation, tells RFE/RL that Pakistan has "dozens" of nuclear weapons dispersed in or near major cities throughout the country. He says that his recent visits to nuclear facilities in Pakistan suggest the country's weapons are still in a disassembled state."I've visited a number of the nuclear facilities [in Pakistan] and I'm fairly confident that security procedures are actually pretty good," Jones says. "The ones I've visited have included sites that hold fissile material and also that hold ballistic-missile technology -- where one could put nuclear weapons on and [that] would give Pakistan a range to target countries like India if there was an exchange."He likens those facilities to "what one might see in China or, frankly, in the United States."Dangerous PrecedentWith his firsthand views of security for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Jones says he is most concerned about how a destabilized government in Pakistan might promote the spread of nuclear-weapons technology out of the country or to Al-Qaeda militants."In most of these scenarios, still, the likelihood that nuclear weapons are going to be used or come in the hands of militants or terrorists is highly unlikely," Jones says. But he is quick to add that "where one might get concerned...is elements of the A.Q. Khan network that were involved in building Pakistan's atomic capability -- a range of scientists that have proliferated nuclear material to North Korea, Iran, and several other places."In that respect, he cites a lesson that was learned under previous leadership in Islamabad, before the international community was fretting publicly about any "existential threat" to the Pakistani state posed by extremists. "We know in the past that there have been talks between members of the A.Q. Khan network and militants, including Al-Qaeda several years ago," Jones says. "So is it possible that some technology at some point falls into the hands of terrorists? I think that's a more likely scenario than actual nuclear weapons coming out of [the Pakistan army's] control."
Comments
by: Saul from: Canada
April 27, 2009 17:42
There goes the USA establishment, Pentagon, CIA and its media again. 1st Iraq on WMDs and now another Muslim country on false pretext of Nukes falling in the hands of extremists in Pakistan. Wow! The web of lies - ain't all of us familiar with them now? Most of the Western, especially US analysts, have no idea how big Pakistan is and how diverse. Besides, nukes are not like laptops that can be stolen by criminals. The way false image is being created about that poor country leads me to believe that there is far more realistic danger lurking in the dark with respect to nukes. I am 100% convinced that US establishment, Pentagon and CIA are, in collusion with Israeli and Indian lobbies, planning a small nuke attack on the US soil or somewhere in Europe, blame it on Pakistan, move against it unilaterally and try to destroy it. I hope I am proven wrong, but this is my prediction - A staged, concocted drama to destroy another Muslim country.
by: Dolmance from: Mexico City
April 27, 2009 14:47
Let's hope the parallels between Obama and FDR don't go beyond the new President having to fix a broken American economy with a big, nasty war. Has anyone done a study of what would happen environmentally speaking if say India and Pakistan exchanged nuclear missiles? Because I really cannot see a nuclear armed Al Qaida not using every weapon at it's disposal.
by: ibsteve2u from: U.S. of A.
April 27, 2009 14:33
On the other hand, imagine how much of the world felt - knowing that our nuclear football was constantly next to somebody who didn't require actual proof of misdeeds to attack another sovereign nation.I'm a rather gung-ho American, but not to the point of ignoring the fact that we don't all live in the same reality around the world.(P.S. Speaking of differing realities: Who was it that sold the Pakistanis the hardware to design and build those nukes, again?)
by: Fraz Haider from: Rawalpindi
April 26, 2009 12:42
A country which can build, maintain and improve its nuclear arsenal against all odds has all the capability to ensure that this capability remains in safe and capable hand. Secretary Clinton’s description this weak regarding situation in Pakistan is the issue of perception or misperception.Mr George Perkovich of Carnegie Endowment is a respected scholar, my suggestion to him would be to stop worrying about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rather he should worry about the US weapons which could be found missing for hours, the sensitive nuclear weapons components and technology which can land up in a different country with that country demanding it and those nuclear facilities those have been recently reported by USNRC as below acceptable safety and security standards as stipulated in the US EPA 2005. Terrorism or extremism in this region is the gift of a friend who masters in stabbing in the back. These people being most feared by the west were created, supported and funded to achieve the objective of breaking up of the former Soviet Union and some other objectives of the regional players. Now once they do not serve any good purpose to the west they are being portrayed as most fearsome creatures on God’s earth. Not that I or most of Pakistani have any soft corner for them or their ideology is appreciated or have any sympathy for them, but one thing I am sure that we Pakistanis can handle them ourselves. My sincere advice to our so called friends would be to stay away from our internal affairs and stop using Pakistan as a ladder for achieving their own objectives.Notwithstanding the above, I am appreciative of Mr Jeff lightfoot, George Perkovich and Seth Jones views on Pakistan’s Command and Control System and the ability of its armed forces to take a good care of Nation’s ‘Crown Jewel’. However fears and concerns highlighted by Mr Perkovich are all about future, which is unpredictable and uncertain. If for a moment it is believed that the concerns are right and logical may I ask about thousands of much more capable nukes in the hands of possibly extremist Christians or Hindus or that matter any other religion in the world. To me this is all about gaining a ‘Total Global Dominance’ as some time back a former National Security Advisor of the US, Brizensky advised to the US in his book ‘Grand Chase Board’.Visiting a Pakistani facility may not be Seth Jones dream only but many other in the US also have similar desires. May I draw your attention towards and incident which happened to a BBC correspondent about two decades back once he tried to get close to one of the site? No one except those whose business is can get close to a site what to talk of a facility housing fissile material or missile technology. Those, in this business anywhere in the world would exactly know what it means. Hence it can be easily concluded that both the claim mentioned in the story 1) Seth Jones is in Pakistan and 2) he has visited any site are baseless, misleading and with designs. Being a patriotic Pakistani I am confident that we can handle our problems our self as all nations in the world do. Therefore no one should interfere with our affairs. As regards a comment regarding destruction plan of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by the US is concerned, I would say only one thing “Anyone who tries any misadventure would dig its own grave’
by: umer from: lahore
April 25, 2009 13:13
such articles add to the already held strong perception that US, UK and india are invloved in conspiracy to get hold on Pakistan's nukes and this perception is certainly not helping Pakistan or the Western interests!anyways, the bottom line is, Keep Dreaming :) as Pakistan would keep hold of its nukes, come what may
by: Zoltan from: Hungary
April 24, 2009 16:43
I hope the United Sates is preparing to destroy the whole nuclear arsenal of Pakistan if militants gain control of the country.This Pakistani case shows us that permiting an islamic country to have nuclear weapon is a threat to the civilized world.
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Ukraine arrests 3 in radioactive material sale
KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Ukrainian security agents have arrested a regional lawmaker and two companions for trying to sell a radioactive substance that could be used in making a dirty bomb, officials said Tuesday.
The legislator in the western Ternopyl region and two local businessmen were detained last week for trying to sell 8.2 pounds (3.7 kilograms) of radioactive material to an undercover agent of the security service, said Marina Ostapenko, a spokeswoman for the service.
The suspects tried to peddle the substance as plutonium-239, a highly radioactive material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, and demanded $10 million, Ostapenko said.
But security experts later determined that the material was likely americium, a widely used radioactive material. Ostapenko said it could be used in a dirty bomb, but not nuclear weapons.
The service said in a statement it believes the material was produced in Russia during the Soviet era and smuggled into Ukraine through a neighboring country.
Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons after the Soviet Union's collapse. However, concerns remain over the existence of unsecured radioactive materials here and in other ex-Soviet republics, where safety rules are often neglected and corruption is rampant.
(This version CORRECTS that security officials say the substance was not plutonium.)
The legislator in the western Ternopyl region and two local businessmen were detained last week for trying to sell 8.2 pounds (3.7 kilograms) of radioactive material to an undercover agent of the security service, said Marina Ostapenko, a spokeswoman for the service.
The suspects tried to peddle the substance as plutonium-239, a highly radioactive material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, and demanded $10 million, Ostapenko said.
But security experts later determined that the material was likely americium, a widely used radioactive material. Ostapenko said it could be used in a dirty bomb, but not nuclear weapons.
The service said in a statement it believes the material was produced in Russia during the Soviet era and smuggled into Ukraine through a neighboring country.
Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons after the Soviet Union's collapse. However, concerns remain over the existence of unsecured radioactive materials here and in other ex-Soviet republics, where safety rules are often neglected and corruption is rampant.
(This version CORRECTS that security officials say the substance was not plutonium.)
Sunday, April 12, 2009
insight: Rethinking the alliance —Ejaz Haider
The US cannot be trusted as an honest broker between India and Pakistan. Its tilt towards India is very clear and its policies and approach towards Pakistan are a clear proof of thatCheck out the text of the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act of 2009, officially titled HR 1886, introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) on April 2 and currently referred to the committee. (see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1886)If this bill did not relate to a serious issue in the backdrop of a very grim situation facing Pakistan and this region, one might have dismissed it as a bad joke. While it would be an essential exercise to deconstruct it clause by clause to lay bare its intent, and one hopes the Foreign Office will do exactly that, it is important here to at least point to what is obvious.First, the bill and some of its clauses, especially those pertaining to India’s interest, are the work of Indian lobbying. That, one should, without any grudge, say is excellent work from India’s perspective. Equally, one might ask what effort, if any, was made by us to thwart India’s designs.The question, however, is this: should the United States be dealing with Pakistan on the basis of its (US) interests or India’s? The question, at this stage, assumes quite arbitrarily that US interests vis-à-vis Pakistan may be different from India’s. Increasing evidence may even put paid to this assumption but for now we shall not touch upon that.One may also assume that given the Obama administration’s own rhetoric, the US faces a grave threat in the region, which it cannot tackle without Pakistan’s help. Logically this means that the US should be trying to find points of convergence with Pakistan. Coming up with a bill that does not even purport to hide its India tilt is a strange way of doing that.Let’s consider Sec 4, Declaration of Principles, Clause 6, sub-clauses (H), (I), (J) and (K), in reverse order.Sub-clause (J) of the bill requires Pakistan “not to support any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other activities meant to instil fear or terror in India”. This could have been drafted by India. But let’s deconstruct it. Seems fine; no? The fine-print is a different story. Given terrorist attacks within Pakistan and the degree of difficulty in tackling the menace, how can Pakistan be expected to ensure India will not be attacked and how would it be determined, and by whom, that Pakistan is “allowing” some groups to attack India — New Delhi?Once again, we are not even getting into the issue of what India might be doing and how might it be funding and supporting not just the Baloch nationalists but also those terrorist groups that are attacking security forces in FATA and elsewhere.As I wrote in this space last Saturday (“Terrorism and its discontents”; Daily Times, April 4) in relation to our discussion at an India-Pakistan conference in Bangkok, “What is...troublesome...is determining whether blame for a particular terrorist act can be laid at the door of the state of Pakistan. How and who is to trace the spoor; who would determine the intent behind the exercise and what role is [India’s] domestic politics likely to play in such an exercise, as it did during and after Mumbai?”This conditionality means Pakistan will always be the villain until it proves itself innocent. Do we want the money and this assistance, notwithstanding its apparent generosity, with this conditionality? I don’t know about official Pakistan but as far as I am concerned, no.Consider sub-clause (K) of the bill. It binds Pakistan “to ensure access of United States investigators to individuals suspected of engaging in worldwide proliferation of nuclear materials, and restrict such individuals from travel or any other activity that could result in further proliferation”.Well...Dr AQ Khan again! That episode, gentlemen, is over. Dr Khan has been sidelined and punished; Pakistan has taken measures to ensure that no one can do such a thing again; other states whose nationals were involved in the racket have still to come clean on what was going on; proliferation is an area where all nuclear weapon states have some blot on them, and that includes the US; credible reports from US experts have proven proliferation by India and so on, thank you.And yes, like the US, we like to try our defaulters ourselves.Sub-clauses (H) and (I) of the bill require Pakistan “not to provide any support, direction, guidance to, or acquiescence in the activities of any person or group that engages in any degree in acts of violence or intimidation against civilians, civilian groups, or governmental entities”; and “to redouble its efforts to prevent the presence of the Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups in Pakistan that support insurgents in Afghanistan”.Very well. Once again, who will determine that Pakistan is successfully and/or sincerely doing this? Given the complexity of what is happening in this region and the different and differing interests of various players, what benchmarks are to be used by the US to make such a determination?As I mentioned above, there is much sting in this bill and the FO will have the occasion to go clause by clause to debate that and formulate an appropriate response. But one thing should be clear: the US cannot be trusted as an ally that can act as an honest broker between India and Pakistan. Its tilt towards India is very clear and its policies and approach towards Pakistan are a clear proof of that.I shall have occasion to get to that in a subsequent piece. But this bill is a piece of legislation that Pakistan must reject categorically and unequivocally. More than that, however, we need to rethink our terms of alliance with the US and for that we need to develop a coherent national response.Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Missile Defence
Missile defense in IndiaBy Bharath Gopalaswamy 27 February 2009
Article Highlights
Recently, Indian officials approached the United States about purchasing a missile defense shield.
New Delhi's once casual interest in missile defense has intensified as its regional threats have increased.
The United States believes that a strong New Delhi can help protect U.S. assets in South Asia and counterbalance China. A few weeks ago, Indian officials held preliminary talks with the United States about purchasing a missile defense shield from it. "India is a partner of ours, and we want to provide it with whatever it needs to protect itself," a U.S. official told the Financial Times. Already, Indian officials and scientists have witnessed some simulations of the U.S. missile defense system, along with a couple of live tests. Washington even has offered to sell the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system to India.India's interest in strategic missile defense dates back to 1983 when New Delhi initiated an "Integrated Missile Development Program." The program included not only offensive missiles such as the nuclear-capable Prithvi and Agni, but also the Akash, a surface-to-air missile that had the potential to provide India with theater missile defense capabilities. Later in the 1990s, India's Defence Research & Development Organization and the country's military discussed initiating conceptual missile defense studies. Around the same time, the Indian military had a few conversations with Israel and Russia about how they could help New Delhi advance its air defense systems. Although such talk clearly demonstrated an Indian interest in missile defense, it was confined to professional military officers and low-level bureaucrats.The interest of India's elected leadership intensified a few years later, their support growing for a variety of reasons. First, 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan turned Pakistan into a U.S. ally, triggering speculation that the Pakistani government might be overturned by anti-American Islamic fundamentalists who would then control Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. And if Pakistani nuclear weapons fell into such hands, India feared it might be the first target.Secondly, some in India believe that a domestic missile defense capability might be able to check Pakistan more generally. Ever since Islamabad obtained nuclear weapons, it has emboldened its strategy of supporting insurgencies within India to settle outstanding political differences--i.e., Kashmir. Missile defense, the argument goes, would prove instrumental in providing New Delhi reassurance and protection since Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be countered both offensively and defensively.Finally, few countries in the world face the missile threats that India does. Of course, there's Pakistan and its Ghauri and Shaheen missile series--both of which possess ranges longer than 1,000 kilometers. But there's also nearby China, a fellow nuclear-armed state equipped with DF-21 missiles that can travel more than 2,000 kilometers. So it's no surprise that the upper-echelons of the Indian government have begun to show significant interest in defense technologies that can, at least theoretically, combat such threats.A ballistic missile flight from Sargodha, Pakistan, could reach New Delhi in about 5-7 minutes. As such, Indian missile defense proponents envision the system working as follows: A technically complex and vast constellation of early warning sensors would detect the missile immediately after it is launched. This part of the system is already more or less in place; the Green Pine radar, which India purchased from Israel around 2002 and is situated about 200 kilometers north of New Delhi, can detect a missile 90 seconds after it has been launched--at least on a preliminary basis. The next step is to determine whether the signal picked up by the radar is that of an incoming missile or a false alarm.Complicating matters is that India and Pakistan share a border, making for shorter ballistic missile flights. For example, the estimated total missile flight times are 8-13 minutes for ranges of 600-2,000 kilometers. The flight times can be even less if the missile is flown in a depressed trajectory.Such a short time period places stringent conditions on procedures for evaluating and verifying warnings. There would be no time to consult or deliberate after receiving this warning. In other words, any response would have to be predetermined, presenting a significant likelihood of accidental nuclear war from false alarms.Oddly, despite such potentially catastrophic consequences, in India the debate about missile defense has become a debate about India's burgeoning ties with Washington as a part of New Delhi's "Next Steps in Security Partnership"--a 2002 diplomatic initiative between the United States and India to expand their cooperation in civilian nuclear activities and civilian space programs, along with broadening their dialogue on missile defense to promote nonproliferation and to ease the transfer of advanced technologies to India.For the United States, missile defense initially was only one aspect of its budding bilateral relationship with New Delhi. But over time missile defense has come to represent something larger in the relationship. Quite simply, it represents Washington's implicit support for India against Pakistan, without, of course, supporting an explicit Indian recourse to offensive military strategies. Along these lines, there's every reason to expect the United States to continue to be supportive of India's emergence as a counterweight to China.Ultimately, technology will decide the operational capability of missile defense in India. But for the time being, it can be assumed that New Delhi's decisions with regard to missile defense are strongly linked to the changing tenor of U.S.-Indian relations. http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-india
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Thursday, January 8, 2009
US report on anti-Muslim long war tactics
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