Anwar Iqbal
Dawn News---29/06/09
WASHINGTON: The United States is helping Pakistan modernise its nuclear arsenal in hopes to make them safer, says a report released on Sunday.
Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.
But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.
The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.
This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.
The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.
‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’
The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.
In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.
The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’
The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.
The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.
Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.
The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.
‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.
The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.
But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.
The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.
This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.
The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.
‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’
The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.
In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.
The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’
The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.
The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.
Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.
The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.
‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.
The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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