Any surgical airstrike, limited war, or Cold Start will drag the region into full war. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford a full-fledged conventional war or even the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball military brinkmanship they engaged in 2001-02The post-Mumbai strategies of India and Pakistan reflect their immediate political concerns rather than long-term, coherent and shared perspectives on counter-terrorism. India is trying to extract maximum diplomatic dividend against Pakistan by activating multilateral channels and applying direct pressure. Pakistan is engaged in damage control in an extremely difficult diplomatic situation created by the Mumbai attacks.Pakistan has banned the Jama’at-ud Dawa, sealed its offices and arrested several of its leaders and activists. One wonders why the government had to wait for a UN Security Council resolution and prodding by the United States to act. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies must have enough information on the activities of hard-line and militant groups, as well as on their linkages with the Taliban. It is also well known that a good number of non-Pakhtun Pakistanis are involved in the Pakistani Taliban movement. Similarly, Pakistani agencies would know if JuD was a front for banned terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayba.The present Pakistani government and military top brass view the Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups as a major threat to Pakistan’s internal political and societal stability. This is a shift from the past when General Pervez Musharraf’s regime pursued a dual policy of taking some action against these groups but leaving them enough space to continue with their activities in a low-key manner.The present government asked the military to launch the ongoing operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in some tribal agencies, and the operations have made significant gains in Bajaur and Khyber. Militants were also pushed back in Swat, though they are far from being fully contained. Given that the security forces had their hands full in the tribal areas, the government did not want to open a new front against militants in mainland Pakistan.However, consensus at the international level on the involvement of a Pakistan-based group in the Mumbai attacks left Pakistan with no credible option but to take immediate action against militant groups in the mainland. These groups are transnational and use all possible means, including violence, to pursue their agenda with total disregard to the imperatives of Pakistan as a nation-state in the comity of nations. They want Pakistan to be subservient to their agenda, and do not respect Pakistan’s sovereign status and territorial boundaries.Should these movements be allowed to impose precarious foreign policy situations on Pakistan? If Pakistan is to function as a coherent and effective state, it cannot allow non-state actors to engage in violent and disruptive activities inside or outside its boundaries.Pakistan’s policymakers need to do some hard and realistic thinking on the current situation and terrorism-related issues. Indian policymakers need to do the same. They need not descend into traditional India-Pakistan polemics to deflect criticism of internal security lapses and the probability of terrorism having domestic roots.The Indian government has not blamed the Pakistani government of direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks, but maintains that a Pakistan-based group planned and executed them. This places indirect responsibility on the Pakistani government, given that it is seen to have allowed such a group to use Pakistani territory for a terrorist attack abroad.However, semi- and non-official Indian circles rarely maintain this distinction and project Pakistan as an irresponsible terrorist state. They find encouragement to adopt this position in India’s official effort to extract the highest possible diplomatic dividends against Pakistan at the international level. As citizens of a number of states were killed in the attacks, India has found it easy to mobilise support. It is interesting to note that Indian expats in the US are fully involved in the campaign to get Pakistan designated as a terrorist state and to get UN approval for Indian airstrikes in Pakistan.A review of this ongoing Indian diplomatic campaign gives a strong impression that India is more interested in undermining and isolating Pakistan at the international level to further India’s wider regional agenda rather than evolving a shared regional counter-terrorism strategy. The present strategy may meet India’s immediate domestic needs, but it does not serve the long-term need of countering terrorism holistically and effectively. This long-term objective cannot be achieved without working with Pakistan.A large number of people in India’s official and non-official circles want to emulate the United States: the argument is that if the US can launch airstrikes in Afghanistan and invade Iraq in response to attacks on its soil, India can do the same to counter terrorism originating in Pakistan.As early as April 2003, while commenting on the US invasion of Iraq, Yashwant Sinha, the then Indian external affairs minister, described Pakistan as a ‘fit case’ for Iraq-like military action because Pakistan possessed weapons of mass destruction, sheltered terrorists and lacked democracy — a charge-sheet similar to the one issued against Iraq by the US. A couple of days later, he made a similar statement in the Rajya Sabha, India’s upper house of parliament, that Pakistan should be tackled with pre-emptive airstrikes.Similar ideas are now being advocated in India that it should launch surgical airstrikes against ‘terrorist training camps’ in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and mainland Pakistan. There is also talk of trying out what Indian strategic experts describe as ‘Cold Start’ to occupy some Pakistani territory at more than one point through a coordinated, swift and massive ground and air operation. This will, it is argued, enable India to deal with Pakistan from a position of strength.Any surgical airstrike, limited war, or Cold Start will drag the region into full war. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford a full-fledged conventional war or even the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball military brinkmanship they engaged in 2001-02 as both face enormous economic challenges. Further, as both possess nuclear weapons, a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear exchange, with devastating consequences for both countries. Therefore, war is not an option.The major reason, then, why some people in India are talking of the military option against Pakistan is the tendency to overestimate India’s capacity to wage a successful war and underestimate Pakistan’s capacity to defend itself.Pakistan’s effort to control Islamic militancy will be strengthened if India provides it with some credible evidence of the involvement of Pakistani groups in terrorist acts in India. This evidence can be combined with the evidence available in Pakistan to endure judicial scrutiny of action against militant elements.Terrorism is a threat to both India and Pakistan. More people have died in Pakistan during 2007-08 by terrorists than in India by so-called Islamic Pakistan-based terrorists. Both countries need to cooperate to deal with the terrorist threat, else they will both not succeed.Further, India should also investigate its domestic sources of terrorism. There are several alienated groups in India, including a significant section of its huge Muslim population that appears to have lost confidence in the Indian political system. The sooner India recognises this reality and deals with it, the better.The imperatives of counter-terrorism, therefore, are cooperation between India and Pakistan; consistency in Pakistan’s efforts to contain militancy within its boundaries; and Indian efforts to cope with domestic sources of terrorism.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
