‘US helping modernise Pakistan’s N-arsenal’ --- Anwar Iqbal

‘US helping modernise Pakistan’s N-arsenal’
Anwar Iqbal
Dawn News---29/06/09

WASHINGTON: The United States is helping Pakistan modernise its nuclear arsenal in hopes to make them safer, says a report released on Sunday.
Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.
But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.
The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.
This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.
The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.
‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’
The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.
In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.
The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’
The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.
The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.
Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.
The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.
‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.
The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Nuclear Non-Option

The Nuclear Non-Option
Christina Jung
The Korea Times
06/24/09

The time has come for South Korea to lay its cards on the table and openly discuss what is to be done about North Korea.News of sanctions and "stern'' measures are now widespread, and play a necessary part in curbing the North's deeply misguided nuclear ambitions. While there may never be a final resolution to this highly complex issue, South Korea would do well to steer clear of one option that appears to be gaining traction in conservative circles ― the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons in order to conclusively deter the North.Acquiring a nuclear weapon to balance the ostensible South-North power asymmetry may provide immediate relief and perhaps a thinly veiled sense of security, but it would nonetheless be devastating to the South's long-term interests in a number of ways. The most obvious result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be further regional destabilization. It would needlessly flare up tensions between the South and its neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan. More significantly, a nuclear South would aggravate tensions with the North, and may culminate in a North-South arms race in a worst-case scenario. None of these outcomes would be conducive to any of the goals that the South wishes to achieve, both within the peninsula and throughout the greater Northeast Asian region.From a more global perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine the international status that the South has built as a non-nuclear weapon state. South Korea is a signatory to numerous international and regional treaties on nuclear weapons, the most central of which is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Acquiring a nuclear weapon would thus effectively render null and void its participation in all of these significant agreements, which prohibit nuclear proliferation and possession. The South's inconsistency would also undoubtedly draw the criticism and ire from its allies and partners, dealing a significant blow to its credibility in global affairs.And if there was ever a surefire way to ensure that the North never gives up its nuclear weapons, it would be for the South to acquire its own. One significant leverage the South maintains over the North lies in its nuclear weapon-free status, for it gives the South a legitimate right to demand that the North dismantle its nuclear capability. Without this leverage, the South would be a hypocrite to demand nuclear dismantlement from the North, and would give the North even more reason to cling to its nuclear program. The suggestion of a nuclear option therefore defies all logic in the context of the South's foremost aims toward the North, which is to persuade the hermit regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons program.Furthermore, those who argue for the South's acquisition of weapons base their claims on the weak presumption that the North's nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the South. To be sure, we cannot entirely preclude the possibility that the North will consciously seek to impose nuclear destruction on the South. Nonetheless, we can be fairly certain that this scenario is unlikely, as any pursuit by the North to destroy the South would inevitably bring self-destruction in the form of retaliatory strikes. While it would be unwise to underestimate the physical threat posed by nuclear capability, it is now apparent that, for the North, nuclear weapons have become a tool of power consolidation domestically and of bargaining leverage internationally ― and not much more. Combined with the assurances of protection under Washington's nuclear umbrella, we can therefore be reasonably confident that no direct existential threat exists.Finally, there is always the classic concern over human error. As history attests, humans are particularly prone to blunders involving judgment on delicate issues. Obviously, the only way to guarantee that no nuclear mishaps occur is to deny their possession; once a nation acquires nuclear weapons, there will always be an infinite number of opportunities for error and misuse.And this should be at the heart of South's pursuit to dismantle the North's capabilities ― the potential for error is always too large.South Korea possesses globally competitive nuclear power plant construction technology, and the country could easily exploit this expertise to develop its own nuclear weapons program. To do so would be tragic, however. Such technology should remain a force for good ― as an invaluable tool to export peaceful nuclear energy use worldwide, especially in high-risk areas ― and must not be abused as a means to satisfy a myopic desire for power.Instead of wringing hands over whether the South should or shouldn't acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear acquisition card should be pushed aside in favor of those more in harmony with its long-term interests. One card off the table will help the South's decision over the North, if even marginally.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/06/137_47354.html

Christina Jung is a Seoul-based writer and editor. She can be reached at jung.christina@gmail.com.

view: Mystery of Indian scientist’s death —Haleema Saadia

view: Mystery of Indian scientist’s death —Haleema Saadia
Daily Times --- 22/06/09
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\06\22\story_22-6-2009_pg3_5

Stories surrounding the nuclear scientist’s suicide seem quite dubious. Mental health professionals generally agree that anyone contemplating suicide desires a swift death. Why would Mahalingam choose torturous and slow death? Did somebody throw him in the river?The dead body of an Indian nuclear scientist Lokanathan Mahalingam was found six days after he mysteriously went missing. According to the police he committed suicide by jumping into the Kali River in Kaiga township in Karwar, Karnataka.The stories surrounding the nuclear scientist’s suicide seem quite dubious. Mental health professionals generally agree that anyone contemplating suicide desires a swift death. Why would Mahalingam choose torturous and slow death? Did somebody throw him in the river? Was he injured or murdered before his body was thrown into the flooded Kali River? Whether Mahalingam was thrown into the river or he willingly offered his life to the powerful currents is going to remain a mystery since his remains have been cremated. A DNA test was performed to ascertain the identity of the dead body because his family members feared that the authorities might have handed over the dead body of someone else. They expected foul play which is why they demanded DNA testing. But that also raises the question: why was he cremated in such a hurry even before the results of the DNA test and the post-mortem report? The presence or absence of air in his lungs, any signs of torture on his body and the level of decomposition could have pointed out to the circumstances in which he met his final end.It is also intriguing that shortly after his body was found by the naval divers, the police announced its verdict that the scientist had committed suicide. The conclusion was premature since Mahalingam left no suicide note, another normal practice with those planning to commit suicide. How could the police state with certainty if the death was suicide? Reports suggest it could be an attempt to quash rumours of the scientist’s kidnapping and subsequent murder. But by acting thus the authorities have disregarded the efforts and contribution of Mahalingam to the Indian nuclear programme and have done a disservice to his family. By ignoring the possibility of target killing, they have subjected their nuclear scientists and engineers to a life of threat and danger. What would be the response of Indian nuclear establishment if another one of their personnel having access to sensitive nuclear information met a similar end? Even if this version of Mahalingam’s death is accepted, the suicide of an Indian nuclear scientist who worked in a sensitive field is not an ordinary event. It points to the shaky human and personnel reliability in the Indian nuclear complex. Till his apparent suicide Mahalingam was working on a sensitive and important post at the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant. Kaiga Atomic Power Plant is not a civilian nuclear plant and is not under IAEA safeguards. It is part of India’s nuclear weapons complex and is designed for plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Mahalingam had a quarter-century experience of working on nuclear reactors. He was by no means a junior officer as wrongly claimed by some Indian newspapers. Interestingly, he had past record of absence without permission. After returning from his worrisome absence, ten years ago, he claimed to have gone in search of spiritual solace. It was the responsibility of the Indian nuclear security apparatus to verify his claims and keep an eye on his activities. Had any action been taken, this mishap would not have happened. It seems that no thought is given to maintaining personality profiles of scientists working in the sensitive areas of the nuclear programme in India. Nuclear weapons possessor states have designed Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP) to ensure that only the most trustful, reliable and dependable individuals exhibiting excellent conduct and responsible behaviour are assigned sensitive jobs. PRP is a measure to prevent proliferation and minimise the threat of accidents due to deviant behaviour and potentially dangerous activities. To top the recklessness shown by those responsible for ensuring security of India’s nuclear complex Mahalingam was given the sensitive task of training young scientists. Until his disappearance he was working in the Simulator Training Division of the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant. A simulator is a precise replica of the control room of a nuclear power plant and the personnel working in that particular area are carefully chosen. The simulator control room mimics the situations and events taking place in the operational control room of nuclear reactor. Scientists and engineers are trained on simulators before they assume their duties on the nuclear plant. Personnel in the control room are highly experienced and have inside knowledge of the all the operations taking place in the nuclear reactor. A slight mistake or a small error of judgement on their part can create havoc. These individuals are responsible for the safe operation of the nuclear reactor and they have to be vigilant enough to deal with any emergency that might arise at any point in time.Apart from the current debacle, Indian nuclear programme has been in the news for all the wrong reasons. This is not the first case of mysterious disappearance and death of an employee of India’s strategic programme. A few weeks back another employee Ravi Mule of the same Kaiga Atomic Power Plant was murdered and his dead body was found in jungle in Kaiga township. Dr Anil Kumar Tiwari, the Director of Uttaranchal Space Application Centre, was assassinated on November 11, 2006. Both cases remain unsolved to date. Also, many cases of uranium thefts and smuggling from Indian nuclear facilities have been reported in the past several years. Indian scientists have been found involved in proliferation activities and have provided crucial know-how to Iran and Iraq. The US had imposed sanctions on two former chiefs Dr YSR. Prasad and Dr C Surendar of Nuclear Power Corporation of India in 2004. The United States, which has cut a nuclear deal with India, should stress upon India to clean up its act and put in place stringent safety and security measures as well as develop a reliable PRP. India claims to be a responsible nuclear power but that responsibility should be evident in its practices as well.

Haleema Saadia is a research fellow at SASSI, Islamabad. She can be reached at saadia.haleema@gmail.com

N-strategy for dummies ---------- The News-18/06/09

N-strategy for dummies
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Rabia Akhtar:The defence analyst. Email: rabois@gmail.com

Nuclear weapons are weapons of the weak because they embolden the weaker state through security that nuclear deterrence provides. There is enough evidence in history to reveal that deterrence as a strategy with its various phases from flexible response to mutually assured destruction (MAD) held value for the two Cold War rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union, only to deny the other 'nuclear superiority' or 'nuclear advantage'. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, the unipolar world order emerged and the US, being the mightiest, moved away from MAD to the doctrine of pre-emption which made much more sense because there was no point anymore in threatening the enemy when it could be beaten ten times over. The powerful state will not rely on deterrence as much as it will rely on pre-emption (either through conventional or nuclear means) because it can afford to. But for the weak states, nuclear weapons are power personified. However unfortunate the situation might seem, there is simply no comparison of states like Pakistan with the United States where an overwhelming conventional capability is absent thus deterrence through MAD seems not only plausible but the only rational doctrine to adopt. For those who do not respect deterrence for what it is worth for the weak and think of the bomb as a liability, history needs to be read backwards. While the critics of deterrence may like to believe that deterrence failed to prevent Vietnam, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egypt-Israel conflict, Kargil crisis when one or the other parties involved were nuclear-weapon states, the lesson learnt is that deterrence works best when it is direct and mutual. In all the cases cited above with the exception of Kargil, blaming the bomb or deterrence is simple ignorance about the facts of Cold War history. For instance, had Egypt possessed even a small nuclear force at the time of the Suez crisis, Anglo-French involvement in the conflict would have been on different grounds altogether; Czechs possessing a few nuclear weapons would have seen a different Russian response and North Korea and Iran have already brought the superpowers to the 'negotiating table'. For Pakistan and India where deterrence is direct and mutual, I believe that it is the minimalist form of MAD coupled with a credible minimum deterrence doctrine that has helped prevent escalation between India and Pakistan and has denied India escalation dominance in every crisis. It has become rather fashionable for analysts at home and abroad to find parallels between the Cold War and the two South Asian rivals instead of founding new theories about crisis behaviour of Pakistan and India. The Cold War history of deterrence witnessed the shift from MAD to the discourse on defence. The cornerstone of the US nuclear security strategy remained reliance on MAD and Robert McNamara, the then US secretary of defence, articulated it well by stating that quantitative improvement in strategic weapons other than those required by MAD was not necessary simply because there was no longer any such thing as nuclear superiority, thus rendering defence useless. As bizarre or uncomfortable the notion might be for the peace nicks; for the weak states nuclear weapons still make sense. The very fact that Pakistan has the capability to threaten the Indians to escalate the conflict by 'threatening' to use nuclear weapons, denies the Indians the advantage of launching and fighting a conventional war in South Asia. This is the 'stability' that MAD provides between Pakistan and India which borders on rationality from the weaker states' perspective. The key, however, to sustain credible deterrence in a hostile crisis-prone environment for Pakistan is to continue to deny Indians the nuclear advantage they are seeking by gradually strengthening its nuclear deterrence.

Comment: Riedel and the Pakistani Bomb —Naeem Salik

Daily Times - Site Edition
Thursday, June 18, 2009

A person of Mr Riedel’s stature should be very careful in gathering and verifying his facts and should also avoid using unsubstantiated stereotypes and sweeping statementsIn the past month or so, there has been a concerted media campaign in the United States raising concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Alarmist press reports were interspersed with some reassuring statements by responsible officials, including President Obama himself, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus.Not to be left behind was Mr Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who served in the NSC during the Clinton administration and is currently a senior fellow at the Saban Centre for Israel and Middle East at the Brookings Institution at Washington, DC. But more importantly he is one of the senior advisors to President Obama on the so-called ‘Af-Pak’ policy. For that particular reason, Mr Riedel’s diatribe against Pakistan and its nuclear security — “Pakistan and the Bomb: How the US can divert a crisis” — published in the Wall Street Journal of May 30, 2009 is being viewed in Pakistan as very disturbing.Mr Riedel has an axe to grind with Pakistan. He came to Pakistan as part of Strobe Talbott’s team in an emotionally charged atmosphere after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 on an impossible mission to persuade Pakistan from following suit. Unfortunately for him and his team, they were meted out very roughshod treatment by senior Pakistani diplomats and he still carries the scar of that experience. He has written in the past on issues related to Pakistan in terms not very favourable to Pakistan, which is perfectly understandable given the fact that most of these papers were commissioned by the Centre for Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.In his WSJ piece, Mr Riedel has made some very positive points, such as calling upon the US to have constancy and consistency in its policy towards Pakistan and to avoid using double standards when treating India and Pakistan. He has also debunked the idea floated around by some in the US political as well as think tank circles of ‘securing’ the Pakistani nuclear arsenal by force, calling it unrealistic and counterproductive.He has also grudgingly acknowledged that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been any proliferation activity involving any Pakistani national since 2004. He has also conceded that Pakistan’s arsenal is well protected, concealed and dispersed. However, he has added so many qualifiers in the form of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ that he has more or less nullified the positive side of these comments. While one does not contest Mr Riedel’s right to have and express his opinions, he should be mindful of the fact that such utterances would not be viewed in Pakistan as his personal views due to his official position. More importantly, a person of his stature should be very careful in gathering and verifying his facts and should also avoid using unsubstantiated stereotypes and sweeping statements.For instance, it is surprising that Mr Riedel has named Yaqub Khan as Pakistan’s military ruler in 1971 instead of Yahya Khan; maybe a quick glance through the country fact file of his old employers would have given him the correct answer.Similarly, on the issue of whether the assistance given to Pakistan has been utilised to expand Pakistan’s nuclear capability, Mr Riedel did not have to look very far. The Pakistan Aid Table compiled by Alan Kronstandt of the Congressional Research Service has given the breakdown, which clearly illustrates that $5.7 billion have been disbursed under the head Coalition Support Fund, which essentially means reimbursement of money spent by Pakistan in providing logistical support to US forces and the expenditure incurred by Pakistan in its own counterterrorism operations.But facts don’t seem to be Mr Riedel’s strength as is evident from his unsubstantiated statements about the ‘shaky’ security of Pakistan’s ‘fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world’ as a result of the ongoing military operation against the Taliban. He says this without establishing a causal relationship between the two events. He also alleges that Pakistan is constructing ‘several’ new reactors — again without any factual basis.The funniest comment is about Pakistan’s efforts to ‘buy more reactors from China to increase its production of fissile material’. Mr Riedel should know better: Pakistan has so far purchased two nuclear reactors from China which are under IAEA safeguards, and if it purchases more of the same, those too would be covered by similar safeguards. Secondly, these reactors are light water or boiling water type reactors that are not suited for producing fissile material even if they were not safeguarded.Mr Riedel has also termed Pakistan a ‘unique’ nuclear country, which has both obtained and proliferated nuclear technology. Just a brief recap of US nuclear history would tell Mr Riedel that all the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were European expatriates — none except one had US citizenship — who had escaped to the US with their ‘stolen’ nuclear secrets from Germany, Italy, Austria and the Scandinavian countries.It is no secret that US later helped Britain and France; Russia helped China; India was assisted by Canada, the US, Britain and France; Germany helped South Africa and Brazil; France virtually built the Israeli nuclear infrastructure; and he only needs to ask Seymour Hersh about the ultimate destination of large quantities of fissile materials stolen from US labs. Then how is Pakistan ‘unique’?There are many more factually incorrect, loaded and deliberately twisted statements that cannot be possibly be addressed given the limitation of space. But one can only hope that responsible people like Bruce Riedel will be more careful with their facts next time around and will be mindful of the fact that unlike journalistic statements, their comments carry serious implications and create doubts in the minds of the Pakistani people about the sincerity of the US’ commitment to Pakistan. Finally, with regards to Mr Riedel’s fears about a ‘jihadist’ takeover of Pakistan and his overblown concern about Pakistan itself falling into wrong hands, one only needs to look at the results of the national elections of February 2008, which unequivocally dispelled these misplaced fears which were also being expressed on the eve of the elections.

Naeem Salik: The writer is a retired brigadier and a defence analyst

Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

Written by The Public Record
Friday, 05 June 2009 20:25
http://www.pubrecord.org/nationworld/933-documents-offer-new-revelations-of-israeli-nuclear-weapons-program.html

Recent Actions by Declassification Panel Show Pattern of CIA Overclassification and Tight Grip on Early Cold War History
New Declassification Releases by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)
During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the few U.S. intelligence organizations to dissent from the Bush administration's allegations of a revved-up Iraqi nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell ignored his own experts, but INR's prescience raised its prestige.
INR also got it right in its forecast of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, according to a recently declassified post-mortem on the U.S. intelligence failure during the October War, published today by the National Security Archive. In the spring of 1973, INR analysts wrote that, absent diplomatic progress in the Middle East, "the resumption of hostilities will become a better than even bet."
INR analysts argued that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would go to war not for specific military objectives, but to take "military action which can be sustained long enough" to get the United States and the Soviet Union strongly involved in the Middle East peace process.
The authors of the October War post-mortem saw the INR estimate as a "case of wisdom lost," because as the signs of conflict unfolded in the fall of 1973, the intelligence establishment forgot those warnings. The post-mortem, which reviewed failures to take into account communications intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), quickly became a secret "best seller" in the intelligence establishment after it was published.
When the Archive filed a mandatory review request for the post-mortem, the CIA denied much of the document, and it took a decision by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in response to the Archive's appeal to reverse the CIA decision and declassify much more of the withheld information. Acting as the court of last resort for mandatory declassification review requests, ISCAP recently reversed other CIA initial denials of documents from the 1960s and 1970s. While it exempted material it regards as sensitive, ISCAP nevertheless found that much of the information denied by the CIA could be declassified without harm to national security.
Among the ISCAP Releases Are:

The U.S. government's first intelligence estimate--a Special National Intelligence Estimate from December 1960--on the purposes of Israeli nuclear activities at a nuclear reactor complex near Beersheba: "We believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort."
Biographical sketches of members of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. For years, the CIA routinely refused to declassify its biographical reporting.
A top secret report from November 1973 on the possibility that Moscow shipped nuclear weapons into Soviet bases in Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war.
A National Intelligence Estimate from April 1986 on "The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups" which found that the "prospects that terrorists will attempt high-level nuclear terrorism" was "low to very low." While the CIA analysts speculated that even the terrorist groups of the 1980s may have had inhibitions against actions that produced civilian mass casualties, they suggested that the inhibitions could erode and that groups "with a different state of mind" could emerge.
ISCAP's decision to declassify these documents is commendable, but the CIA's initial denials suggest that the Agency is following overly restrictive declassification review standards. Just as troubling, the Agency used the CIA Information Act to prevent ISCAP from making a decision on the classification status of a history of early covert operations, "Office of Policy Coordination, 1948-1952."
These CIA examples suggest that the rules and regulations that support the U.S. government secrecy system enable government agencies to follow unreasonably narrow standards. Moreover, as the CIA's action on the covert operations history suggests, laws on the books give the Agency inordinate power to keep the veil of secrecy over important parts of its history. Indeed, President George W. Bush's executive order on secrecy policy, still in force, gives the CIA veto power over ISCAP decisions on intelligence records. These problems point out the need for significant change in the U.S. government's secrecy policy.

The security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

During the last week of April, I visited four cities in Pakistan (Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi). The purpose of the trip was to discuss a December 2008 Center for American Progress report that I coauthored, Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region.
Although this was my first trip to Pakistan, one of the two other colleagues who accompanied me had visited the country on three previous occasions. For two reasons, we had exceptional access to some 60 current and former civilian and military government officials (including a two-hour visit to the ISI headquarters), members of the media and academia, and heads of nongovernmental organizations. First, one of the members of the working group who helped us formulate the report is now the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Second, several of our colleagues from the Center for American Progress have moved into key positions in the Obama administration. Moreover, since we aren't in government, it was easier for us to challenge the bromides that some officials peddle.
Before the visit, I knew Pakistan was facing several critical political, economic, and security problems. Still, there were some hopeful signs: Pakistan held free and fair elections in February 2008; the country has an independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society and media; and the Obama administration and Congress were finally making U.S. relations with Pakistan a priority.
That said, the day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today's Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order.
After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn't about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.
The trip reinforced my belief that Pakistan has a great many political, economic, and social problems that prevent it from achieving its full potential. But the majority of the population wants the duly constituted government to fulfill its responsibilities to promote the general welfare and provide for the common defense. They aren't looking to some outside force such as the Taliban to assume control of the country and solve these problems. Unlike Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban in Pakistan isn't seen as a group capable of imposing order on a chaotic situation. Rather, the Taliban is seen as an organization trying to upset the existing order. For instance, the majority of the Pakistani population urged the government to take forceful action against the Taliban when it reneged on its agreement in the Swat District.
Moreover, at this time, the Pakistani Army has no desire to seize political power, nor will it let the Taliban take control of Pakistan proper or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country. The army knows that if it staged a coup at this time, it would become responsible for all of the country's economic and social problems.
Likewise, the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan, even if it keeps a large contingent on the border with India. Since the army knows that the collateral damage--including creating refugees--would be significant if it uses force, it won't take action until ordered to do so by the prime minister and the Parliament.
I'm also convinced that Pakistan's nuclear weapons won't be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents. This sentiment is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, and Adm. Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president himself. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Obama said, "We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals."
Why? Because even though the program originally was started by a civilian, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the 1970s, the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India's large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That's exactly why it's currently increasing its nuclear arsenal. In addition, over the past three years, Washington has made a $100-million investment to improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon safeguards. (The Pakistanis won't let us see how this money was spent because they fear that we will use this information to disable the nukes.)
It's also important to note that Islamabad's intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army's control. In fact, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, once headed the ISI, and the high-level officials in that agency are all his appointees and thus, very loyal to him.
Lastly, the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won't let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons.
Given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don't buy it at this time.

2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists