India reels over Obama's silence

India reels over Obama's silenceBy M K Bhadrakumar Diplomatic predicaments can at times be almost laughable. Indian officials were scurrying around like headless chickens because 120 anxious hours had passed and United States president-elect Barack Obama had not yet put a phone call through to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh - as he has done to at least nine other heads of state. The Indians could learn a thing or two from the Kremlin. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev found himself exactly in Manmohan's predicament when by November 8 his Kremlin telephone still had not rung. But 43-year-old Medvedev did a smart thing. He put a call through to Chicago to the 47-year old president-elect. The Kremlin thereupon went ahead and publicized the



conversation in an upbeat account. A budding controversy was nipped before it could blossom. Kashmir issue reviving Young people move real fast. The embarrassment is acute in Delhi since 76-year-old Manmohan committed an incredible gaffe in the runup to the US elections in late September by telling the 65-year-old US President George W Bush that Indians "loved" him - ignoring how fast the American people's equation with their lameduck leader was deteriorating. Delhi finds it appalling that Obama phoned Pakistani leader Asif Zardari on Saturday and the two leaders reportedly discussed the Kashmir issue. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee promptly reacted, invoking the Simla Accord of 1972 as the cornerstone of India-Pakistan relations, which rules out third-party mediation over the disputed territory of Kashmir. It is a long while since an Indian statesman mentioned the Simla Accord. It is a "back-off" message and it comes amid reports that in a move to inspire Islamabad to perform better in the "war on terror", the incoming US administration may coax India into a settlement of the Kashmir problem and that Obama proposes to appoint former US president Bill Clinton as special envoy to undertake a sustained mediatory mission between India and Pakistan. Indians might have fondly overlooked Clinton's incurable flaws and warmed to him as president, but his anointment as Kashmir envoy will not go down well. Public opinion would see it as a failure of the government's foreign policy. And the ruling Congress party is gearing up for a string of tough provincial and federal elections. However, Obama may also be unwittingly exposing some of the fallacies underlying the Manmohan government's foreign policy - China, the war in Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation. Floundering dreams Indian strategists blithely assume that Washington ascribes crucial importance to building up India as a counterweight to China. They estimate India stands to gain from the US's containment strategy towards China. But a containment strategy towards China may be the last thing on Obama's mind. China is a key player in any US effort to rebuild the global financial architecture, and Beijing is behaving like a "stakeholder". The Indian obsession with "great-power" status looks out of place in the changed context. George W Bush administration officials constantly drilled into Indian ears the importance of Delhi taking on responsibilities for the management of the world order. They visualized India as a junior partner in the strategy to control the waterway between the Persian Gulf and the chokepoint of the Malacca Strait through which the bulk of China's oil imports is transported. Similarly, the Bush administration prodded Delhi to seriously consider military involvement in Afghanistan. Against the backdrop of the US-India civilian nuclear deal, audacious Indian strategists began fancying Delhi and Washington would move towards a "serious conversation" as regards the "full range of issues relating to Pakistan's political and strategic future". Obama's Afghan strategy Obama threatens to shake up the daydreamers in Delhi. His top priority is to seek an exit strategy in Afghanistan. He will be wary of following in the tragic footsteps of president Lyndon Johnson who, like him, inherited a war (Vietnam), which ultimately consumed his presidency and destroyed his political life. Obama could as well have delivered LBJ's famous Great Society speech of May 1964 at the University of Michigan commencement. He is at a comparable point in the march of American history and politics. Equally, Obama empathizes with Pakistan's plight. He would assess that the moral and political responsibility for destabilizing Pakistan primarily lies with Washington and that as long as the Afghan war continues, Pakistan will remain in the vortex of volatility, which will affect regional stability. He may not necessarily opt for Central Command chief General David Petraeus' strategy of "surge" first followed by negotiations with the Taliban, but his campaign rhetoric that he is determined to win the Afghan war must be seen in its entire context. Washington accepts Pakistan has special interests in Afghanistan and the US needs to accommodate them. These include security guarantees against perceived Indian threats as well as regard for the Durand Line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan. It shouldn't come as a surprise to Delhi if the US seeks a rollback of the scale of the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Even-handed policyTwo, Obama will actively seek to improve India-Pakistan relations so that they become predictable. His inclination to bring in Clinton as special envoy must be seen from this perspective. He needs someone with persuasive skill to influence Delhi, while he focuses on Pakistan and the war. But Obama cannot be naive enough to conclude that his route to Afghan settlement lies through the treacherous minefields of the 60-year-old Kashmir dispute. Nor is Clinton unaware that India will never accept any redrawing of its boundaries. And Indians are famous for hunkering down, as he learned in the late 1990s when they went nuclear. Clinton would know his task essentially would be to probe the Indian offer to make the borders separating the two parts of Kashmir "irrelevant" within the overall framework of a durable peace process with Pakistan. Therefore, the high probability is that despite his fondness for travel, good food and diplomacy, he may still be reluctant to take up the challenging assignment in South Asia. Compared to the Cold War era when India withstood the hostile US stance on the Kashmir issue, it is in a far happier position today on the world arena. So, why are Indians going ballistic? The problem lies elsewhere. The Manmohan government frittered away a rare four-year spell of relative calm to provide responsive government in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). A colossal failure of leadership in Delhi and massive political ineptitude locally in J&K incrementally sapped India's strong position. The consequent alienation of Kashmiri people runs deep. The challenge facing Delhi is to hold free and fair elections to the provincial assembly in J&K due in December, and to facilitate the formation of a government which the international community will regard as democratically elected. Delhi's fear is that any talk of US mediation may embolden Kashmiri secessionists. On balance, Obama can be expected to pursue an even-handed policy towards the two South Asian rivals India and Pakistan. But herein lies the rub. The expectation in Delhi is that the US ought to build up India as the pre-eminent power in the region. This is the real source of the angst among the Indian elite and strategists, even though the Obama administration will continue with the US policy to seek a strong relationship with India in the sphere of military and intelligence cooperation. Nuclear deal may unravel Meanwhile, a potentially debilitating discord is appearing on the horizon. Obama supported the nuclear deal with India, which was recently ratified by the US Congress. But now it transpires, following "leaks" from Washington, that as early as September 23, Obama had written to Manmohan that his administration would regard the deal with India as a "central element" of the US's nuclear weapons policy. He put on record that his administration would press for the US's ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "at the earliest practical day". Furthermore, he said his administration would "launch a major diplomatic initiative" to ensure that CTBT came into force. Obama added he would also pursue negotiations on a "verifiable, multilateral treaty" to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Both with regard to the CTBT as well as an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material, he wrote, "I very much hope and expect India will cooperate closely with the United States in these multilateral efforts". Curiously, the Manmohan government kept the letter under wraps until it became public knowledge last week. It was apprehensive that the letter challenges the official contention that the deal accords recognition to India as a nuclear weapons state. The letter touches a raw nerve. There is apprehension that Obama's thinking will be integrated into new US disarmament proposals that draw India into the global nuclear order through the CTBT and the fissile material production ban and impose on India a more stringent accounting of its nuclear material. Delhi's priority is to use the deal to provide the context to access to sensitive US military technology within the overall framework of the "strategic partnership". Surely, there is a grey area here. Did the Bush administration negotiate the deal with transparency? Hard to say. Are Indians so dumb as to be led up the garden path and hustled into a deal full of ambiguities? Not really. Only Bush and Manmohan would know. It appears India and the US have a growing need to retain Manmohan and Bush in their current jobs as lifetime heads of governments so that the strategic partnership can go from strength to strength. Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.