An Indian in Every Pakistani?

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Shireen M Mazari

The writer is a defence analyst

Lack of formal education and sheer ignorance does not by definition imply an innate sense of stupidity. On the other hand, formal education in itself is no guarantee of an intelligent and rational human being – just look at the American leaders over the years! As for mental stability, that has little to do with formal education or education of any sort whatsoever. What is true is that leaders who are intelligent and not overwhelmed by a sense of their own greatness and the autocratic "I", realise their limitations and seek guidance. That is why while many commentators attribute President Zardari's bizarre pronouncements very charitably to a lack of information or knowledge, the reality is that there is an ominous design in it all. After all, he is surrounded by not only his sycophants but also the whole state machinery with its bureaucrats, intelligence networks and so on. So why do statements that damage the nation in the long run continue to pour forth from the present leadership? Does no one dare to advise the president, or does he see himself as all-knowing even as he is all-powerful? Or is the reality that his advice is actually linked to a US agenda targeting Pakistan? Whatever the case, let us see if a pattern can be traced in all his shenanigans, at least in the realm of foreign and security policies where he has managed to reduce us to a collective absurdity and a vile joke. First, there is suddenly a furore over a truncated map of Pakistan that is only now being examined by a wider Pakistani audience. But the reality is that the map first appeared in the US Armed Forces Journal in July 2006, written by a retired US intelligence officer, Ralph Peters and entitled, "Blood Borders". Some of us had pointed out at that time that this was now part of the US agenda for the so-called "Greater or Broader Middle East Project", but at that time few paid notice. This has been part of the problem here in Pakistan – we never see far enough ahead and now the US design is in the midst of being operationalised and we have a leadership that has come with a seeming commitment to aid this nefarious US design of destabilising Pakistan through increasing military incursions through the tribal belt and moving beyond – and we have already had that with the US attacks on Bannu – and multiple efforts to eventually roll back our nuclear capability. Now let us look at our own leadership's antics. No one from the presidency has forcefully refuted US media claims that in September this year President Zardari gave the US a nod to continue predator attacks against Pakistan. Meanwhile, we had the "absurdity" of the president claiming that the US had not violated Pakistan's sovereignty since only aerial attacks were being conducted! Then we had the farce of the parliamentary consensus resolution on terrorism which demanded the government take action against the predator attacks. The government has so far not moved an iota on any of the substantive demands of this resolution. Instead, to make us look even more ridiculous than we already were looking, our leadership hopes that Obama will stop the attacks. Have they looked up Obama's statements and his potential secretary of state's viewpoints? From any rational perspective, given the manner in which the US is behaving it is now a hostile if not an enemy state for us, but we have that strange minister of defence continuing to state that if the US stays here for three decades it will be good for Pakistan! Does he think we will survive in any viable form after three decades of bombings by the US and the retaliatory lethal and non-discriminatory suicide attacks against this nation? But then so many of the present leadership, in keeping with past tradition, have homes and rich setups abroad. So what do they care? Parallel to our continuous conceding of ground to the US, we are also now complying with the US agenda of establishing India as the regional hegemon. If we see no threat from India and we want a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, eventually we may have a declaration by this president that he hates nukes and we will renounce ours unilaterally – that is unless the US has created enough instability to seek a UN Security Council intervention regarding control of our nuclear assets! Yes, it may seen far-fetched to some, but look how so many unthinkable developments have hit us in a short space of time – beginning right from the present occupant of the presidency itself.So when President Zardari offers a "no-first use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons to India, there is a design behind it – a US design. The problem is we have short memories and have forgotten that India has actually reneged on its limited NFU declaration it had made earlier in its overt nuclear life! When India declared its strategic doctrine and stated its intent of using nuclear strikes against any WMD threat from anywhere, it effectively adopted a "first use" doctrine similar to that of the US.As for Pakistan, given our limited conventional capability, we cannot afford to remove the ambivalence we are maintaining regarding NFU. In this we are no different from the much mightier NATO. Is it not time for our security managers and strategists to inform the president that one does not bandy about NFU offers whimsically or because one hates the idea of nuclear weapons. No one loves nukes and no one loves war – apart from Mr Bush and the neocons – but there are realities that need to be considered; and one does not bandy about strategic doctrines simply as appeasement tools. Our declared posture of nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort and a deliberate ambivalence on NFU must not be compromised. As for the idea of a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), it is the Indians who have always rejected the idea, just as they rejected the zero missile idea and now with India acquiring Missile Defence from the US, we cannot continue to support notions that we floated before May 1998. Of course, if the Indians had conceded to a NWFZ and renounced their grandiose nuclear weapon programmes, their fears regarding China (or so their pretext goes) could easily have been handled in a protocol attached to the treaty similar to the protocols attached to and an integral part of the Latin American NWFZ treaty – the Tlatelolco Treaty. But all that was in the past – as was the no-war pact which Pakistan kept pushing for with India. Now all that is truly feasible in the nuclear domain with India is joint nuclear power generation and an ongoing strategic dialogue to maintain the nuclear balance. But then that is not part of the nuclear agenda of the US. The US continues to seek a rollback of Pakistan's nuclear programme as part of its long-term negative agenda towards Pakistan.As for the new, more so-called informed US media on Pakistan, it is high time they realised that our suspicions and hostility towards the US have nothing to do with illiteracy or Talibanisation – Jane Perlez's analysis notwithstanding. Instead, it has everything to do with US policies towards Pakistan. It is that simple. But our greater issue is with our leadership that seems to be hand in glove with the US. After all, we can certainly counter the predator or the impending grim "Reaper" attacks now on the cards. When will our missiles prove their worth? Or, if our military feels insecure with a direct military response, how about more simple actions easier to accomplish? Here are some suggestions: halt the transit logistic supplies; suspend high-level diplomatic relations; opt out of the trilateral commission; reduce the number of US personnel in Pakistan; take back all the bases. That should be enough to send a resolute message of Pakistani intent to the US and its NATO allies. Finally, Mr President, I have searched intensely within myself to discover a little Indian within my Baloch, Punjabi, Seraiki and Pathan heritage, but all I see is an intense Pakistani, born in the sovereign state of Pakistan. For me India is as foreign a country as any other. Sorry Mr President, but you are wrong on this count too.

Email: callstr@hotmail.com

Policy in Wonderland-Ejaz Haider

INSIGHT: Policy in Wonderland —Ejaz Haider

Mr Zardari has offered no-first-use (NFU) to India. This is new. But its newness notwithstanding, it shows he knows next to nothing about the issue and was either not briefed on it or decided, of his own bat, to charge down the pitchPresident Asif Ali Zardari’s address to the Hindustan Times Summit 2008 through video-conferencing from Islamabad reminds me of HL Mencken’s line that “Poetry has done enough when it charms, but prose must also convince”.Good intentions are the stuff of poetry, but realpolitik works and survives on the basis of capability and power projection and that is the stuff of prose. The prosaic line was delivered by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which quickly made clear that the remarks were not official and that change of Pakistani policy would have to be seen on the ground first. End of story.

Let me make the positive assumption about Mr Zardari, however — i.e., he really wants to break new ground. That’s good news. The bad news is that, like wars, the areas where some good can be done must be chosen carefully.Exhibit A: Let South Asia be a nuclear free zone (NFZ). Sure. Why just South Asia? The entire world should be an NFZ. Indeed, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty talks about disarmament as one of the three pillars of the treaty, the other two being non-proliferation and the right to fuel cycle.But Article VI has not happened and is unlikely to consummate anytime soon unless the new US President-elect can begin to stitch back the tattered non-proliferation regime, do so without discrimination and move from non-proliferation to disarmament. Whether such is possible after the India-US civil nuclear deal is not something on which I shall wager my meagre resources.India has never pegged its nuclear capability on Pakistan, citing global reasons. That may be bunkum given its deployment patterns and force configuration but who can deny it its Foucauldian discourse which has informed its policy since the NPT came up for discussion. Over time, it has used both the nuclear capability and other sinews of national power to add value to itself. Why would it do poetry when prose has worked fine for it?Plus, this is not breaking new ground at all.

Pakistan first talked about a South Asian NFZ during General Zia-ul Haq’s time. We were of course developing our nuclear capability, as was India! We offered it, they rejected it and it was business as usual.Incidentally, on this note of history, let me pre-empt Mr Zardari on something he might also offer India thinking it is new ground — a no war pact. That too we offered India; that too was rejected. So yes, Mr President, it won’t be new.Exhibit B: First use of nuclear weapons. Mr Zardari has offered no-first-use (NFU) to India. This is new. But its newness notwithstanding, it shows he knows next to nothing about the issue and was either not briefed on it properly or decided, of his own bat, to charge down the pitch. If the first, he was obviously not briefed by the Strategic Plans Division. If the second, he needs to learn to play himself in before attacking. Let’s consider.NFU is for the birds, Mr President. Even India, which began with a declaratory NFU policy has let it drop quietly. Our nuclear capability and first use had rather simple premises. We needed the weapons capability because we were/are conventionally inferior. That being the case, we needed to, and still do, project the capability and the will to use it — and do so first and early into a conflict.But this still does not solve the problem of NFU. So here goes.

NFU is insubstantial in military terms unless it can be verified. Since Indian and Pakistani capabilities remain opaque, it is impossible to verify that the forces on one or both sides are configured for an NFU policy.Simply declaring NFU intent is merely a political statement. While nuclear weapons have a political purpose, they are also military weapons. Indeed, it is the military side — projection of capability and the will to use it — that allows a nuclear-weapon state to draw political mileage out of them.But if verification that a force is configured for NFU is important for the policy declaration to have any military meaning, are there any parameters through which this can be achieved?Li Bin, a Chinese expert, has presented five important parameters through which a state can project its NFU intent and which can be verified by rival states: the size of the nuclear force; the composition of that force; the number of warheads on each missile; the accuracy of nuclear weapons (whether counter-value or counter-force targeting); and the strength of the conventional forces. (For a detailed discussion of these points see Ejaz Haider, “First use and nuclear risk-reduction”; Daily Times, June 22, 2004.)Let it be said, however, that I raise the above points and objections strictly within the ambit of nuclear strategy and to show that Mr Zardari talked about a non-issue. Both Pakistan and India now face other forms of threats that need to be countered and they require cooperative strategies. It would be more useful, while nuclear weapons hold the inter-state balance, to offer concrete and workable proposals in those areas. Exhibit C: Mr Zardari also expressed the desire to trade with India and said that he looked forward to an economic union. No one can contend against the idea of trade per se. That, therefore, is not the issue. There was a time Pakistan used non-economic arguments to shoot down trade with India. Now there is a rush, without looking into what can be traded and to what extent and end, to trade. It has become a shibboleth.

I cannot do better than to draw the president’s and the government’s attention to work done in the area by Moeed Yusuf and his colleagues. See Yusuf, “Peace trade-off?” Daily Times, November 20, 2006; Yusuf, “Using Trade as a Driver of Peace: Prospects in the Indo-Pak Context,” Criterion, Vol 2, No 3, July-September 2007; Khan, Shaheen and Yusuf, “Managing Conflict through Trade: The Case of Pakistan and India” in Regional Trade Integration and Conflict Resolution: Southern Perspectives, Shaheen Rafi Khan, ed. (London, Routledge, 2008); Khan, Yusuf, Bokhari, and Aziz, “Quantifying Informal Trade Between Pakistan and India” in The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan-India Trade, Naqvi and Schuler, eds. (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2007). This is an area that, more than good intentions, requires solid work. There are other economists who strongly favour trade. At the minimum there should be informed debate on the issue. And that brings me to the conclusion.The last time Pakistan tried its hand at a coherent national security policy was with the 1976 White Paper. Since then there has been no attempt to formulate a coherent NSP and/or set down some mechanism to review it annually, biennially or quinquennially etc. New opportunities and dangers have emerged; the world has changed in many ways. Yet, we trundle along like we are sleepwalking through all this.Mr Zardari will do the country much good if he could get down to the task of doing this review which could then become a basis for policies in various areas.As the situation stands, here’s an offering from Alice in Wonderland, the dialogue between Alice and the Cheshire Cat:“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where –” said Alice.“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

Nuclear South Asia

Daily Times 25 Nov. 2008

analysis : Debating first use -Rasul Bakhsh Rais (Daily Times, (Tuesday, November 25, 2008)

analysis : Debating first use -Rasul Bakhsh Rais
While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use optionDuring a candid interview with Indian journalists assembled on the invitation of the Hindustan Times, President Asif Ali Zardari addressed many difficult issues in a warm and reconciliatory manner. His Indian interviewers may have found him easy and forward-looking with some bold ideas; ideas that many carrying the burden of history on both sides of the border may not readily accept.While talking about nuclear weapons, he sounded like a mystic from the heart of Sindh who is not comfortable with India and Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are bad, because, if used, they could kill millions and devastate the environment.But then India and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons. And there is a reason nuclear states devote so much material and scientific resources to produce them: deterrence — preventing other states from committing aggression.In examining deterrence, the issue of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons is extremely important, and in every case, it is a result of well thought out strategy based on the strategic balance and security environment of nuclear states. President Zardari’s comment on this difficult issue should be read in light of the general tenor of his conversation rather than as a reflection of change in Pakistan’s earlier position on the matter.But first, we should contextualise the first use option, and understand how and why it has been at the centre of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine. Assuming that constant increase in Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities and American interest in specific types of political and security policies in and around the region keep Pakistan’s strategic environment fluid, how will Pakistan’s deterrence posture towards India be affected?The first use option implies that Pakistan will not wait for India to strike first with nuclear weapons. Rather, it will keep its options open as to the stage of a conflict when it should use nuclear weapons. The issue has two levels: doctrinal and operational. It makes sense for a country with limited nuclear resources and limited capability to fight a conventional war against a larger adversary not to renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first.There is the benefit of ambiguity: such a posture would definitely interfere with the strategic gaming of the adversary. Pakistan’s first use option is primarily meant to offset India’s conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is a matter of conjecture under what conditions of war Pakistani strategists decide to pull the nuclear trigger, if at all. Pakistan’s best bet is that India would be deterred from major conventional war by the declaratory policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons. Since the entire edifice of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence rests on this option, its nuclear policy credibility would be suspect should it ever commit itself to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack by India.We are familiar with the strategic debate in the United States of the first use option that accompanied the massive retaliation doctrine against the conventional threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The US compensated for its relatively weak conventional forces by declaring that it would respond to conventional provocation with nuclear weapons at a time and place of its choosing. The massive retaliation doctrine was credible as long as the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons. Once it did, the doctrine lost credibility because even without a formal acknowledgement, nuclear parity began to impact American strategic thinking. Since Moscow had acquired second strike capability, it had the means to cause unacceptable damage to American cities.European allies of the US became concerned about the credibility of extended deterrence. Nuclear parity then caused a shift to flexible response, meaning that the US might not use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression, but it retained the first use option.While the strategic environment of South Asia is vastly different from that of the Cold War, Pakistan has the benefit of the accumulated lessons of that era, i.e. ambiguity, uncertainty, risk propensity and doctrinal flexibility deter a nuclear adversary. With small nuclear forces in hand and a big gap in conventional capabilities, it suits Pakistan’s interests to maintain the first use option.How credible is the threat? At what stage of a conflict would Pakistan use nuclear weapons? Would it be at the beginning of a war when its conventional assets are secure and it has not lost major chunks of its territory; or close to the end when its very survival is threatened by serious setbacks in the conventional battlefield?These are not easy questions for any strategist in Pakistan because of two reasons: the dynamic nature of the balance of power, which is rapidly shifting in favour of India; and the multiple economic and political troubles Pakistan faces today.The question of ‘when’ Pakistan would use nuclear weapons is the most troubling one. Using nuclear weapons at a time when it has lost a conventional war would prove suicidal. India could retaliate, or even choose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. By going for the second option, India would gain tremendous international support and use that sympathy to pursue its objectives against Pakistan with greater vigour and determination.Using nuclear weapons at the start of a war could invite retaliation and combined with that an intensive conventional attack. By using nuclear weapons first, Pakistan would hardly gain any strategic ground, since India could strike back and cause equal or greater damage. Rising sentiments in favour of revenge in the targeted state, international support for the victim of the nuclear attack and the invoking of collective security under the UN for action against Pakistan would present a situation with unacceptable security and political costs.Pakistan would have to be more careful in calculating the costs of a first strike, and opt for it only under the most desperate conditions. But what would these conditions be? The threat to Pakistani territorial integrity posed by a massive Indian conventional attack may present the most obvious condition that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. That will have horrendous consequences as well.What we need to do in South Asia is to even restrain from engaging in conventional conflict. Rather, possibilities of peace and reconciliation should be explored, and with some commitment and struggle, we may discover each other’s humanity and respect our right to exist with honour and dignity.Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk

FCNL Nuclear Calendar

Nuclear Calendar
November 24, 2008Receive updates by email
UncertainNational Academy of Sciences issues its second phase report on assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile (Public Law 109-364, Sec. 3116).Nov. 24Due date for comments on the National Nuclear Security Administration's final SPEIS (Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) for Complex Transformation, the proposed plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex. Comments can be submitted by email.Nov. 27Thanksgiving (holiday)Nov. 27-28International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors meeting. Vienna, AustriaNov. or Dec.State Department's International Security Advisory Board issues a report on China's Strategic Modernization. A draft of the report is on the Washington Times website.Nov. or Dec.National Academy of Sciences issues the first phase report on assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile (Public Law 109-364, Sec. 3116).Dec. 1Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry, issues an interim report to Congress (Public Law 110-181, Sec. 1062 and Public Law 110-417, Sec. 1060).Dec. 1-5Biological Weapons Convention annual meeting. GenevaWeek of Dec. 1 or 8Six-party talks resume on North Korea's nuclear program (possible). BeijingDec. 29:00-11:00 a.m., Peter Scoblic, The New Republic, "Progressives Change the Debate around Nuclear Disarmament: Practical Applications of New Psychological Research." Sponsored by the Proteus Fund. At the Third Way, 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 501, Washington. RSVP to Nandini Merz by email.Dec. 2Georgia run-off election between Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R) and Jim Martin (D)Dec. 2-3NATO foreign ministers meeting. Budapest, HungaryDec. 2-5ExchangeMonitor Publications, "Nuclear Deterrence Summit," with keynote speakers Rep. Ellen Tauscher (CA), and Thomas D'Agostino, National Nuclear Security Administration. L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 480 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington. Registration online.Dec. 2-5Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons annual meeting. The Hague, NetherlandsDec. 3Noon-1:00 p.m., Sally McNamara, Heritage Foundation; Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council; and Mario Loyola, Senate Republican Policy Committee, "Missile Defense in Europe: The Way Forward." RSVP online. Webcast on the Heritage Foundation website.Dec. 3Noon-1:30 p.m., Richard Hatchett, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, "Public Health Preparedness and the Unthinkable: Reflections on Nuclear Terrorism and Pandemic Influenza." Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Encina Hall, Hills Conference Room, 616 Serra St., Second Floor, Stanford, CADec. 312:30 p.m., Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by former Sen. Bob Graham, issues its report (Public Law 110-53, Sec. 1851 et seq.). S-207 Capitol Building, WashingtonDec. 312:30-2:00 p.m., Takeo Akiba, Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry; Tamim Khallaf, Egyptian Foreign Affairs Ministry; and Sarah MacIntosh, U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Challenges Facing Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Impact on International Security." Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Bowie-Vernon Room N262, 1033 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MADec. 3International Convention on Cluster Munitions opens for signature. Oslo, NorwayDec. 46;30-9:00 p.m., Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, guest of honor, ICAS Annual Liberty Award Dinner, 325 Russell Senate Office Building, WashingtonDec. 5U.S. and Russian due date on the decision to extend the START nuclear arms reduction treaty. (The treaty expires Dec. 5, 2009.) Dec. 6Louisiana general election in Congressional District 2 between Rep. William Jefferson (D) and Anh Cao (R), and in Congressional District 4 between Paul Carmouche (D) and John Fleming (R) (Elections were rescheduled because of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike.)Week of Dec. 8House and Senate reconvene for a lame-duck session.Dec. 91:00 p.m., Energy Department, public hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership draft PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). Holiday Inn Washington-Capitol, 550 C St., SW, Washington. (Other public hearings are held across the country, Nov. 17-Dec. 4.)Dec. 94:00-5:30 p.m., Edward Ifft, Georgetown University; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment; and Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation, "“Steps to Zero.” Sponsored by Physicians for Social Responsibility. At the Carnegie Endowment, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington. RSVP by noon, Dec. 8 to Jill Parillo by email.Dec. 119:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Peace and Security Initiative community-wide meeting. At the Carnegie Endowment, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington
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The Need For Clarity In India’S Nuclear Doctrine

The Need For Clarity In India’S Nuclear Doctrine
Ali Ahmed
November 11, 2008
IDSA
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis
While the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 was an elaborate document, the press release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on India’s operationalisation of its nuclear doctrine of January 4, 2003 was, on the other hand, very succinct. While reflexively it may be said that India’s doctrine is predicated on a nuclear retaliation of sufficient magnitude to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ against nuclear use by an adversary against India or its forces anywhere, it is contended here that there has been a shift in the doctrine as explicated in the press release to potentially countenance ‘flexible response’. Since transparency in the nuclear doctrine is important for communication of nuclear intent to potential adversaries, there is a requirement of spelling out the nuclear doctrine in greater measure. This article brings to the fore the need for clarity by challenging the commonly held position that India’s doctrine is one of ‘assured destruction’ by making the case that it can equally be interpreted as ‘graduated deterrence’. In doing so, it highlights an area of potential confusion and recommends that this be addressed.
The understanding widely held is that India’s nuclear doctrine is one of assured retaliation of a massive order or ‘assured destruction’ – defined as a strategy based on a high order counter value threat. This is explicable as it is in keeping with India’s philosophy regarding nuclear weapons as being ‘political weapons’ not meant for nuclear use. Their only utility is to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons by adversaries against India. Since these are not meant for war fighting, they have a role in operationalising India’s philosophy of ‘deterrence by punishment’. This is in keeping with the other pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, namely, No First Use, minimum credible deterrent, unilateral moratorium on testing and amenability to universal nuclear disarmament.
The National Security Advisory Board came up with a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (Draft) positing ‘massive retaliation’ for consideration by the government in August 1999 after the Kargil conflict of that summer. In the Draft, the relevant portion has been articulated thus: “Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor” {Para 2.3 (b)}.1 In the wake of Operation Parakram of 2001-02, the government, through a press release from the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, confirmed the adoption of the nuclear doctrine that was explicated in a press release. The appropriate portion is extracted below:
“(ii) A posture of “No First Use”: Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
(iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”2(Italics added)
The doctrine is now one of ‘assured retaliation’ to nuclear use by an adversary with the proviso that this would be massive in the case of first strike. In other words, retaliation in face of sub ‘first strike’ levels or usage could be of a lower order. In effect, India’s nuclear doctrine has moved away from one of assuredly inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ posited in the Draft to one that potentially includes ‘flexible’ or ‘graduated’ response. This shift from ‘assured destruction’ to ‘graduated deterrence’ has not been adequately registered in strategic commentaries, with most commentators continuing to believe that India’s nuclear doctrine continues to be one of retaliation of a massive order.
In case the sub para (ii) of the press release (reproduced above) is being over-interpreted and meanings not meant to be derived are being arrived at here, then it points to the element of confusion induced by the press release - referred to in the introductory paragraph of this article. There is, therefore, a need to clarify to the strategic community, the interested public and indeed, more importantly, to potential adversaries, exactly what is intended. In case India’s nuclear deterrence is in accord with the popularly subscribed view in the strategic community, then the words ‘first strike’ would require to be substituted by ‘first use’ in a review of the doctrine. In such a case, the official doctrine requires to reiterate the Draft’s wordings that “India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable” (Para 4.1) for any form of nuclear ‘first use’.
Such a critique is not mere hair-splitting for these terms have specific definitions and are not inter-changeable. For the distinction, a resort to noted nuclear pundit Lawrence Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy is in order. ‘First strike’ is the opening volley directed against largely counter-force targets with the intent of crippling the adversary’s means of nuclear retaliation.3 This would amount to nuclear first use of a high order against which massive retaliation would be rational, politically acceptable and legitimate.
First strike is, however, not necessarily the only manner of nuclear first use. A sub-first strike level of nuclear first use is feasible and may even be rational and legally and politically sustainable in the circumstance of the conflict. Against such a form of nuclear first use, such as against military forces that threaten the nuclear threshold of a belligerent, ‘assured retaliation’, may not be the best response option and most certainly should not be the sole response option. On receipt of a nuclear first use by the enemy not amounting to ‘first strike’, several factors would impact nuclear decision making. These include the aspect of self-deterrence; the need for proportionality and discrimination in keeping with the laws of armed conflict; escalatory potential of response options; international pressures; economy of force considerations; need for equivalence between the crime and punishment; and the need to win subsequent peace. Therefore, ‘flexible response’ has much to recommend it. If this is the nuclear doctrine India has apparently moved to, it requires acknowledging this explicitly.
It needs to be highlighted that the possibility of a shift away from ‘assured destruction’ through ‘massive retaliation’ was already thoughtfully worked into the Draft (Para 2.4) in the following manner:
“India's peace time (Italics added) posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:
(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat; and
(b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.”
Interestingly, the term ‘massive’ has not been used in the Draft but finds mention in the press release. That it has not been used in the Draft indicates that retaliation need not have ‘massive’ connotations, so long as its quantum would make it ‘unacceptable’ to the aggressor. ‘Punitive retaliation’ to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage does not necessarily require massive retaliation. Therefore, the quantum of retaliation was left as a matter of political and operational choice to be dictated by the circumstance. The decision maker is thus not constrained in the options available for nuclear retaliation, which could be massive while not being necessarily so.
This is evident from the fact that the Draft does not mention the nature of the retaliation during war time, restricted as it is to the projection of the posture in peace time. For in-conflict deterrence posture to be different from a peace time posture is sensible and has been catered for in the Draft accordingly. Thus, the Draft has been a precursor for the officially adopted doctrine and there is an element of continuity between the two. The nature of the deterrent posture in war time not having been reflected on indicates that other options have not been ruled out. The Draft, in not overly restricting the government’s nuclear options, had potentially ruled in ‘flexible response’, which the official nuclear doctrine has virtually accepted. In case this is an incorrect impression, then there is no reason for the word ‘peace time’ to have figured in the Draft. It has evidently been used advisedly and calls for an interpretation along the line contended here.
Such options could include a quid pro quo, quid pro quo plus or a spasmic strike, as posited by General Sundarji.4While the peace time posture would appear to rule these out, the nature of the in-conflict deterrent posture – not having been explicated – cannot be said, ipso facto, to have ruled these out. India’s response is to be dictated by the guiding philosophy given in the Draft as: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Action, informed by such intent, while ruling out quid pro quo, could still countenance a quid pro quo plus response. Since the press release explicitly mentions ‘massive’ retaliation only in case of first strike, it rules in the quid pro quo option also. In effect, India has now a nuclear deterrent posture that potentially rules in ‘flexible response’. This marked shift has not drawn any strategic comment and, on that account, requires deliberation by the strategic community and even perhaps, an elaboration by the National Security Coulcil.
The Draft puts its function to serve only as a guide thus: “Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment (Italics added) of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review (Para 1.6).” That this has been done has been communicated through the press release and, therefore, the same can be taken as authoritative. Since this is the critical source document informing thinking on India’s nuclear deterrence posture, there is a need to clarify exactly what is India’s nuclear posture. Is it ‘assured destruction’? Or, does it rule in ‘flexible response’?
Here it must be acknowledged that the Draft was not to be taken as the government’s position, even though it was released for discussion by the then National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri B Mishra. That it was not the official position was clarified after its release by a senior minister in the NDA government, Shri Jaswant Singh. The Draft can, however, be taken as informing the doctrine officially adopted and explicated in the press release. There are elements of continuities and discontinuities between the two. However, the press release is the authoritative statement and is very clear. That it has, however, given rise to an interpretation at variance with the commonly held notion of Indian deterrence, there is a case for clarifying the issue. To this author, the official doctrine is indeed one positing ‘flexible response’ as evident from its use of ‘first strike’ as against ‘first use’ in the relevant sentence. That this fact has not been registered by the wider strategic community is why the point being raised here for wider debate.
The only fallout from acknowledging the shift would be on India’s position that nuclear weapons are only for deterring. This is not affected in a major way by the shift to ‘flexible response’ since having a menu of options does not degrade deterrence. Instead, an ‘assured destruction’ posture is not credible against enemy nuclear first use of a lower order, such as a counter force attack on invading forces on his own territory. Therefore, there is a case for the shift and acknowledging the shift openly. The strategic commentaries that have largely missed the shift should also reflect on its implications. In this manner the public - that has a right to know in a democratic system - and the enemy - that needs to know as per deterrence theory – would be in a better position to appreciate the nuclear doctrine in the correct perspective.
Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
1.The Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on India’s Nuclear Doctrine is available at:
2. Press release on India’s nuclear doctrine is available at:
3. Freedman, L., Evolution of Nuclear Strategy; London, MacMillan Press, 1989 (2nd Edition), p. 135.
4. Sundarji, K., Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century; New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 2003, pp. 146-153.

Barack Obama's missile defense challenge

Barack Obama's missile defense challengeBy Pavel Podvig 11 November 2008

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
What a difference eight years makes. Following the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a new disarmament initiative that called for reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads apiece. Although that statement was basically ignored--at the time, Washington was embroiled in the recount saga--Putin's proposal remained the official Russian position on disarmament in subsequent years.
Fast-forward to this recent president election. Instead of calling for reductions in nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Barack Obama's victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, he quickly presented Obama with his first major foreign policy test--how to handle the issue of missile defense in Europe, the biggest irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. He also seemed determined to demonstrate that Russia is going to be a difficult and capricious partner for the new U.S. administration.
Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow’s standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system."
So far, the Obama team has shown great care in dealing with the thorny issue of missile defense in Europe. During the campaign, they deliberately avoided making any critical statements on the European system to avoid alienating Polish voters in battleground states such as Pennsylvania. And now that the election is over, we're hearing that they're telling the eager Polish government that their general position on missile defense--it should be deployed only "when the technology is proved to be workable"--applies to the European part of the system as well. This isn't good news for missile defense in Europe, since its technology is "workable" only in a narrow sense, if at all.
Of course, this story is far from over. If the Obama administration decides not to deploy interceptors and radar in Europe, it opens itself to a charge of yielding to Russian pressure--especially from Republicans, for whom missile defense is a signature issue. The plan to deploy missile defense in Europe also has supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic; both governments seem to believe that the presence of U.S. personnel on their soil would provide them a security guarantee far stronger than NATO membership. Finally, Russia isn't exactly interested in seeing the issue disappear: The system presents no threat whatsoever, but the controversy allows the Kremlin to score lots of rhetorical points.
Finding a solution that calms the waters and satisfies everyone won't be easy. But it's not impossible either. One thing the new administration must avoid is getting into a discussion with Russia about whether Washington has the right to deploy its military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, or whether Russia should have the right to veto such a decision. While a legitimate discussion, we know that it's not going to get us anywhere.
Therefore, we need to take the dispute in a different direction. Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow's standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system. The offer still seems to be on the table, although Russia has been far less enthusiastic about it since the United States made clear that this joint system wouldn't replace the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The problem with those sites might seem serious, but it can be solved. A year ago, Washington considered delaying the actual deployment of the interceptors until the ballistic missile threat from Iran (or maybe some other country) becomes evident. Moscow seemed interested, but the United States withdrew the offer. It certainly could be revived now. And I believe such a compromise would satisfy missile defense supporters and skeptics alike and also buy the necessary time to make the issue less sensitive politically. History shows us that once controversy dissipates, legitimate questions can be asked about effectiveness and cost--and on these counts, the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe fails in any sober, independent assessment.
What would remain then is a joint U.S.-Russian project in which both countries would work together to monitor missile tests and satellite launches. It's hard to think of a better legacy of the current missile defense dispute.