Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

Declassified Docs Offer New Revelations of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

Written by The Public Record
Friday, 05 June 2009 20:25
http://www.pubrecord.org/nationworld/933-documents-offer-new-revelations-of-israeli-nuclear-weapons-program.html

Recent Actions by Declassification Panel Show Pattern of CIA Overclassification and Tight Grip on Early Cold War History
New Declassification Releases by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)
During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the few U.S. intelligence organizations to dissent from the Bush administration's allegations of a revved-up Iraqi nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell ignored his own experts, but INR's prescience raised its prestige.
INR also got it right in its forecast of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, according to a recently declassified post-mortem on the U.S. intelligence failure during the October War, published today by the National Security Archive. In the spring of 1973, INR analysts wrote that, absent diplomatic progress in the Middle East, "the resumption of hostilities will become a better than even bet."
INR analysts argued that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would go to war not for specific military objectives, but to take "military action which can be sustained long enough" to get the United States and the Soviet Union strongly involved in the Middle East peace process.
The authors of the October War post-mortem saw the INR estimate as a "case of wisdom lost," because as the signs of conflict unfolded in the fall of 1973, the intelligence establishment forgot those warnings. The post-mortem, which reviewed failures to take into account communications intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), quickly became a secret "best seller" in the intelligence establishment after it was published.
When the Archive filed a mandatory review request for the post-mortem, the CIA denied much of the document, and it took a decision by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in response to the Archive's appeal to reverse the CIA decision and declassify much more of the withheld information. Acting as the court of last resort for mandatory declassification review requests, ISCAP recently reversed other CIA initial denials of documents from the 1960s and 1970s. While it exempted material it regards as sensitive, ISCAP nevertheless found that much of the information denied by the CIA could be declassified without harm to national security.
Among the ISCAP Releases Are:

The U.S. government's first intelligence estimate--a Special National Intelligence Estimate from December 1960--on the purposes of Israeli nuclear activities at a nuclear reactor complex near Beersheba: "We believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort."
Biographical sketches of members of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. For years, the CIA routinely refused to declassify its biographical reporting.
A top secret report from November 1973 on the possibility that Moscow shipped nuclear weapons into Soviet bases in Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war.
A National Intelligence Estimate from April 1986 on "The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups" which found that the "prospects that terrorists will attempt high-level nuclear terrorism" was "low to very low." While the CIA analysts speculated that even the terrorist groups of the 1980s may have had inhibitions against actions that produced civilian mass casualties, they suggested that the inhibitions could erode and that groups "with a different state of mind" could emerge.
ISCAP's decision to declassify these documents is commendable, but the CIA's initial denials suggest that the Agency is following overly restrictive declassification review standards. Just as troubling, the Agency used the CIA Information Act to prevent ISCAP from making a decision on the classification status of a history of early covert operations, "Office of Policy Coordination, 1948-1952."
These CIA examples suggest that the rules and regulations that support the U.S. government secrecy system enable government agencies to follow unreasonably narrow standards. Moreover, as the CIA's action on the covert operations history suggests, laws on the books give the Agency inordinate power to keep the veil of secrecy over important parts of its history. Indeed, President George W. Bush's executive order on secrecy policy, still in force, gives the CIA veto power over ISCAP decisions on intelligence records. These problems point out the need for significant change in the U.S. government's secrecy policy.

The security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

During the last week of April, I visited four cities in Pakistan (Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi). The purpose of the trip was to discuss a December 2008 Center for American Progress report that I coauthored, Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region.
Although this was my first trip to Pakistan, one of the two other colleagues who accompanied me had visited the country on three previous occasions. For two reasons, we had exceptional access to some 60 current and former civilian and military government officials (including a two-hour visit to the ISI headquarters), members of the media and academia, and heads of nongovernmental organizations. First, one of the members of the working group who helped us formulate the report is now the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Second, several of our colleagues from the Center for American Progress have moved into key positions in the Obama administration. Moreover, since we aren't in government, it was easier for us to challenge the bromides that some officials peddle.
Before the visit, I knew Pakistan was facing several critical political, economic, and security problems. Still, there were some hopeful signs: Pakistan held free and fair elections in February 2008; the country has an independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society and media; and the Obama administration and Congress were finally making U.S. relations with Pakistan a priority.
That said, the day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today's Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order.
After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn't about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.
The trip reinforced my belief that Pakistan has a great many political, economic, and social problems that prevent it from achieving its full potential. But the majority of the population wants the duly constituted government to fulfill its responsibilities to promote the general welfare and provide for the common defense. They aren't looking to some outside force such as the Taliban to assume control of the country and solve these problems. Unlike Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban in Pakistan isn't seen as a group capable of imposing order on a chaotic situation. Rather, the Taliban is seen as an organization trying to upset the existing order. For instance, the majority of the Pakistani population urged the government to take forceful action against the Taliban when it reneged on its agreement in the Swat District.
Moreover, at this time, the Pakistani Army has no desire to seize political power, nor will it let the Taliban take control of Pakistan proper or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country. The army knows that if it staged a coup at this time, it would become responsible for all of the country's economic and social problems.
Likewise, the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan, even if it keeps a large contingent on the border with India. Since the army knows that the collateral damage--including creating refugees--would be significant if it uses force, it won't take action until ordered to do so by the prime minister and the Parliament.
I'm also convinced that Pakistan's nuclear weapons won't be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents. This sentiment is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, and Adm. Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president himself. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Obama said, "We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals."
Why? Because even though the program originally was started by a civilian, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the 1970s, the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India's large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That's exactly why it's currently increasing its nuclear arsenal. In addition, over the past three years, Washington has made a $100-million investment to improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon safeguards. (The Pakistanis won't let us see how this money was spent because they fear that we will use this information to disable the nukes.)
It's also important to note that Islamabad's intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army's control. In fact, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, once headed the ISI, and the high-level officials in that agency are all his appointees and thus, very loyal to him.
Lastly, the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won't let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons.
Given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don't buy it at this time.

2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Rising Tide Of Militancy Feeds Fears About Pakistan's Nukes - Radio Free Europe

Rising Tide Of Militancy Feeds Fears About Pakistan's Nukes - Radio Free Europe

A worker in Islamabad cleans a bas-relief of the Chaghi Mountains, where Pakistan conducted its atomic explosions in 1998.
April 24, 2009
By Ron Synovitz
Advisers to U.S. President Barack Obama's administration say their worst security nightmare is the possibility that Pakistan -- a nuclear-armed country -- might fall under the control of Al-Qaeda militants.Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani insists that no group will be allowed to challenge the authority of the government. Pakistani officials also insist that the country's nuclear arsenal is secure.But U.S. officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week highlighted concerns about the security situation in Pakistan. Clinton described advances by Islamic militants in Pakistan as a "mortal threat" to the security and safety of the world.George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says he has never been more concerned about the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamist extremists."I would say that I thought [the threat] was exaggerated -- that there were 10 or 12 other [threats] in Pakistan that were more probable and were also very grave -- [but] it's gotten much worse in the last few years, and you have a sense of parts of Pakistan now becoming ungovernable by the Pakistani state," Perkovich says. "Today I'm feeling like we really, really have to focus on the nuclear danger in a way that I wouldn't have said was the case until recently. It's not an exaggeration to say that there is a risk."Locked Up Tight?Most experts say they have no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now under tight control by Pakistan's Strategic Plan Division -- the security structure headed by 58-year-old General Khalid Kidwai and intended to keep the weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic militants, Al-Qaeda scientists, or Indian saboteurs. Jeff Lightfoot, assistant director of the Atlantic Council's program on international security, says he is not so worried about militants obtaining Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the army's current system of safeguards. Lightfoot tells RFE/RL that he sees the recent extremist advances as a danger primarily to Pakistan itself -- and by extension, the wider region with Afghanistan and India.He describes "the greatest threat" as a "gradual bleeding of Pakistani authority" that would leave large parts of the country outside central government control. Lightfoot calls the military the "glue of the country" but questions its ability to demonstrate that it can control and defend Pakistan's borders and ensure sovereignty, something he labels "an ideology problem.""In terms of the nuclear weapons and them falling into the hands of terrorists, the army may not necessarily be able to control all of Pakistan," Lightfoot adds, "but I don't think that necessarily translates into a breakdown of their nuclear-weapons command-and-control system."Key FigurePerkovich says current safeguards should ensure that any possible collapse of the civilian government in Islamabad would not affect the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons -- at least, he says, as long as General Kidwai remains in control."The civil government is not relevant to the control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan; it is entirely an army issue," Perkovich says. "We do have a strong sense that [Pakistan's nuclear weapons] are controlled by elements in the army that have been selected and are reliable. As long as that control by this current military leadership remains strong, then I think one can have pretty good confidence that these weapons won't be used crazily."But Perkovich says his concern centers around what could happen if pro-Islamist elements within Pakistan's military and security forces turned against Kidwai."The risk on the nuclear side is that the country falls apart or has a civil war that the bad guys win," Perkovich says. "The fear comes if there is a coup within the military so that, somehow, the people now in charge within the military get dispossessed of their nuclear weapons by other people in the military who would be less responsible."To that "first fear," however, Perkovich adds another alarming scenario: "The second fear is [if] there is basically just a takeover by the Taliban and somehow the military crumbles and flees."Guessing GameThe size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is classified information in Islamabad. Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been careful not to disclose the exact number or locations of its nuclear weapons. Estimates by experts and researchers range from around 50 nuclear weapons to as many as 150. Former President General Pervez Musharraf declared in 2007 that the weapons were in a "disassembled state" -- most likely meaning that the warheads were kept separately from the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to targets as far away as New Delhi, India.General Kidwai has said that the nuclear warheads could be assembled very quickly with land- and air-delivery systems.Seth Jones, a political scientist who is currently in Pakistan doing research for the RAND Corporation, tells RFE/RL that Pakistan has "dozens" of nuclear weapons dispersed in or near major cities throughout the country. He says that his recent visits to nuclear facilities in Pakistan suggest the country's weapons are still in a disassembled state."I've visited a number of the nuclear facilities [in Pakistan] and I'm fairly confident that security procedures are actually pretty good," Jones says. "The ones I've visited have included sites that hold fissile material and also that hold ballistic-missile technology -- where one could put nuclear weapons on and [that] would give Pakistan a range to target countries like India if there was an exchange."He likens those facilities to "what one might see in China or, frankly, in the United States."Dangerous PrecedentWith his firsthand views of security for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Jones says he is most concerned about how a destabilized government in Pakistan might promote the spread of nuclear-weapons technology out of the country or to Al-Qaeda militants."In most of these scenarios, still, the likelihood that nuclear weapons are going to be used or come in the hands of militants or terrorists is highly unlikely," Jones says. But he is quick to add that "where one might get concerned...is elements of the A.Q. Khan network that were involved in building Pakistan's atomic capability -- a range of scientists that have proliferated nuclear material to North Korea, Iran, and several other places."In that respect, he cites a lesson that was learned under previous leadership in Islamabad, before the international community was fretting publicly about any "existential threat" to the Pakistani state posed by extremists. "We know in the past that there have been talks between members of the A.Q. Khan network and militants, including Al-Qaeda several years ago," Jones says. "So is it possible that some technology at some point falls into the hands of terrorists? I think that's a more likely scenario than actual nuclear weapons coming out of [the Pakistan army's] control."


Comments

by: Saul from: Canada
April 27, 2009 17:42
There goes the USA establishment, Pentagon, CIA and its media again. 1st Iraq on WMDs and now another Muslim country on false pretext of Nukes falling in the hands of extremists in Pakistan. Wow! The web of lies - ain't all of us familiar with them now? Most of the Western, especially US analysts, have no idea how big Pakistan is and how diverse. Besides, nukes are not like laptops that can be stolen by criminals. The way false image is being created about that poor country leads me to believe that there is far more realistic danger lurking in the dark with respect to nukes. I am 100% convinced that US establishment, Pentagon and CIA are, in collusion with Israeli and Indian lobbies, planning a small nuke attack on the US soil or somewhere in Europe, blame it on Pakistan, move against it unilaterally and try to destroy it. I hope I am proven wrong, but this is my prediction - A staged, concocted drama to destroy another Muslim country.

by: Dolmance from: Mexico City
April 27, 2009 14:47
Let's hope the parallels between Obama and FDR don't go beyond the new President having to fix a broken American economy with a big, nasty war. Has anyone done a study of what would happen environmentally speaking if say India and Pakistan exchanged nuclear missiles? Because I really cannot see a nuclear armed Al Qaida not using every weapon at it's disposal.

by: ibsteve2u from: U.S. of A.
April 27, 2009 14:33
On the other hand, imagine how much of the world felt - knowing that our nuclear football was constantly next to somebody who didn't require actual proof of misdeeds to attack another sovereign nation.I'm a rather gung-ho American, but not to the point of ignoring the fact that we don't all live in the same reality around the world.(P.S. Speaking of differing realities: Who was it that sold the Pakistanis the hardware to design and build those nukes, again?)

by: Fraz Haider from: Rawalpindi
April 26, 2009 12:42
A country which can build, maintain and improve its nuclear arsenal against all odds has all the capability to ensure that this capability remains in safe and capable hand. Secretary Clinton’s description this weak regarding situation in Pakistan is the issue of perception or misperception.Mr George Perkovich of Carnegie Endowment is a respected scholar, my suggestion to him would be to stop worrying about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rather he should worry about the US weapons which could be found missing for hours, the sensitive nuclear weapons components and technology which can land up in a different country with that country demanding it and those nuclear facilities those have been recently reported by USNRC as below acceptable safety and security standards as stipulated in the US EPA 2005. Terrorism or extremism in this region is the gift of a friend who masters in stabbing in the back. These people being most feared by the west were created, supported and funded to achieve the objective of breaking up of the former Soviet Union and some other objectives of the regional players. Now once they do not serve any good purpose to the west they are being portrayed as most fearsome creatures on God’s earth. Not that I or most of Pakistani have any soft corner for them or their ideology is appreciated or have any sympathy for them, but one thing I am sure that we Pakistanis can handle them ourselves. My sincere advice to our so called friends would be to stay away from our internal affairs and stop using Pakistan as a ladder for achieving their own objectives.Notwithstanding the above, I am appreciative of Mr Jeff lightfoot, George Perkovich and Seth Jones views on Pakistan’s Command and Control System and the ability of its armed forces to take a good care of Nation’s ‘Crown Jewel’. However fears and concerns highlighted by Mr Perkovich are all about future, which is unpredictable and uncertain. If for a moment it is believed that the concerns are right and logical may I ask about thousands of much more capable nukes in the hands of possibly extremist Christians or Hindus or that matter any other religion in the world. To me this is all about gaining a ‘Total Global Dominance’ as some time back a former National Security Advisor of the US, Brizensky advised to the US in his book ‘Grand Chase Board’.Visiting a Pakistani facility may not be Seth Jones dream only but many other in the US also have similar desires. May I draw your attention towards and incident which happened to a BBC correspondent about two decades back once he tried to get close to one of the site? No one except those whose business is can get close to a site what to talk of a facility housing fissile material or missile technology. Those, in this business anywhere in the world would exactly know what it means. Hence it can be easily concluded that both the claim mentioned in the story 1) Seth Jones is in Pakistan and 2) he has visited any site are baseless, misleading and with designs. Being a patriotic Pakistani I am confident that we can handle our problems our self as all nations in the world do. Therefore no one should interfere with our affairs. As regards a comment regarding destruction plan of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by the US is concerned, I would say only one thing “Anyone who tries any misadventure would dig its own grave’
by: umer from: lahore
April 25, 2009 13:13
such articles add to the already held strong perception that US, UK and india are invloved in conspiracy to get hold on Pakistan's nukes and this perception is certainly not helping Pakistan or the Western interests!anyways, the bottom line is, Keep Dreaming :) as Pakistan would keep hold of its nukes, come what may

by: Zoltan from: Hungary
April 24, 2009 16:43
I hope the United Sates is preparing to destroy the whole nuclear arsenal of Pakistan if militants gain control of the country.This Pakistani case shows us that permiting an islamic country to have nuclear weapon is a threat to the civilized world.

Ukraine arrests 3 in radioactive material sale

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Ukrainian security agents have arrested a regional lawmaker and two companions for trying to sell a radioactive substance that could be used in making a dirty bomb, officials said Tuesday.
The legislator in the western Ternopyl region and two local businessmen were detained last week for trying to sell 8.2 pounds (3.7 kilograms) of radioactive material to an undercover agent of the security service, said Marina Ostapenko, a spokeswoman for the service.
The suspects tried to peddle the substance as plutonium-239, a highly radioactive material that can be used to build nuclear weapons, and demanded $10 million, Ostapenko said.
But security experts later determined that the material was likely americium, a widely used radioactive material. Ostapenko said it could be used in a dirty bomb, but not nuclear weapons.
The service said in a statement it believes the material was produced in Russia during the Soviet era and smuggled into Ukraine through a neighboring country.
Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons after the Soviet Union's collapse. However, concerns remain over the existence of unsecured radioactive materials here and in other ex-Soviet republics, where safety rules are often neglected and corruption is rampant.
(This version CORRECTS that security officials say the substance was not plutonium.)

insight: Rethinking the alliance —Ejaz Haider

The US cannot be trusted as an honest broker between India and Pakistan. Its tilt towards India is very clear and its policies and approach towards Pakistan are a clear proof of thatCheck out the text of the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act of 2009, officially titled HR 1886, introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) on April 2 and currently referred to the committee. (see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1886)If this bill did not relate to a serious issue in the backdrop of a very grim situation facing Pakistan and this region, one might have dismissed it as a bad joke. While it would be an essential exercise to deconstruct it clause by clause to lay bare its intent, and one hopes the Foreign Office will do exactly that, it is important here to at least point to what is obvious.First, the bill and some of its clauses, especially those pertaining to India’s interest, are the work of Indian lobbying. That, one should, without any grudge, say is excellent work from India’s perspective. Equally, one might ask what effort, if any, was made by us to thwart India’s designs.The question, however, is this: should the United States be dealing with Pakistan on the basis of its (US) interests or India’s? The question, at this stage, assumes quite arbitrarily that US interests vis-à-vis Pakistan may be different from India’s. Increasing evidence may even put paid to this assumption but for now we shall not touch upon that.One may also assume that given the Obama administration’s own rhetoric, the US faces a grave threat in the region, which it cannot tackle without Pakistan’s help. Logically this means that the US should be trying to find points of convergence with Pakistan. Coming up with a bill that does not even purport to hide its India tilt is a strange way of doing that.Let’s consider Sec 4, Declaration of Principles, Clause 6, sub-clauses (H), (I), (J) and (K), in reverse order.Sub-clause (J) of the bill requires Pakistan “not to support any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other activities meant to instil fear or terror in India”. This could have been drafted by India. But let’s deconstruct it. Seems fine; no? The fine-print is a different story. Given terrorist attacks within Pakistan and the degree of difficulty in tackling the menace, how can Pakistan be expected to ensure India will not be attacked and how would it be determined, and by whom, that Pakistan is “allowing” some groups to attack India — New Delhi?Once again, we are not even getting into the issue of what India might be doing and how might it be funding and supporting not just the Baloch nationalists but also those terrorist groups that are attacking security forces in FATA and elsewhere.As I wrote in this space last Saturday (“Terrorism and its discontents”; Daily Times, April 4) in relation to our discussion at an India-Pakistan conference in Bangkok, “What is...troublesome...is determining whether blame for a particular terrorist act can be laid at the door of the state of Pakistan. How and who is to trace the spoor; who would determine the intent behind the exercise and what role is [India’s] domestic politics likely to play in such an exercise, as it did during and after Mumbai?”This conditionality means Pakistan will always be the villain until it proves itself innocent. Do we want the money and this assistance, notwithstanding its apparent generosity, with this conditionality? I don’t know about official Pakistan but as far as I am concerned, no.Consider sub-clause (K) of the bill. It binds Pakistan “to ensure access of United States investigators to individuals suspected of engaging in worldwide proliferation of nuclear materials, and restrict such individuals from travel or any other activity that could result in further proliferation”.Well...Dr AQ Khan again! That episode, gentlemen, is over. Dr Khan has been sidelined and punished; Pakistan has taken measures to ensure that no one can do such a thing again; other states whose nationals were involved in the racket have still to come clean on what was going on; proliferation is an area where all nuclear weapon states have some blot on them, and that includes the US; credible reports from US experts have proven proliferation by India and so on, thank you.And yes, like the US, we like to try our defaulters ourselves.Sub-clauses (H) and (I) of the bill require Pakistan “not to provide any support, direction, guidance to, or acquiescence in the activities of any person or group that engages in any degree in acts of violence or intimidation against civilians, civilian groups, or governmental entities”; and “to redouble its efforts to prevent the presence of the Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups in Pakistan that support insurgents in Afghanistan”.Very well. Once again, who will determine that Pakistan is successfully and/or sincerely doing this? Given the complexity of what is happening in this region and the different and differing interests of various players, what benchmarks are to be used by the US to make such a determination?As I mentioned above, there is much sting in this bill and the FO will have the occasion to go clause by clause to debate that and formulate an appropriate response. But one thing should be clear: the US cannot be trusted as an ally that can act as an honest broker between India and Pakistan. Its tilt towards India is very clear and its policies and approach towards Pakistan are a clear proof of that.I shall have occasion to get to that in a subsequent piece. But this bill is a piece of legislation that Pakistan must reject categorically and unequivocally. More than that, however, we need to rethink our terms of alliance with the US and for that we need to develop a coherent national response.Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

Cricket Terrorism in Lahore

Missile Defence

Missile defense in IndiaBy Bharath Gopalaswamy 27 February 2009
Article Highlights
Recently, Indian officials approached the United States about purchasing a missile defense shield.
New Delhi's once casual interest in missile defense has intensified as its regional threats have increased.
The United States believes that a strong New Delhi can help protect U.S. assets in South Asia and counterbalance China. A few weeks ago, Indian officials held preliminary talks with the United States about purchasing a missile defense shield from it. "India is a partner of ours, and we want to provide it with whatever it needs to protect itself," a U.S. official told the Financial Times. Already, Indian officials and scientists have witnessed some simulations of the U.S. missile defense system, along with a couple of live tests. Washington even has offered to sell the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system to India.India's interest in strategic missile defense dates back to 1983 when New Delhi initiated an "Integrated Missile Development Program." The program included not only offensive missiles such as the nuclear-capable Prithvi and Agni, but also the Akash, a surface-to-air missile that had the potential to provide India with theater missile defense capabilities. Later in the 1990s, India's Defence Research & Development Organization and the country's military discussed initiating conceptual missile defense studies. Around the same time, the Indian military had a few conversations with Israel and Russia about how they could help New Delhi advance its air defense systems. Although such talk clearly demonstrated an Indian interest in missile defense, it was confined to professional military officers and low-level bureaucrats.The interest of India's elected leadership intensified a few years later, their support growing for a variety of reasons. First, 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan turned Pakistan into a U.S. ally, triggering speculation that the Pakistani government might be overturned by anti-American Islamic fundamentalists who would then control Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. And if Pakistani nuclear weapons fell into such hands, India feared it might be the first target.Secondly, some in India believe that a domestic missile defense capability might be able to check Pakistan more generally. Ever since Islamabad obtained nuclear weapons, it has emboldened its strategy of supporting insurgencies within India to settle outstanding political differences--i.e., Kashmir. Missile defense, the argument goes, would prove instrumental in providing New Delhi reassurance and protection since Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be countered both offensively and defensively.Finally, few countries in the world face the missile threats that India does. Of course, there's Pakistan and its Ghauri and Shaheen missile series--both of which possess ranges longer than 1,000 kilometers. But there's also nearby China, a fellow nuclear-armed state equipped with DF-21 missiles that can travel more than 2,000 kilometers. So it's no surprise that the upper-echelons of the Indian government have begun to show significant interest in defense technologies that can, at least theoretically, combat such threats.A ballistic missile flight from Sargodha, Pakistan, could reach New Delhi in about 5-7 minutes. As such, Indian missile defense proponents envision the system working as follows: A technically complex and vast constellation of early warning sensors would detect the missile immediately after it is launched. This part of the system is already more or less in place; the Green Pine radar, which India purchased from Israel around 2002 and is situated about 200 kilometers north of New Delhi, can detect a missile 90 seconds after it has been launched--at least on a preliminary basis. The next step is to determine whether the signal picked up by the radar is that of an incoming missile or a false alarm.Complicating matters is that India and Pakistan share a border, making for shorter ballistic missile flights. For example, the estimated total missile flight times are 8-13 minutes for ranges of 600-2,000 kilometers. The flight times can be even less if the missile is flown in a depressed trajectory.Such a short time period places stringent conditions on procedures for evaluating and verifying warnings. There would be no time to consult or deliberate after receiving this warning. In other words, any response would have to be predetermined, presenting a significant likelihood of accidental nuclear war from false alarms.Oddly, despite such potentially catastrophic consequences, in India the debate about missile defense has become a debate about India's burgeoning ties with Washington as a part of New Delhi's "Next Steps in Security Partnership"--a 2002 diplomatic initiative between the United States and India to expand their cooperation in civilian nuclear activities and civilian space programs, along with broadening their dialogue on missile defense to promote nonproliferation and to ease the transfer of advanced technologies to India.For the United States, missile defense initially was only one aspect of its budding bilateral relationship with New Delhi. But over time missile defense has come to represent something larger in the relationship. Quite simply, it represents Washington's implicit support for India against Pakistan, without, of course, supporting an explicit Indian recourse to offensive military strategies. Along these lines, there's every reason to expect the United States to continue to be supportive of India's emergence as a counterweight to China.Ultimately, technology will decide the operational capability of missile defense in India. But for the time being, it can be assumed that New Delhi's decisions with regard to missile defense are strongly linked to the changing tenor of U.S.-Indian relations. http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-india